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Unexpected usage of user data has made headlines as both governments and commercial 
entities have encountered privacy-related issues. Like other social networking sites, 
LinkedIn provides users to restrict access to their information or allow for public 
viewing; information available in the public view was used unexpectedly (i.e., profiling). 
A non-profit entity called ICWATCH used tools to gather information on government 
mass surveillance programs by scraping publicly accessible user data from LinkedIn. 
Previous research has shown that privacy concerns influence behavior intention in 
contrived scenarios. What remains unclear is whether LinkedIn users, whose data was 
scraped by ICWATCH (an actual situation), would have similar privacy concerns and 
subsequently express the intent to take privacy-preserving action.  
 
This study proposed to answer three research questions in the context of an actual 
privacy-centric situation, using an explanatory sequential mixed methods design. First, 
what is the user's disposition towards privacy? Second, to what extent does this influence 
users' privacy concerns regarding the inclusion of their LinkedIn profile information 
within ICWATCH? Third, to what extent do these concerns influence their stated 
intention to modify their LinkedIn profile/settings to minimize/eliminate this inclusion? 
The two-phase approach performed quantitative analysis on collected survey data, 
followed by analysis on follow-up interview data to provide context.  
 
The resulting analyses found significant support for each hypothesis and divergence of 
underlying factors between degrees of the hypotheses and variable representations. Those 
participants who were not inclined to privacy and were not concerned with the situation, 
as expected, did not intend to modify their LinkedIn profile. However, they did express 
underlying factors such as control and privacy risk belief, unlike their counterparts. Those 
participants who were more inclined and more concerned about the situation did express 
an intent to modify their profile and revealed underlying factors such as regulations and 
usage. The findings support the extension of the existing literature onto actual privacy-
centric situations. The results also highlight challenges with population demographics in 
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     The availability of personal information on the Internet has broad implications as it 
relates to individual privacy. Dinev et al. (2008) note survey results where participants 
reveal that "Privacy is among the highest of individual rights," falling between freedom 
of speech and freedom of religion (p. 215). Warren and Brandeis (1890) defined privacy 
as the right to be left alone, which has been foundational for privacy research (Christin et 
al., 2011; Conger et al., 2013; Dinev et al., 2013; Miltgen & Peyrat-Guillard, 2014; 
Pavlou, 2011; Smith et al., 2011; Spiekermann & Cranor, 2009; Xu, Dinev et al., 2011). 
Building on this, Pavlou provides a consumer definition of privacy as the right not to be 
disturbed, and more specifically, not to have personal information used for purposes other 
than those for which the data was initially submitted. Concerns related to information 
privacy are increasingly prevalent due to the volume of information collected, 
transmitted, and stored by organizations (with and without consent), whose intentions are 
not always evident (Rusk, 2014; Schwaig et al., 2013). Pavlou notes that "Specifically, 
the tension between the proper use of personal information and information privacy has 
been touted as one of the most serious ethical debates of the information age" (p. 977). 




commercial entities. For example, data-dependent organizations such as Google, 
Facebook, and Amazon are particularly vulnerable to privacy-related concerns. Each has 
recently encountered privacy matters ranging from Facebook and Google's use of 
targeted raced-based advertising (Maheshwari & Isaac, 2016) or keywords (Miller, 
2013), respectively, and Amazon's use of dynamic pricing purportedly based on customer 
data (Martinez, 2016). Miltgen and Smith (2015) note that, "Ironically, it appears that 
consumer concerns associated with surveillance, reported extensively during 2013 and 
2014, are being directed more at commercial than government data interchanges" (p. 
741). 
     Current research is replete with studies and polls highlighting opinions regarding 
various privacy concerns (PCON). Miltgen and Smith (2015) conducted polls indicating 
70% of respondents expressing concerns regarding online tracking and profiling. 
Wakefield (2013) noted multiple surveys where 70-90% of respondents expressed 
concerns about privacy (i.e., increasing part of modern life, secondary use, access, and 
willingness to disclose). Bansal and Zahedi (2014) cite surveys where 93% of 
respondents were concerned about privacy in online transactions and other polls where 
two-thirds of United States citizens were concerned about the threat hackers and 
criminals posed to privacy. Recent studies have also noted privacy concerns related to 
online social networks (OSN). Jiang et al. (2013) reported that 33% of respondents were 
concerned about personal privacy loss in online social interactions. The user privacy 
concerns associated with social networking's situational aspects are explored in this 
research, explicitly that of user data being scraped from LinkedIn and posted to a third-




     This research's relevant aspect is that user information shared with social media 
services is not limited to just that service. For instance, governments conduct or propose 
to conduct social media profiling for a variety of purposes, including vetting foreign 
nationals, vetting individuals for approval of security clearances (U.S. Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence [ODNI], 2016), criminal activity (Joy, 2016), and 
fraudulent welfare recipients (Farrell, 2016). Commercial entities also use consumer data 
from social media. A U.S. Federal Trade Commission (2014) report indicated that 
commercial entities use social media data to enhance activities such as marketing (direct, 
online, and analytics), risk mitigation (identify verification and fraud detection), and 
people search, often without consumer knowledge. Subsequently, private entities, such as 
ICWATCH, also use social media information for profiling. Specifically: 
ICWATCH is a project to collect and analyze resumes of people working in the 
intelligence community. People working for intelligence contractors, the military, 
and intelligence agencies frequently mention secret codewords and surveillance 
programs in public resumes. These resumes are useful for uncovering new 
surveillance programs, learning more about known codewords, identifying which 
companies help with which surveillance programs, examining trends in the 
intelligence community, and more. (ICWATCH Surveillance, 2015) 
The researcher designed this study to investigate the level of an individual's disposition to 
value privacy (DTVP), how this influences situation-specific Internet privacy concerns 
(SIPC) related to the information being scraped and posted by a third-party from 
LinkedIn, and ultimately, how this disposition influences the user's behavioral intention 





     The effect of privacy concerns in actual OSN usage (or continued usage) is poorly 
understood. While the literature has clearly shown that users’ privacy concerns will 
influence their intended behavior in contrived scenarios, some indicate that users often 
behave in ways not necessarily reflected in their stated privacy concerns and attitudes. Xu 
and Gupta (2009) note an ongoing disagreement relating to the predictive reliability of 
intention. Pavlou (2011) cites additional privacy complexities, including the lack of a 
unified concept of information privacy, as well as how, "The role of context shapes the 
meaning and conceptualization of information privacy" (p. 980). There is no support for 
whether the linkage between privacy concerns and behavior intention is congruent with 
actual privacy situations. 
     If an individual's behavior related to privacy concerns can be unpredictable, it is 
essential to understand why. Contributing factors encompass various constructs and 
theories used in the literature and privacy's contextual and paradoxical aspects. Privacy 
studies contain a variety of constructs, including computer anxiety (Osatuyi, 2015), 
disposition (Li, 2014), perceived anonymity (Jiang et al., 2013), privacy concerns (Jiang 
et al., 2013; Li & Unger, 2012; Mao & Zhang, 2013; Miltgen & Smith, 2015; Schwaig et 
al., 2013; Xu et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2013), self-esteem (Schwaig et al., 2013), trust 
(Zhou, 2015), and website reputation (Li, 2014). Privacy studies have also employed 
numerous theories, including the big five personality model (Osatuyi, 2015), cognitive 
consistency theory (Wakefield, 2013), control agency perspective (Xu et al., 2012), 
innovation diffusion theory (Luo et al., 2013), justice theory (Zhou, 2011), privacy 




2014), social contract (Li et al., 2011), technology acceptance model (TAM) (Mao & 
Zhang, 2013), theory of planned behavior (Benson et al., 2015), theory of reasoned action 
(TRA) (Bansal et al., 2016; Bensen et al., 2015), and utility theory (Bansal & Zahedi, 
2014). However, there is little representation across these constructs and theories in an 
existing/actual situation; it is not clear if these are applicable in actuality. 
     Many studies have also explored the contextual and situational aspects of privacy and 
its paradoxical nature. Throughout the literature, specific websites establish the context 
(i.e., financial, health, social media, travel) (Bansal et al., 2016; Bansal et al. 2010; Li et 
al., 2011; Li, 2014; Wakefield et al., 2011; Xu, Divev et al., 2011), type of website (i.e., 
chat, health, social media) (Bansal et al., 2010; Benson et al., 2015; Osatuyi, 2015), 
and/or type of service (i.e., location-aware marketing; location-based services, mobile 
commerce, mobile office) (Luo et al., 2013; Mao & Zhang, 2013; Xu et al., 2012; Xu, 
Luo et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 2013). Manipulating elements through experimentation 
allows for assessing situational aspects (Kayhan & Davis, 2016; Li et al., 2011). 
Wakefield (2013) notes that "Marketing researchers have coined the term, 'privacy 
paradox,' to describe the consumer who is reluctant to provide personal information yet 
succumbs to organizational requests for personal data" (p. 159). Multiple studies have 
explored this phenomenon in a variety of settings, including e-commerce (Wakefield, 
2013; Xu, Luo et al., 2011), financial (Xu, Dinev et al., 2011), healthcare (Xu, Dinev et 
al., 2011), news services (Li & Unger, 2012), and social networking (Xu, Dinev et al., 
2011). However, as noted earlier, these approaches are not actual situations; all are 




     The privacy problem continues to grow, "As the reliance on web-based systems for 
delivery of services increases, privacy concern related to disclosing various types of 
personal information online gains prominence" (Bansal et al., 2010, p. 146). Most 
recently, Facebook was sued for the improper access to the data of 87 million users by 
Cambridge Analytica (Balsamo & Liedtke, 2018), while Google was also fined $57 
million due to improper disclosure of data collection across services (for personalized 
advertising) (Satariano, 2019). Hong and Thong (2013) note that, "The increase in 
digitalized personal information and advances in Internet technologies pose new 
challenges to consumers' information privacy" (p. 13). As noted by Dinev (2014), another 
contributing factor is the paradoxical behavior of people stating their concerns about 
privacy as they continue to share their personal information, which may be illustrated by 
Facebook's rise in daily active users over 2018 (Isaac, 2019). Complicating this further is 
a lack of clarity of the problem. As Bansal and Zahedi (2014) note, companies hesitate to 
disclose/share breach data due to potential business loss. 
Goals 
     There were three goals for this research study. First, the research results will 
contribute to the literature by providing empirical justification for a relationship between 
privacy concerns and behavior intention in an actual privacy-centric situation. Second, 
the research will justify the appropriateness of the constructs regarding usage in an actual 
situation. Third, the research will also justify scales’ suitability for assessing privacy 
concerns with an actual situation. 
     As defined in multiple reference studies, behavior intention is either an intention to 




& Peyrat-Guillard, 2014; Xu, 2010) or intention to use/continue using (Bansal et al., 
2010; Ku et al., 2013; Li & Unger, 2012; Li, 2014; Mao & Zhang, 2013; Osatuyi, 2015; 
Schwaig et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2013; Zhou, 2015, 2011). Numerous researchers have 
assessed privacy behaviors through experiment (Bansal et al., 2016; Li & Unger, 2012; Li 
et al., 2011) or observed behavior (Chakrabotry et al., 2013; Chen & Sharma, 2012; Jiang 
et al., 2013; Miltgen & Payrat-Guillard, 2014; Zhang et al., 2013). Nevertheless, a gap 
remains between intentions and actual vs. contrived scenarios. This gap merits further 
investigation, as Xu and Gupta (2009) note concerns in the predictive ability of stated 
intentions, drawing from the weak relationship between subjective (self-reported) and 
objective (actual) system usage that Straub et al. (1995) observed. 
     This research further extends the dimensions utilized by Xu et al. (2012), which 
denoted that, “Privacy concerns are context-specific, based in the specifics of by whom, 
why, when, and what type of personal information is being collected, distributed, and 
used” (p. 3) and can vary over time for the same person (Conger et al., 2013). Their 
research extended other research by Li et al. (2011), which posited that the effect of 
general privacy concerns might be less critical than situation-specific ones. The study 
contributed new insights into the situational elements of privacy concern by 
demonstrating its impact on behavior intentions related to a current privacy-centric social 
media situation. 
     While the hypotheses predict (a) a user's disposition towards privacy would influence 
their privacy concern regarding having their information scraped by ICWATCH and (b) 
would declare their intention to take steps to modify their profile to stop sharing the 




part of the research design, participants were divided into outcome groups so that 
interview responses could provide context into the varying degrees of support for each 
variable. However, only the two groups aligned with the full hypothesis support were 
well represented (OG-A and OG-H). 
     This research strengthened the usage of general privacy concern constructs for future 
research streams. The usage of general privacy concern constructs is well represented 
throughout the reference studies, but not in an actual, current privacy-centric situation. 
Multiple studies have used general privacy concern constructs to examine: contrived 
scenarios (Choi & Land, 2016; Kayhan & Davis, 2016), experience with the Internet 
(Dinev & Hart, 2006; Son & Kim, 2008), experience with a specific site (Min & Kim, 
2015; Ozdemir et al., 2017; Xu, Dinev et al., 2011), and perceptions of a specific site (Li, 
2014; Li et al., 2011). Where the constructs were lacking usage was in an actual (non-
contrived) situation. 
     The research also encouraged increased use of scales for DTVP (aka general privacy 
concerns) and situational privacy concerns. Kayhan and Davis (2016) used existing scales 
for DTVP to study its influence on Internet privacy concerns via contrived scenarios. 
Others used similar techniques for examining experiences with a specific site (Xu, Dinev 
et al., 2011) and perceptions of a specific site (Li, 2014). Researchers also used the 
existing scales to evaluate situational privacy concerns and their influence on behavior 
via experience with the Internet (Dinev & Hart, 2006; Son & Kim, 2008) and experience 
with specific sites/services (Min & Kim, 2015; Ozdemir et al., 2017). Again, where the 




Questions and Hypotheses 
     Studies by Kayhan and Davis (2016) and Li (2014) served as a basis for constructing 
the research framework for this study. As part of their research models, both studies 
evaluated the relationship between DTVP and contextual privacy concerns. Kayhan and 
Davis assessed the influence of DTVP on situational privacy concerns using contrived 
scenarios. Li evaluated the relationship between DTVP and site-specific privacy 
concerns. Li also investigated the relationship between site-specific privacy concerns and 
behavioral intention (i.e., privacy-preserving behavior). The research focused on 
evaluating three questions, supporting the simplified framework shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1  
Research Model 
 
Note. As each of these control variables was categorical, each category was modeled as dummy 
(binary) variables; age used five dummy variables, and sex used two.  Four dummy variables (30-
39, 20-29, <20, and female) had insufficient analysis samples. 
1. What is the user’s disposition towards privacy (DTVP)? 
2. What is the user’s level of privacy concern regarding their information being 




3. To what extent do their concerns influence their intention to continue sharing 
information openly on LinkedIn (BITN)?  
Disposition to Value Privacy (DTVP) 
     DTVP was also studied as a global information privacy concern (GIPC), and general 
privacy concern is a person's general attitude towards privacy. Researchers have 
variously defined DTVP as the desire/need for privacy (Li, 2014), tendency to worry 
about information privacy (Li et al., 2017; Li et al., 2011), tendency to preserve or 
restrain disclosure of private/personal information (Xu, Dinev et al., 2011), or the 
inherent worries about the opportunistic behaviors of providers (Kayhan & Davis, 2016). 
DTVP is not specific to any website or company (Li et al., 2017; Li et al., 2011) or 
specific contexts (Xu, Dinev et al., 2011). DTVP can differ among individuals (Li et al., 
2011) and can influence situation-specific (Kayhan & Davis, 2016) and website-specific 
privacy concerns (Li, 2014). 
Situation-Specific Internet Privacy Concern (SIPC) 
     Unlike DTVP, situation-specific Internet privacy concerns, also studied as Internet 
privacy concerns, are more specific than dispositional (Xu, Dinev et al., 2011). Xu, Dinev 
et al. define internet privacy concerns as an individual's anxiety resulting from privacy 
loss via information disclosure to a website. Others’ definitions focus on information 
flow via a website (Min & Kim, 2015), website or peer misuse of information (Ozdemir 
et al., 2017), effects of opportunistic behaviors related to submitted information (Dinev & 




     Research has demonstrated that DTVP positively affects internet privacy concerns 
(Kayhan & Davis, 2016; Li, 2014; Xu, Dinev et al., 2011). Researchers have used a 
variety of methodologies to establish this effect, including visiting a website followed by 
a survey (Li, 2014), a survey conditional on previous interaction with a type of website 
(Xu, Dinev et al., 2011), and a survey with contrived experiment scenarios (Kayhan & 
Davis, 2016). Kayhan and Davis also found that DTVP positively impacted situational 
privacy concerns in an experimental context manipulating privacy situations (e.g., 
presenting a privacy violation due to inadequate security measures). Considering the 
contiguous support for the positive relationship between DTVP and Internet privacy 
concerns, it should remain valid in an actual privacy-centric situation. Therefore, the first 
hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis One (H1). Disposition to Value Privacy (DTVP) has a positive effect on 
situation-specific Internet privacy concerns (SIPC). 
Behavioral Intention 
     Schwaig et al. (2013) note that privacy concerns influence a user's attitude towards a 
specific information practice and/or intention to use a system. Li (2012) suggests, “That 
an individual's intention to disclose information is based on the comparison of expected 
benefits and perceived risks in a given context” (p. 1). The relationship between privacy 
concern and behavior intention has been studied extensively in the literature. Specific 
examples of intentions influenced by Internet privacy concerns include willingness to 
provide personal information to transact on the Internet (Dinev & Hart, 2006), engage in 




Kim, 2008), and continuous intention to use social network services (SNS) (Min & Kim, 
2015). 
     Numerous studies demonstrate that privacy concerns negatively affect intention to 
disclose/provide personal information (Bansal et al., 2010; Dinev & Hart, 2006; Dinev et 
al., 2008; Li et al., 2017; Li et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 2018; Min & Kim, 2015; Ozdemir 
et al., 2017) and use or continued use of a site or service (Ku et al., 2013; Li, 2014; Mao 
& Zhang, 2013; Schwaig et al., 2013; Xu, 2010). Research has also demonstrated that 
Internet privacy concern negatively affects behavior intention, established through the 
survey methodology (Dinev & Hart, 2006; Min & Kim, 2015; Son & Kim, 2008). Again, 
considering the contiguous support for the negative relationship between Internet privacy 
concerns and behavior intention, it should continue to remain valid in an existing 
situation. Therefore, the second hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis Two (H2). Situation-specific Internet privacy concerns (SIPC) have a 
negative effect on the intention to continue sharing information publicly on LinkedIn 
(BITN). 
Control Variables 
     This study used age and sex as the two control variables. Age was used in 91% of the 
reference studies and placed into the five most categories in the reference studies. Sex 






     The relevance of this research rests on three factors. First, the research trends toward a 
more focused context (i.e., broad to specific). Second, the research focus is a problem 
that continues to grow as a growing body of users contribute data used in unforeseen 
ways. Finally, the literature shows that while privacy concerns influence intended 
behavior, it can also be influenced by other factors (e.g., benefits), neither of which can 
be sufficiently reliable without analysis of actuality analysis. The observed research trend 
in the context of privacy concern supports the relevance of this research. A review of the 
construct-aligned studies shows a clear trend from broad to specific in terms of online 
context, as described in Table 1. For example, one can see a trend starting with privacy 
concerns regarding the Internet (broad) to concerns interacting with Facebook (specific). 
Table 1 
Privacy Concern Research Focus 




2006-2008 Internet, Online 
Companies 
Dinev & Hart, 2006; Dinev et al., 
2008; Son & Kim, 2008 
2010-2014 Website 
Categories 
Bansal et al., 2010; Li, 2014; Li et 
al., 2011; Li & Unger, 2012; Xu, 
Dinev et al., 2011 
2014-2017 Social Media, 
Facebook 
Choi & Land, 2016; Ku et al., 
2013; Li et al., 2017; Min & Kim, 
2015; Osatuyi, 2015; Ozdemir et 
al., 2017 
 
     According to LinkedIn’s website (press.linkedin.com/about-linkedin), the service has 
more than 722 million users. According to the ICWATCH website 
(transparencytoolkit.org/project/icwatch), the system has scraped over 100,000 resumes 




similar rate. In that case, this could add several thousand more resumes each year, not 
including the possibility of continuous monitoring/updating of resumes already scraped, 
potentially exposing the data of hundreds of thousands of individuals. Külcü and 
Henkoğlu (2014) note, 
The main reason for the need to be conscious about the use of social networking 
sites and attaching importance to privacy is the misuse of personal information by 
social networking sites or the misuse of the viewable content by other users. (p. 
761) 
     While research indicates that privacy concerns influence behavior, other research 
suggests that this behavior is subject to change by the perceived benefit resulting from 
sharing information, denoted as the privacy paradox (Xu, Luo et al., 2011). Constructs 
such as the privacy calculus (Li et al., 2011) or privacy tradeoff (Jiang et al., 2013) can 
assess this paradox. User privacy concerns can also be influenced by situational (Kayhan 
& Davis, 2016; Li, 2014) and contextual (Bansal et al., 2016; Xu et al., 2012) factors. 
Another factor contributing to the problem is what information social media users choose 
to share. Cichy et al. (2014) note that privacy may be viewed as a commodity, and users 
may be willing to disclose personal data for reciprocal benefits. However, Osatuyi (2015) 
notes, "Unlike on social media platforms, customers on e-commerce sites are not required 
to disclose their personal information to complete transactions" (p. 11). What users 
choose to share may also change over time, as Bansal et al. (2010) note: 
Prior experiences shape individuals' attitudes and form their dispositions with 
respect to a given context or circumstance. For example, painful memories from 




information that had led to identity theft) could shape individuals' beliefs about 
their vulnerability in the online environment. (p. 146) 
However, Li et al. (2011) note, "With progressive Web site interaction, the effect of 
general privacy concern will be gradually mediated or overridden by specific emotional 
and cognitive reactions to the Web site" (p. 442). This observed contradiction 
necessitates the need to evaluate privacy concerns in an actual privacy-centric situation. 
Significance 
     This study is unique because it evaluated what participants declare they will do (well 
covered in literature) in the context of an actual privacy-centric situation (little coverage 
in literature). Relevant literature indicates that the influence of privacy concerns on 
behavior is generally evaluated in two ways: a participant’s statements regarding their 
actions (Jiang et al., 2013; Miltgen & Peyrat-Guillard, 2014) and what the participant has 
stated they will do (intention) (Bansal et al., 2010, 2016; Dinev et al., 2008; Ku et al., 
2013; Li et al., 2011; Li & Unger, 2012; Li, 2014; Mao & Zhang, 2013; Osatuyi, 2015; 
Schwaig et al., 2013; Xu, 2010; Xu & Gupta, 2009). It is also worth noting that other 
privacy-related studies have evaluated behavior (concerning general privacy) based on 
how users had previously acted (dataset reviews). The assumption for this lack of 
research based on real situations is due more to the difficulty in finding real-world 
situations than a lack of interest or oversight by the research community. Possible results 
from the research also contribute to the literature, regardless of support for the proposed 
hypotheses. As stated earlier, most of the outcomes will either strengthen or weaken the 
observed relationships between general and situation-specific privacy concerns and/or the 





     Many factors contribute to the challenges of exploring privacy concerns and behavior. 
Opportunities to study real privacy-centric situations are problematic; service providers 
likely deem such research undesirable as it could provide an unfavorable view of their 
service. Given the limited opportunities for assessing real privacy-related situations, 
many studies substitute contrived scenarios and previous behaviors instead. Researchers 
employ a variety of methods to assess behavioral intention, including fabricating websites 
for assessment (Li et al., 2011), scenarios (Cichy et al., 2014; Li & Unger, 2012), 
assessing general privacy beliefs (Miltgen & Peyrat-Gillard, 2014; Schwaig et al., 2013), 
review existing websites (Bansal et al., 2016), and assessing services (e.g., chat, LBS, m-
commerce, and social media) (Jiang et al., 2013; Ku et al., 2013; Li, 2014; Mao & Zhang, 
2013; Osatuyi, 2015; Zhou, 2011). However, each of these has only yielded a prediction 
of the individual's actual behavior in a contrived scenario. Underlying this, as noted by 
Schwaig et al. (2013), many assume that users behave rationally. 
     During 2018, LinkedIn changed its website access and set up an authorization wall, 
making it challenging to correlate which users listed on ICWATCH were still publicly 
sharing their profile via LinkedIn. Complicating this further, LinkedIn public profile 
setting modifications may also take weeks to propagate through search engines. These 
barriers made an evaluation of actual behavior, in the context of this study problematic; 
authorized users always have full profile access. Future modifications to the underlying 





     Several issues were associated with the research study. First, the literature has 
demonstrated that multiple variables can influence privacy concerns and behavior or 
moderate their relationship. Next, the potential for an interaction effect existed based on 
the methodology selected. Lastly, there were also potential issues with the selection of a 
convenience population. 
     Many studies have examined the direct link between privacy concerns and behavioral 
intention (Bansal et al., 2016; Ku et al., 2013; Li & Unger, 2012; Li et al., 2011; Li, 2014; 
Mao & Zhang, 2013; Miltgen & Peyrat-Guillard, 2014; Osatuyi, 2015; Schwaig et al., 
2013; Zhang et al., 2013). Still, other studies suggest numerous additional variables 
influence each factor independently and/or moderate the relationship between the two. 
Other variables influencing behavior include attitude (Chen, 2013a; Chen & Sharma, 
2015; Schwaig et al., 2013), computer anxiety (Osatuyi, 2015; Schwaig et al., 2013), 
control (Benson et al., 2015), enjoyment (Chen, 2013b), perceived benefits (Li, 2014), 
perceived rewards (Miltgen & Smith, 2015), privacy protection beliefs (Li et al., 2011), 
privacy risk (Chen, 2013b; Li et al., 2011; Luo et al., 2013; Zhou, 2011, 2015), self-
esteem (Schwaig et al., 2013), technology acceptance factors (Mao & Zhang, 2013; 
Zhou, 2015), trust (Bansal et al., 2016; Chen & Sharma, 2012; Treiblmaier & Chong, 
2011; Wakefield, 2013; Zhou, 2011, 2015), and use (Benson et al., 2015). Other variables 
influencing privacy concerns include: hyper-personal framework aspects (Jiang et al., 
2013), information sensitivity (Kayhan & Davis, 2016), perceived control (Xu et al., 
2012), personality traits (Osatuyi, 2015), previous online privacy invasion (Bansal et al., 




website familiarity (Li, 2014), and website reputation (Li, 2014). Variables moderating 
the relationship between privacy concern and behavior include geographic region (Ku et 
al., 2013), industry domain (Li & Unger, 2012), experience (Li & Unger, 2012), 
perceived quality of personalization (Li & Unger, 2012), perceived rewards (Miltgen & 
Smith, 2015), and trust (Cichy et al., 2014). Another factor contributing to the complexity 
of the issue is the contextual nature of privacy. Li et al. (2011) note: 
In comparison, general privacy concern was found to be a far less important factor 
influencing privacy beliefs and behaviors. The results not only provide important 
insights into resolving some of the equivocation found in the literature regarding 
privacy behavior, but also better explain inconsistencies in consumers' privacy 
behavior found in practice. (p. 435) 
     Studies have also noted situational and contextual factors that may override general 
privacy concerns (Li et al., 2011; Xu et al., 2010) via numerous contextual factors 
influencing privacy concerns, including information contingency, privacy interventions, 
and requesting organizations (Miltgen & Peyrat-Guillard, 2014). 
 Considering this, some interaction effects may have skewed the research results or 
potentially disqualified participants prematurely. The author assumed that most 
participants were unaware of the situation. Making them aware of it in the survey 
introduction could have prompted premature (regarding this study) privacy-preserving 
behavior. Users may have chosen not to participate based on this action or disqualified 
themselves despite the wording of the disqualifying question on the questionnaire. 
     This study’s proposed convenience population was comprised of individuals 




2nd-degree LinkedIn connections to the author. The population may be a source of 
potential sample bias, considering the LinkedIn relationship with the author and the 
LinkedIn limitations on the total number of results in any given search. However, these 
users were part of the larger population (all LinkedIn users included within ICWATCH). 
The use of a convenience population does not necessarily limit the results’ 
generalizability, as Li et al. (2010) noted. Several of the reference studies have utilized 
convenience populations, especially among student populations (Bansal et al., 2010, 
2016; Jiang et al., 2013; Li et al., 2011; Mao & Zhang, 2013; Osatuyi, 2015; Xu, 2010; 
Zhang et al., 2013). 
Assumptions 
     The research made several assumptions. First, users were not aware of this situation; 
however, it is conceivable that they were. As noted earlier, the literature has observed a 
privacy paradox (Wakefield, 2013; Xu, Luo et al., 2011), where the perceived benefit of 
the service overrides the user's privacy concerns. It is reasonable to assume that users 
may make their LinkedIn profiles available to be discovered and that a situation such as 
this was conceivable. 
     Second, that it was appropriate to continue evaluating privacy concerns as a 
unidimensional construct. Literature addressing privacy concerns’ influence on intended 
behavior as a unidimensional construct is plentiful. However, privacy concerns 
influencing intended behavior is also well represented as a multidimensional construct. 
The researcher assumed that a unidimensional approach to evaluate “real situation” 
privacy concerns was appropriate in that it provided a foundation for future 




     The proposed focus qualified as a privacy-centric situation. Modeling the elements of 
the Facebook/Cambridge Analytica situation described earlier, it would appear that this 
situation involves (a) users voluntarily providing information to one company, while (b) a 
second company was using that data without consent. While this situation may be similar 
in those elements, other elements such as the discretionary LinkedIn profile visibility 
settings and the unassociated third-party relationship between LinkedIn and ICWATCH 
may invalidate this assumption. 
Limitations 
     There were two identified limitations associated with the research, the reliance on 
external services, and the social media privacy environment. This study relied on external 
services (LinkedIn and ICWATCH), specifically their availability and behavior. As 
discussed earlier, LinkedIn changed its website access forcing a modification to the 
methodology. The security update only illustrates that any alterations to either service 
would have dramatically affected this research. Second, any newsworthy privacy event 
could have influenced people’s perceptions of privacy regarding this situation. As noted 
earlier regarding Facebook and Cambridge Analytica, a similar privacy situation with 
Microsoft or LinkedIn (for example) could temporarily contribute to anomalous results. 
While participants may not have expressed any concern regarding LinkedIn and 
ICWATCH situation, they may have conflated a more recent event with this situation, 
thereby skewing the results. 
Delimitations 
     The author created specific options limiting decisions to constrain this study’s scope, 




population exclusions, and time horizons. First, the only privacy-preserving behavior 
within this study’s scope was modifying "Your profile's public visibility" of the user's 
LinkedIn profile. It is reasonable to assume that a savvy user would understand that their 
profile data could be modified to remove intelligence community participation indicators 
(i.e., codewords or other terms) as an alternative privacy-preserving behavior. However, 
given the breadth of potential indicators for ICWATCH to monitor, it would be 
imprudent to imply that this is appropriate protection for the participant. The author also 
controlled only two variables (age and sex) for inclusion due to their representation in the 
reference studies and implemented an arbitrary 80% cutoff to limit the scope. While there 
were several other relevant control variables such as experience (31% of reference), 
usage (46% of reference), and education (31% of reference), they had notably less 
representation in the literature. 
     As noted earlier, this study used 1st- and 2nd-degree connections as part of the target 
population, which permitted the inclusion of the "Introduction" feature (i.e., via first 
connections). Expanding the population to include 3rd-degree connections would have 
limited the study to only using the "Connect" function within LinkedIn. Upon completing 
the quantitative analysis, the author chose willing participants selected from groups 
aligned with the outcomes described in Table 1. The researcher conducted follow-up 
interviews on participants in groups meeting a 5% sample representation threshold to 
provide context to the survey results. 
     Finally, the LinkedIn website states, "After you change or disable your profile public 





visibility?lang=en). To allow for this possibility, the questionnaire included a suitability 
question asking if the respondent had modified "Your profile's public visibility" within 
the last 30 days, via LinkedIn "Settings and Privacy" options for any reason other than 
due to your profile information being on ICWATCH? The author allowed 30 days to pass 
to permit search engines to update and to place the time in context (approx. one month) 
for ease of user perception. However, there is no guarantee that users who modified their 
profile 30 days earlier would still not be visible via search engines. 
Definition of Terms 
     Table 2 provides a list of terms and their associated definitions found throughout the 
research proposal. 
Table 2 
Definition of Terms 
Term Definition References 
1st-degree connection Within the LinkedIn 
network, 1st-degree 
connections have accepted 
an invitation to connect to 
another member. 
LinkedIn, 2019 
2nd-degree connection Within the LinkedIn 
network, 2nd-degree 
connections are other 
members connected to a 
user's 1st-degree 
connection(s) (i.e., no 
direct connection). 
LinkedIn, 2019 
3rd-degree connection Within the LinkedIn 
network, 3rd-degree 
connections are other 1st 









Term Definition References 
behavior intention The intention of a 
LinkedIn user to continue 
to share their LinkedIn 
profile publicly. 
Li, 2014; Li et al., 2011; 
Osatuyi, 2015; Schwaig et 
al., 2013; Zhou, 2011 
disposition to value 
privacy 
A person's general attitude 
towards privacy. 
Kayhan & Davis, 2016; Li, 
2014; Li et al., 2011; Li et 
al., 2017; Xu, Dinev et al., 
2011 
 
ICWATCH A project, hosted by 
WikiLeaks that collects 
and analyzes resumes from 
various social networks to 
identify people working in 
the intelligence community 
and make them searchable 




privacy concern An individual's concerns 
resulting from the loss of 
privacy from information 
disclosure to a website, 
flow of information with a 
website, or misuse of 
information by a website 
or peers, effects of 
opportunistic behaviors 
related to submitted 
information, and practices 
and use of information by 
online companies. 
Dinev & Hart, 2006; Min 
& Kim, 2015; Ozdemir et 
al., 2017; Son & Kim, 
2008; Xu, Dinev et al., 
2011 
privacy paradox The contradiction arising 
from a user’s stated 
privacy concern and their 
actual behavior. 
Li & Unger, 2012; 
Wakefield, 2013; Xu, Luo 
et al., 2011 
 
List of Acronyms 






List of Acronyms 
Acronym Term 
AVE average variance extracted 
BEHV Behavior 
BITN behavior intention 
BNFT Benefit 
CFIP concern for information privacy 
CMB common method bias 
CNTL Control 
COLL Collection 
CR composite reliability 
DTVP disposition to value privacy 
e-commerce electronic commerce 
ERRS Errors 
FTC Federal Trade Commission 
GIPC global information privacy concern 
GPCN general privacy concern 
ICWATCH intelligence community watch 
INVN Invasion 
IS information system 
IUIPC Internet user’s information privacy concern 
m-commerce mobile commerce 
MPEG moving picture experts group 
OG- outcome group 
ODNI Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
OSN online social network 






P2 phase two 
PCON privacy concern 
PLS partial least squares 
PLSc consistent PLS algorithm 
PNTR personality traits 
PRBF privacy risk beliefs 
REGL Regulation 
SEM structural equation modeling 
SIGINT signals intelligence 
SIPC situation-specific Internet privacy concern 
SPCN specific privacy concerns 
TAM technology acceptance model 
TPB theory of planned behavior 
TRA theory of reasoned action 
USGE Usage 
Summary 
     This chapter provided background regarding the ongoing problem of privacy as it 
relates to social media. Current research lacks visibility into real privacy-centric 
situations. This study's goals were identified as contributing to the existing literature, 
appropriateness of constructs, and the use of scales to assess “real-world” privacy-centric 
scenarios. The author presented two research hypotheses to evaluate the influence of 
DTVP on situational privacy concerns and, subsequently, situational privacy concerns on 
privacy-preserving behaviors. Much of the study's significance is its unique approach to 
evaluating an actual privacy-centric situation, not presently represented in the literature. 




variable quantity and interaction effects. The author also introduced assumptions 
regarding the research proposal (i.e., cognition, dimensionality, applicability). Finally, 
limitations such as the reliance on external services and delimitations such as imposed 







Review of Literature 
Constructs and Theories 
     This study evaluates the influence of DTVP (aka general privacy concern) on 
situational privacy concerns and situational privacy on behavioral intention (e.g., privacy-
preserving). The literature on these relationships offers a variety of frameworks and 
theories. However, researchers have generally only evaluated these relationships in a 
notional or contrived context. This study proposes to explore the relationships in the 
context of an actual privacy-centric situation. 
Privacy Concern 
     Of the variety of constructs used within information systems (IS) research (e.g., 
experience, risk, security, sensitivity, usage, and trust), privacy concern has been one of 
the most widely used (Li et al., 2010; Xu & Gupta, 2009), with the most inconsistent 
results (Li et al., 2010). Privacy concern generically can be defined as reflecting a user's 
concern (or worry) about personal information regarding its collection, storage, and use 
(Xu & Gupta, 2009; Zhou, 2015). Collection concerns include factors such as 
methodology, time, and disclosure. Concerns regarding the storage of personal 




concerns include factors such as inappropriate/undisclosed applications (e.g., 
discrimination and marketing) and sharing (Hui et al., 2007; Kobsa, 2007). 
     Researchers have widely studied privacy concerns in a general context. Li et al. (2011) 
noted, 
A large body of research has focused on consumers' general privacy concern, 
which is defined as an individual's general tendency to worry about information 
privacy. General privacy concern is not specific to a particular context (e.g., a 
specific Web site or online company) and differs from person to person. (p. 434) 
Xu et al. (2012) also support this view regarding a detailed study of general privacy 
concerns. 
     Researchers have also examined privacy concerns as both a unidimensional and 
multidimensional construct. From a unidimensional approach, privacy concerns have 
generated numerous studies related to its influence on a variety of constructs, including 
behavior intention (Dinev et al., 2008; Li, 2014; Li et al., 2017; Li et al., 2011), control 
(Xu, Dinev et al., 2011), privacy risk belief (Li et al., 2011; Xu, Dinev et al., 2011), 
specific privacy concern (Kayhan & Davis, 2016; Li, 2014), and trust (Bansal et al., 
2010). Information sensitivity also influences general privacy concerns (Bansal et al., 
2010) and privacy experience (Li, 2014). Smith et al. (1996) note that “it is common for 
information privacy to be approached as though it were a unidimensional construct” (p. 
169) and studied as a general privacy concern or DTVP (Kayhan & Davis, 2016; Li, 
2014; Li et al., 2017; Li et al., 2011; Xu, Dinev et al., 2011). 
     Smith et al. (1996) developed a scale to measure multidimensional privacy concerns, 




Smith et al., 1996; Stewart & Segars, 2002; Xu, 2010; Xu & Gupta, 2009; Xu et al., 
2012; Zhang et al., 2013; Zhou, 2011) and is often referred to as concerns for information 
privacy (CFIP). CFIP encompasses four dimensions: collection (the amount of data 
accumulated/stored), errors (deliberate or accidental inaccuracies), unauthorized 
secondary use (internal and external, collected for one purpose but used for another), and 
improper access (availability to unauthorized people). Malhotra et al. (2004) later 
extended this to the Internet users' information privacy concerns (IUIPC), which 
encompasses three factors: collection, control, and awareness of privacy factors. Jiang et 
al. (2013) have incorporated the IUIPC construct into current research. 
     Though generally not a primary focus, researchers have examined privacy concerns in 
contextual and situational conditions. While many studies have approached evaluating 
privacy in a general context, each study typically contained a specific contextual element, 
including location-based services (Zhou, 2015), online (Miltgen & Peyrat-Guillard, 
2014), regulations (Miltgen & Smith, 2015), social media (Jiang et al., 2013; Ku et al., 
2013; Osatuyi, 2015), and websites-general (Bansal et al., 2016; Kayhan & Davis, 2016). 
Multiple constructs have been studied regarding their influence from, upon, and 
moderating privacy concern within a contextual condition, including age (Zhang et al., 
2013) behavior (Bansal et al., 2010; Dinev et al., 2008; Li, 2014; Xu, 2010), control (Xu, 
2010; Xu et al., 2012), device (Xu, 2010), education (Zhang et al., 2013), experience 
(Zhang et al., 2013), familiarity (Li, 2014), gender (Zhang et al., 2013), income (Zhang et 
al., 2013), invasion (Bansal et al., 2010; Dinev et al., 2008), regulation (Xu, 2010), 
reputation (Li, 2014), risk (Zhou, 2011), sensitivity (Bansal et al., 2010), surveillance 




also been studied regarding their influence from, upon, and moderating privacy concerns 
within a situational condition, including behavior (Li et al., 2011), protection (Li et al., 
2011), responsibility (Kayhan & Davis, 2016), risk (Li et al., 2011), and sensitivity 
(Kayhan & Davis, 2016). 
Behavior/Intention to Disclose 
     Mackenzie and Spreng (1992) utilized a scale for measuring purchase intention, which 
had an implied definition of the likelihood to purchase an advertised product as 
influenced by attitude. Later, Jarvenpaa et al. (1999) and Jarvenpaa et al. (2000) 
expanded the construct into a willingness to buy. More recent studies have evolved the 
definition further, as Li et al. (2011) also utilized behavior intention (as modeled in this 
research) and described this as "The effect of salient privacy beliefs on intention to 
release personal information" (p. 438). Zhou (2011) used a similar construct, termed 
usage intention, which, "Reflect the usage, personal information disclosure and 
recommendation [of a service provider to others]" (p. 217). Other studies have used this 
construct as the intention to create online accounts (Osatuyi, 2015), use a site for inquiry 
(Li, 2014), create online accounts (Osatuyi, 2015), and use a site for information request 
(e.g., auction, financial, or travel) (Li, 2014). Schwaig et al. (2013) note that privacy 
concerns influence a user's attitude towards a specific information practice and/or 
intention to use a system. Li (2012) suggests, "That an individual's intention to disclose 
information is based on the comparison of expected benefits and perceived risks in a 
given context" (p. 1). 
     The literature reflects 42 factors that have been studied related to privacy regarding 




including attitude (Mackenzie & Spreng, 1992; Schwaig et al., 2013), experience (Bansal 
et al., 2010, 2016), innovativeness (Xu & Gupta, 2009; Xu, Luo et al., 2011), privacy 
concern (Bansal et al., 2010, 2016; Dinev et al., 2008; Ku et al., 2013; Li et al., 2011; Li 
& Unger, 2012; Li, 2014; Mao & Zhang, 2013; Osatuyi, 2015; Schwaig et al., 2013; Xu, 
2010;, Xu & Gupta, 2009), protection (Li et al., 2010, 2011; Li & Unger, 2012), risk (Li 
et al., 2010, 2011; Luo et al., 2013; Treiblmaier & Chong, 2011; Zhou, 2011, 2015), trust 
(Bansal et al., 2010, 2016; Treiblmaier & Chong, 2011; Wakefield, 2013; Zhou, 2011, 
2015), usage (Li & Unger, 2012; Mao & Zhang, 2013), usefulness (Li et al., 2010; Luo et 
al., 2013; Mao & Zhang, 2013; Zhou, 2015), and value (Mao & Zhang, 2013; Xu, Luo et 
al., 2011). 
Theories Associated with Privacy Concern 
     Li (2012) provided an integrated framework for privacy concern research theories and 
categorized them based on origin, consequences, trade-offs, and influential factors 
(institutional and individual). Table A2 provides an overview of this framework and a 
breakout of the theories used across the construct-aligned studies 
     The scales-aligned studies represented coverage across four categories, including 
consequence factors (Dinev & Hart, 2006), trade-off factors (Li, 2014; Li et al., 2011; 
Min & Kim, 2015), and institutional influential factors (Xu, Dinev et al., 2011). 
Expanding outward, the construct-aligned studies represented coverage across four 
categories, including origin factors (Li et al., 2010; Xu, 2010), consequence factors 
(Bansal et al., 2016; Dinev & Hart, 2006), trade-off factors (Bansal et al., 2010; Bansal et 
al., 2016; Dinev et al., 2008; Li, 2014; Li et al., 2011; Min & Kim, 2015), and individual 




studies with a contextual and situational focus covered three categories, including origin 
factors (Xu, 2010), trade-off factors (Bansal et al., 2010; Dinev et al., 2008; Li et al., 
2011), and individual influential factors (Li, 2014). 
Inclusions 
     The two constructs included in this research are unidimensional privacy concerns and 
behavior as intention. Multiple studies have identified a conflict in an individual's privacy 
concerns and subsequent behaviors (Joinson et al., 2010; Li et al., 2011; Zhou, 2011). 
Cichy et al. (2014) note that "Privacy concerns emerged as the most frequently 
mentioned factor affecting respondents' personal driving data disclosure intentions" (p. 
6). Privacy concerns were also studied to observe their influence on "… Various 
behavior-related variables, e.g., willingness to disclose personal information, intention to 
transact, and information disclosure behavior" (Xu & Gupta, 2009, p. 140). Privacy 
concerns also constitute one of the most likely behavior-related variables to cause stress. 
As a general construct, privacy concern is well represented in the literature. Consistently, 
across several studies, DTVP demonstrated its influence on privacy concerns (Kayhan & 
Davis, 2016; Li, 2014; Xu, Dinev et al., 2011). Internet privacy concern (as a general 
construct) influencing behavior intention is also well supported in the literature (Dinev & 
Hart, 2006; Li et al., 2011; Li et al., 2017; Min & Kim, 2015; Ozdemir et al., 2017; Son 
& Kim, 2008). 
     As stated earlier, privacy concerns influence a user's attitude towards a specific 
information practice and/or intention to use a system (Schwaig et al., 2013). Li et al.'s 
(2011) work support this, noting, "Since the online consumer acts on beliefs and 




privacy-related cost-benefit analysis" (p. 42). Several research lines also found trust 
influences a user's privacy concern and behavior (Joinson et al., 2010; Li et al., 2011; Xu 
et al., 2012; Zhou 2011, 2015). Additionally, Zhou (2015) notes that privacy concerns 
significantly affect privacy risk (uncertainty). Concurrently, for various reasons, users 
often behave in ways that do not reflect their privacy concerns and attitudes. For instance, 
users may sacrifice privacy for benefits they value (e.g., economic rationale). In other 
words, "Regardless of a user's expressed privacy concerns, they are willing to reveal the 
most intimate details of their personal preferences if deemed appropriate" (Spiekermann 
& Cranor, 2009, p. 71). A user's behavior is also not static. Their attitudes may change 
over time (Conger et al., 2013), influenced by the immediate benefits resulting from the 
disclosure over long-term privacy maintenance (Spiekermann & Cranor, 2009). 
Exclusions 
     Multiple variants of privacy concern and behavior constructs, other related variables, 
and all of the theories related to privacy concern from the reference studies are excluded 
from this research. As noted earlier, two constructs for multidimensional privacy concern 
(CFIP and IUIPC) are also excluded. While both the influence of CFIP and IUIPC on 
behaviors are represented abundantly throughout the literature (Choi & Land, 2016; Mao 
& Zhang, 2013; Ostauyi, 2015; Xu, 2010; Xu & Gupta, 2009) with consistent results, 
neither has been studied in an existing privacy-centric situation. It was prudent to 
establish the validity of general privacy concerns before exploring multidimensional 
aspects. 
     The literature shows that privacy research behavior has also been modeled as prior 




(2015) used data collected from social networking sites to evaluate actual prior action 
against factors such as demographics, experience, network size, and productivity. The 
literature also notes 11 factors influencing conduct, including affiliation (Chen & 
Sharma, 2012), age (Chakraborty et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2013), attitude (Chen, 2013a), 
enjoyment (Chen, 2013b), gender (Chakraborty et al., 2013), privacy concern (Jiang et 
al., 2013; Miltgen & Peyrat-Guillard, 2014), reciprocity (Chen & Sharma, 2012), reward 
(Jiang et al., 2013), risk (Chen, 2013b), trust (Chen & Sharma, 2012), and usage (Chen & 
Sharma, 2012). However, the researcher excluded both prior action and conduct as 
neither reflected intention in an actual privacy-centric situation, past vs. present 
application. 
     Privacy concern has been widely studied for its influence in a variety of constructs, 
including anonymity of others (Jiang et al., 2013), anonymity of self (Jiang et al., 2013), 
behavior (Bansal et al., 2016; Cichy et al., 2014; Jiang et al., 2013; Li et al., 2011; Li & 
Unger, 2012; Li, 2014; Osatuyi, 2015), computer anxiety (Osatuyi, 2015), disposition (Li, 
2014), perceived intrusiveness (Jiang et al., 2013), perceived rewards (Miltgen & Smith, 
2015), perceived usefulness (Zhou, 2015), personality traits (Bansal et al., 2016), 
personalization quality (Li & Unger, 2012), privacy protection belief (Li et al., 2011), 
privacy risk belief (Li et al., 2011; Zhou, 2015), psychological ownership (Cichy et al., 
2014), trade-off discount (Bansal & Zahedi, 2014), trust (Cichy et al., 2014; Zhou, 2015), 
and website reputation (Li, 2014). Privacy concern has been regularly examined 
regarding its impact on other constructs, including behavior/adoption intention (Mao & 
Zhang, 2013; Osatuyi, 2015; Schwaig et al., 2013), computer alienation (Schwaig et al., 




age, education, experience, and income level) (Zhang et al., 2013), overall privacy 
concern (Mao & Zhang, 2013), perceived risk (Zhou, 2011), personality traits (Osatuyi, 
2015), self-esteem (Schwaig et al., 2013), and trust (Zhou, 2011). Given that this study's 
focus was to validate the influence of general privacy concerns in an actual privacy-
centric situation, all of these were excluded. 
     Extensive research shows that behavior influences and moderates other factors, such 
as privacy concerns (Li & Unger, 2012), protection (Li & Unger, 2012), and quality (Li 
& Unger, 2012). Researchers found moderating influence of behavior ranging from 
innovativeness (Xu & Gupta, 2009), motivation (Mackenzie & Spreng, 1992), privacy 
concern (Cichy et al., 2014; Ku et al., 2013; Osatuyi, 2015), quality (Li & Unger, 2012), 
and region (Ku et al., 2013) to relevance (Li et al., 2010), risk (Gerlach et al., 2015), 
sensitivity (Bansal et al., 2016), and value (Li & Unger, 2012). Again, as the research 
focus for this paper was to validate the influence of general privacy concerns on behavior 
intention in a real privacy-centric situation, all of these were excluded from examination.  
     Finally, all theories related to privacy concerns were excluded from this research. The 
research focused on establishing the influence validity of general privacy concerns on 
behavioral intention in an actual privacy-centric situation. The study did not seek to 
validate why it merely sought to provide context. Each of the theories required other 
constructs (e.g., beliefs and attitudes). As with all other privacy-related constructs, the 
study excluded all associated theories from the study. 
Strengths 
     The literature's strength is the consistent results from the utilized scales, constructs, 




measurement items for both DTVP and privacy concerns. Three studies found that DTVP 
positively affects privacy concerns, using the same items for DTVP (Kayhan & Davis, 
2016; Li, 2014; Xu, Dinev et al., 2011). Three additional studies found that privacy 
concern negatively affects behavior intention, using the same items for privacy concern 
(Dinev & Hart, 2006; Min & Kim, 2015; Ozdemir et al., 2017). 
     The scales-aligned studies have also found consistent results using the same 
unidimensional approach for both DTVP and privacy concerns. Kayhan and Davis 
(2016), Li (2014), and Xu, Dinev et al. (2011) each found that unidimensional privacy 
concern constructs positively affected privacy concerns. Five studies found that 
unidimensional privacy concerns negatively affected behavior intention (Bansal et al., 
2010; Dinev et al., 2008; Li et al., 2011; Li, 2014; Li et al., 2017. Finally, 10 of the 
reference studies found consistent results investigating the influence of privacy concern 
(both uni and multidimensional) using a survey methodology, demonstrating that privacy 
concerns’ negative effect on behavior intention (Dinev et al., 2008; Dinev & Hart, 2006; 
Ku et al., 2013; Mao & Zhang, 2013; Min & Kim, 2015; Osatuyi, 2015; Ozdemir et al., 
2017; Son & Kim, 2008; Xu & Gupta, 2009; Zhang et al., 2018). 
Weakness/Gaps 
     Identified weaknesses amongst the reference studies included minimal investigation 
into situational influences associated with privacy concerns and behavior and research 
focused on actual situations. As previously discussed, researchers have noted that 
situational and contextual factors can influence privacy concerns (Kayhan & Davis, 2016; 
Li et al., 2011; Xu et al., 2010). However, limited studies have focused on the contextual 




having a contextual focus (Bansal et al., 2010; Dinev et al., 2008; Li, 2014; Xu, 2010) 
and only two having a situational focus (Kayhan & Davis, 2016; Li et al., 2011). 
     The literature is also limited in investigations using existing privacy-centric situations. 
Ten of the reference studies investigated privacy concern's influence on behavior 
intention based on a user's experience, including experience with the Internet (Dinev et 
al., 2008; Dinev & Hart, 2006; Son & Kim, 2008), experience with the type of 
site/service (Ku et al., 2013; Mao & Zhang, 2013; Osatuyi, 2015; Xu, Dinev et al., 2011; 
Zhang et al., 2018), and experience with specific site/service (Min & Kim, 2015; 
Ozdemir et al., 2017). Three studies evaluated a user's perceptions of a specific site, both 
real and contrived (Bansal et al., 2010; Bansal et al., 2016; Li, 2014; Li et al., 2011; Xu, 
2010; Xu & Gupta, 2009). Four studies have utilized privacy scenarios (Choi & Land, 
2016; Gu et al., 2017; Li & Unger, 2012; Kayhan & Davis, 2016). Finally, four studies 
evaluated privacy concern and/or privacy behavior from a historical approach, either 
demonstrated action (via observation or dataset review) (Chakraborty et al., 2013; Li et 
al., 2015) or stated action (conduct) (Jiang et al., 2013; Miltgen & Peyrat-Guillard, 2014). 
Similar Study Methods 
     While 31 of the reference studies contained at least one hypothesis related to privacy 
concerns, only 21 had similar construct assessments and/or utilized the same scales. 
Those were studies examining the relationship of dispositional privacy concerns and 
site/situation-specific privacy concerns (3), those that studied the relationship between 
privacy concerns and behavior intention (19), and those utilizing the same scales (9). 






Reference Studies Alignment Matrix 
Area of 
Alignment 







Total = 3 
Kayhan & Davis, 2016; Li, 
2014; Xu, Dinev et al., 2011 
Total = 3 
Kayhan & Davis, 2016; 
Li, 2014; Xu, Dinev et 
al., 2011 





Total = 19 
Bansal et al., 2010;  
Bansal et al., 2016; Choi & 
Land, 2016; Dinev et al., 
2008; Dinev & Hart, 2006; 
Gu et al., 2017; Ku et al., 
2013; Li, 2014; Li et al., 
2011; Li et al., 2017; Li & 
Unger, 2012; Mao & Zhang, 
2013; Min & Kim, 2015; 
Osatuyi, 2015; Ozdemir et 
al., 2017; Son & Kim, 2008; 
Xu, 2010; Xu & Gupta, 
2009; Zhang et al., 2018 
Total = 7 
Dinev & Hart, 2006; Li, 
2014; Li et al., 2011; Li 
et al., 2017; Min & 
Kim, 2015; Ozdemir et 




Total = 9 
Dinev & Hart, 2006; 
Kayhan & Davis, 2016; Li, 
2014; Li et al., 2011; Li et 
al., 2017; Min & Kim, 2015; 
Ozdemir et al., 2017; Son & 




     The two research methods most utilized in the construct-aligned studies were 
experiment and survey. No study using the experimental approach fell into more than one 
area of alignment from Table 6. However, only one study fell into all three of the 
alignment areas for employing surveys (Li, 2014), and two fell into more than one 




     Seven of the aligned reference studies from Table 6 employed an experimental 
methodology. Of the three studies investigating the influence of dispositional privacy 
concerns and site/situation-specific privacy concerns, one study utilized an experimental 
methodology (Kayhan & Davis, 2016). Of the 19 studies investigating the influence of 
privacy concerns on intention, six studies utilized an experimental methodology (Bansal 
et al., 2016; Choi & Land, 2016; Gu et al., 2017; Li et al., 2011; Li & Unger, 2012; Xu, 
2010). Of the nine studies utilizing the same scales, two studies utilized an experimental 
methodology (Kayhan & Davis, 2016; Li et al., 2011). 
     Thirteen of the aligned reference studies employed a survey methodology. Of the three 
studies investigating the influence of dispositional privacy concerns and site/situation-
specific privacy concerns, two studies utilized a survey methodology (Kayhan & Davis, 
2016; Li, 2014). Of the 19 studies investigating the influence of privacy concern on 
intention, 12 studies utilized a survey methodology (Bansal et al., 2010; Dinev et al., 
2008; Dinev & Hart, 2006; Ku et al., 2013; Li, 2014; Mao & Zhang, 2014; Min & Kim, 
2015; Osatuyi, 2015; Ozdemir et al., 2017; Son & Kim, 2008; Xu & Gupta, 2009; Zhang 
et al., 2018). Of the nine studies utilizing the same scales, six utilized a survey 
methodology (Dinev & Hart, 2006; Li, 2014; Min & Kim, 2015; Ozdemir et al., 2017; 
Son & Kim, 2008; Xu, Dinev et al., 2011). 
     Survey methodology emerged as the most appropriate methodology for this research. 
Surveying was common across all of the aligned studies and the most commonly used 
across all reference studies (22 out of 31). Chapter 3 referenced studies that demonstrated 




validity (CR, AVE, square root of AVE), and bias (common method bias [CMB], 
Harman's single-factor). All constructs under review exhibited consistency of results.  
Similar Study Measurements 
     Numerous studies assessed the same constructs in a manner similar to the proposed 
study. Several studies examined the influence of DTVP on privacy concerns, utilizing the 
same scales. Kayhan and Davis (2016) found that dispositional privacy concerns to be 
positively related to situational privacy concerns. Similarly, Li (2014) found a disposition 
to privacy as having a positive impact on site-specific privacy concerns. Xu, Dinev et al. 
(2011) found that DTVP positively affected privacy concerns. 
     Multiple studies also examined the influence of DTVP on behavioral intention, 
utilizing the same scales. Li et al. (2017) found that general privacy concern negatively 
affects behavioral intention (i.e., disclosing personal information). Li et al. (2011) found 
that general privacy concern negatively affects behavioral intention (i.e., disclose 
personal information). 
     Several studies examined the influence of privacy concerns on behavioral intention, 
utilizing the same scales. Dinev and Hart (2006) found that a higher user Internet Privacy 
Concern is related to a lower behavioral intention (i.e., provide personal information). 
Min and Kim (2015) found that perceived privacy concern negatively affects behavioral 
intention (i.e., giving personal information). Ozdemir et al. (2017) found that the higher a 
user's privacy concerns, the less likely they are to disclose information. Son and Kim 
(2008) found that information privacy concerns positively affect public and private action 





     The chapter provided a discussion of the constructs and theories associated with 
research in privacy concerns and behaviors. The author provided detailed discussions 
regarding the inclusion of privacy concerns (unidimensional) and behavioral intentions in 
the study. Also included were the rationales for excluding other constructs 
(multidimensional privacy concern, other types of behavior, and other privacy-related 
variables), as well as relevant theories associated with privacy concerns. The strengths 
associated with existing studies were discussed, highlighting their consistency of results. 
The weaknesses and gaps associated with existing research noted a lack of coverage of 
situational influences on privacy concerns and real privacy-centric situations. The author 
outlined common methodologies utilized in the literature and standard methods to 
evaluate reliability, validity, and bias. Finally, the chapter concluded with a review of 








     This study proposed to validate the influence of privacy concerns on behavior 
intention in an actual privacy-centric situation. Creswell and Plano Clark (2018) provided 
a template style introduction for mixed method approaches, modeled for research design. 
An explanatory sequential mixed methods design with interview follow-up was 
employed. The sequence involved collecting quantitative data first and then 
contextualizing the quantitative results with qualitative data. The methodology sought to 
assess if general and situational privacy concerns influenced behavior in an actual 
situation and provide context for the findings. The first quantitative phase of the study 
involved collecting questionnaire data from situation-affected LinkedIn users via the 
Internet to assess whether DTVP influenced situational privacy concerns and influenced 
behavior intention. The second, qualitative phase, served as a follow-up to the 
quantitative phase to group the various potential outcomes (derived from variable 
combinations) and ascertain any context to assist in understanding the outcomes. The 
explanatory follow-up goal was to provide context to hypothesis support, grounded in 
variable support degree combinations. 
Phase 1 (P1): Quantitative Methodology 
     This section provides an overview of the quantitative methodology phase of the 




associated constructs, measurement items, and specific validity and reliability 
measurements. The section continues with a population description and data collection. 
The section concludes with a discussion of the use of PLS in the analysis. 
     Twenty-nine of the 31 reference studies with at least one hypothesis related to privacy 
concerns used survey methodology. All 21 of the scales-aligned studies identified in 
Table 4 utilized a survey methodology. The author sent the questionnaire to his 1st-
degree connections using the LinkedIn Message function and to each of his 2nd-degree 
connections using the Connect (with a note) function. Appendix B contains a copy of the 
instrument. 
P1: Instrument Development 
     Using items adapted from validated scales in existing literature, as described in Tables 
A3, A4, and A5, the researcher operationalized the variables with questions re-worded to 
fit the research context. The three constructs were measured with a seven-point scale 
ranging from 1 to 7, anchored with "strongly disagree" and "strongly agree." A single 
item measured each of the demographic factors (control variables), age and sex. Finally, 
given participants' ability to modify their LinkedIn profile before contact, the author 
added a binary scale question as a participant disqualifier. 
     The researcher used three items adapted originally from Malhotra et al. (2004) and 
subsequently used in a variety of studies (Kayhan & Davis, 2016; Li, 2014; Li et al., 
2014; Li et al., 2017; Li et al., 2011; Xu, Dinev et al., 2011) to measure Disposition to 
Value Privacy (DTVP). Table A3 reports the results. 
     As illustrated in Table A4, the author used four items adapted originally from Dinev 




2016; Min & Kim, 2015; Ozdemir et al., 2017; Son & Kim, 2008; Xu, Dinev et al., 2011) 
to measure Situation-Specific Internet Privacy Concerns. 
     The author measured behavioral intention using three items adapted from Molhatra et 
al. (2004) that were subsequently used to measure behavioral intention in a variety of 
additional studies on which the research framework was directly based (Li et al., 2011; 
Min & Kim, 2015) or to evaluate the impact of privacy concerns on intention (Bansal et 
al., 2010, 2016; Zhang et al., 2018). See Table A5. 
P1: Sample and Data Collection 
     A preliminary methodology to determine the viability of the convenience population 
yielded positive results. The first step was to search all of the author's LinkedIn 
connections using the search term "SIGINT" (signals intelligence, a generic term used for 
demonstration by ICWATCH developers) (re:publica, 2015), which resulted in 3,392 1st- 
and 2nd-degree connections; however, only 1,316 were readily accessed (due to server-
side search limitations of 1000 non-unique results at a time). The second step was to 
reduce this list to individuals who were both (a) a LinkedIn connection and (b) listed on 
ICWATCH, which resulted in a reduction to 496 connections (~37%). It was assumed 
that this reduction would remain consistent across all the author's 1st- and 2nd-degree 
connections and was anticipated to yield a sample population for this study of ~1,275 
individuals. However, this was merely an initial support metric and was not intended to 
account for additions resulting from new LinkedIn connections.  
     Two additional enhancements overcame the server-side search limitations mentioned 
earlier, search filters (e.g., industry, location, etc.) and premium membership. The search 




individuals both on LinkedIn and ICWATCH. Based on a separate study by Claybaugh 
and Haseman (2015), which resulted in a 19% response rate, 260 participants were 
expected to participate. This was considered viable as a total number of participants from 
a cross-section of reference studies had the following characteristics: largest = 889, 
smallest = 100, median = 285, mode = ~341.  
     The survey was administered to the 1,310 individuals thru LinkedIn directly. Due to a 
LinkedIn message size restriction, a 300-character message was created to invite each 
participant. The message read, “'Please participate in my Ph.D. dissertation study, 
investigating linkages between privacy and behavior of users like you, who had their 
LinkedIn account scraped and made searchable through ICWATCH, a third-party 
website. The anonymous survey is available at 
https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/CP5JWGS" 
     For 1st-degree connections, the invite was sent using the "Send a message" function. 
For 2nd-degree connections, the invite was sent using the "Connect with note" function. 
While the 300-character limit only applied to the 2nd-degree connection invites, the same 
invite was used for both degrees of connection to maintain consistency. 
     Initially, it was observed that while 2nd-degree connections were accepting the 
connection request, there was not a visible correlation with a subsequent survey response.  
Therefore, it was assumed that invitees merely accepted the connection request and did 
not see the invite. To mitigate this, each time a 2nd-degree connection accepted the 
request to connect, a short one-time follow-up message was sent using the now available 
"Send a message" feature (as they were now 1st-degree connections). The follow-up 




hope you will consider participating in my Ph.D. dissertation survey, which is 
anonymous." 
     From the 1,310 invites sent via LinkedIn, there were 78 responses; 13 were not used, 
as eight were incomplete and five indicated they were not sharing their profile publicly 
(disqualification), resulting in 65 valid responses (4.96%). Participant demographics are 
described in Table 5. 
Table 5 
Demographic Information of the Questionnaire Respondents 
Demographic Variables Category Frequency (%) 
Sex 
Female 8 (12.31%) 
Male 57 (87.69%) 
Age 
< 20 0 (0%) 
20-29 1 (1.54%) 
30-39 9 (13.85%) 
40-49 16 (24.62%) 
50+ 39 (60.00%) 
 
An ad-hoc post-invite analysis using the Social Security: Get Ready For Baby website 
(https://www.ssa.gov/OACT/babynames/index.html) was used to derive approximate sex 
demographics of the population, resulting in a 1067 male (81.45%) to 149 female (11.31) 
distribution, with 94 indeterminate.  
Phase 2 (P2): Qualitative Methodology 
     As part of the mixed method approach, the author invited select participants to 
participate in a one-on-one interview (i.e., follow-up) to contextualize the quantitative 




approach, either to create an instrument (Cichy et al., 2014; Ku et al., 2013; Malhotra et 
al., 2004; Smith et al., 1996; Treiblmaier & Chong, 2011) or to contextualize results (Ball 
et al., 2012). This study employed a purposeful sampling approach, utilizing a simple 
scoring model to identify and invite a minimum of three participants from pre-defined 
variable outcome groups. What follows is a discussion of the qualitative portion of the 
study, specifically, how the population was identified and invited for follow-up. Next, a 
discussion regarding the demographics of the interview population and the participants is 
described. Finally, an elaboration on the methodology used to derive the qualitative data 
for analysis is discussed. 
P2: Interview Development 
     As this research was explanatory in design, it employed semi-structured interviews, 
which modeled the approach used by Ball et al. (2012). Also, to support an explanatory 
design, the semi-structured approach employed topics aligned directly with the 
questionnaire. This served to elaborate on the underlying concepts influencing the 
participant's responses in the questionnaire. The topics also served a dual-purpose as the 
categories for code alignment; categories were modeled after an approach used by Cichy 
et al. (2014).  
     Since the research design assumed that this situation was a breach of privacy, the first 
topic prompted a discussion on the participant's belief regarding this matter. It was 
initiated by stating, "For the next few minutes, let's discuss if this is a breach of privacy." 
The second topic prompted a discussion on the participant's disposition to value privacy 





     The third topic prompted a discussion regarding the participant's level of privacy 
concern regarding the situation related to the ingestion of their LinkedIn information into 
ICWATCH. It was initiated by stating, "For the next few minutes, let's discuss your level 
of concern regarding LinkedIn scraping/posting your data." The fourth topic prompted a 
discussion on the participant's intention to modify their LinkedIn profile's visibility and 
was initiated by stating, "Finally, let's discuss your intention to modify your LinkedIn 
profile's visibility." At the end of each interview, the participant was given the 
opportunity to provide any additional thoughts by stating, "Are there any other additional 
thoughts or comments you might have?" 
P2: Sample and Data Collection 
     Only a subset of Phase 1 participants comprised the convenience population for this 
phase of the study, expressly, those who (a) completed the questionnaire associated with 
Phase 1 (quantitative), and (b) indicated a willingness to be interviewed (per 
questionnaire response). A simple scoring model was selected to derive each variable's 
least ambiguous representation for respondent assignment to an outcome group. The 
scoring model calculated the numerical sum of results for each variable's questions, then 
selected the top and bottom 25% of all scores within each variable to derive the least 






Internal Consistency and Discriminate Validity of Constructs 
Constructs # of Questions 
(7-pt Likert) 
+ or - Score Range Top 25% Bottom 25% 
BITN 3 neg 0-21 <13 >17 
DTVP 3 pos 0-21 >18 <15 
SIPC 4 posx 0-28 >21 <16 
Note. H = high score, L = low score 
 
     Respondents were assigned to one of the eight possible outcome groups based on 
score calculations, as shown in Table 7. Of the 65 respondents, only 11 volunteers had 
appropriate scores for assignment to five outcome groups (OG-A, OG-B, OG-E, OG-G, 
and OG-H). However, any respondents groups not meeting a 5% population 
representation were not invited for interviews, as they were considered outliers. 
Table 7 
Outcome-group Score Results and Distribution 
Outcome-
Group 
BITN DTVP SIPC Qualified Volunteer 
OG-A >17 <15 <16 7 5 
OG-B <13 <15 <16 1 1 
OG-C >17 <15 >21 0 0 
OG-D <13 <15 >21 0 0 
OG-E >17 >18 <16 1 1 
OG-F <13 >18 <16 0 0 
OG-G >17 >18 >21 1 1 





     As mentioned earlier, the interview methodology modeled the approach utilized by 
(Ball et al., 2012), employing semi-structured interviews around four topics; however, the 
interviews were remote rather than face-to-face. An email was sent to the volunteers in 
groups A and H to solicit a date/time for the follow-up interview, with a total of six 
participants responding, a 50/50 split between groups as shown in Table 8. Once a 
date/time was confirmed, a web conference invite was emailed to the participant, and 
interviews were conducted via web conferencing (Zoom). During each, the author 
confirmed the participant ID, provided a brief description of the interview purpose and 
process, then provided each topic sequentially (as discussed earlier). A transcription of 
each of the interviews is provided in Appendix E. Each participant was also provided an 
opportunity to convey additional comments at the end of the interview, modeled as a fifth 
topic. 
Table 8 
Individual Participant Score Results and Distribution 
Participant Outcome-Group BITN DTVP SIPC 
11269613365 OG-A 21 3 4 
11223476508 OG-A 21 6 5 
11188138618 OG-A 18 6 8 
11251351842 OG-H 9 21 28 
11224014306 OG-H 12 21 28 
11205114603 OG-H 9 21 25 
 
The six-person sample demographic was all male and all in the 50+ age category, as 






Demographic Information of Interview Participants 
Demographic Variables Category Frequency (%) 
Sex 
Female 0 (0%) 
Male 6 (13.33%) 
Age 
< 20 0 (0%) 
20-29 0 (0%) 
30-39 0 (0%) 
40-49 0 (0%) 
50+ 6 (100%) 
 
     A methodology provided by Creswell and Plano Clark (2018) was employed to 
support generating and utilizing the qualitative data. In the first part of the methodology, 
which is relevant to this section, the data must be prepared for analysis (i.e., transcribed 
and formatted), explored (read and understood), then coded and analyzed (e.g., interrelate 
categories). In the second part of the methodology, which is covered later, the data is 
analyzed and represented (Appendices A and D), the results summarized and related 
(Table 14), and the data and results validated. 
     Data Preparation. Interviews were recorded and then transcribed using a two-step 
process. The audio recording was done using the Zoom cloud recording feature, which 
resulted in a downloadable Moving Picture Experts Group (MPEG-4) file of the 
interview. Transcription was accomplished using a cloud-based tool called Otter, which 
performed the speech-to-text translation. The first step was to upload the MPEG-4 file 
into Otter, which resulted in a rough draft transcription of the recording. The second step 




service would highlight words synchronized to the audio). A second recording and 
transcription methodology was in place for redundancy using the TapeACall application; 
however, this was for backup only, and the additional files were not utilized. 
     Data Exploration. Each of the interviews was read multiple times to explore the data. 
In this context, data exploration was limited to understanding the completeness and 
context of a particular snippet and annotating each onto a separate card.  This exploration 
yielded 163 snippets, of which 149 were carried forward into step three.  During 
exploration, it became evident that the interview statements reflected the multi-
dimensional aspects of privacy concern and other constructs well-represented in existing 
privacy literature. 
     Coding and Analysis. Using a category/code approach, the snippets were separated 
into codes and then grouped by category. After analyzing each of the 149 snippets, 12 
codes were derived. As noted earlier, the codes were operationalized using constructs 
adapted from existing literature, as described in Table A6. A code/snippet alignment 
validation was also conducted, which is discussed in a later section, resulting in 139 
usable code/snippet alignments, as shown in Appendix D. 
Summary 
     This chapter provided a detailed discussion of the mixed method approach used in the 
research. The first half elaborated on the quantitative portion. This portion employed a 
survey methodology, using instrument scales operationalized from existing literature. 
LinkedIn connections, numbering 1,310, were sent an invite, with a valid response rate of 
4.96%, skewed heavily towards males over 50 years of age. Next, the qualitative portion 




outcome groups, based on the quantitative findings, using a simple scoring model. Only 
two of the groups met the 5% representation threshold, of which only six participants 
were interviewed. Finally, the multi-step methodology used to transform interview data 









     In this chapter, the results of the data analysis are reported in various discussions and 
tables for both the research's quantitative and qualitative phases. The quantitative portion 
describes demographic statistics, findings from validity and reliability testing, and 
hypothesis analysis. The qualitative phase of the research also includes demographic 
statistics and validity and reliability support, integrated with the quantitative data for 
contextual support. Finally, the chapter culminates in a summary of the results. 
Phase 1 (P1): Quantitative Data Results 
     This section provides a discussion of the quantitative findings. The section elaborates 
on the validity, reliability, and consistency of findings from the measurement model. This 
is followed by a discussion of the data analysis methodology. Finally, the section 
concludes with an elaboration of the results of the quantitative analysis. 
P1: Measurement Model Findings 
     The validation methodology used SmartPLS analysis for convergent validity, the 
degree to which the same construct measures are related or agree. Xu, Luo et al. (2011) 
note, "In PLS, we conducted three tests to determine the convergent validity of measured, 
reflective constructs in a single instrument: reliability of items, composite reliability of 




items was assessed in several scales-aligned studies (Dinev & Hart, 2006; Kayhan & 
Davis, 2016; Li et al., 2011; Li et al., 2017; Son & Kim, 2008; Xu, Dinev et al., 2011). 
This study assessed each item’s factor loading to ensure it exceeded a minimum threshold 
of 0.70 (Bollen, 1989). All exceeded the threshold, as shown in Table 10. 
Table 10 
Loading and Cross-Loadings of Measures 
Constructs BITN DTVP SIPC 
BITN     
 BITN1 0.826 -0.351 -0.436 
BITN2 0.880 -0.331 -0.462 
BITN3 1.041 -0.417 -0.543 
DTVP     
 SPCN1 -0.346 0.859 0.651 
SPCN2 -0.412 0.943 0.680 
SPCN4 -0.418 0.769 0.568 
SIPC     
 SIPC1 -0.418 0.748 0.952 
SIPC2 -0.480 0.653 0.905 
SIPC3 -0.510 0.640 0.899 
SIPC4 -0.476 0.592 0.818 
 
     Composite reliability of constructs was also assessed in two scales-aligned studies 
(Kayhan & Davis, 2016; Xu, Dinev et al., 2011). This study also assessed that each 
construct’s composite reliability exceeded the minimal criterion of 0.70 (Nunnally, 












DTVP SIPC BITN 
BITN 0.942 0.846 0.920   
DTVP 0.894 0.739 -0.400 0.860  
SIPC 0.941 0.800 -0.525 0.738 0.895 
Note. Square root of AVE on the diagonals, correlations on off-diagonals 
 
AVE was assessed in several scales-aligned studies (Dinev & Hart, 2006; Kayhan & 
Davis, 2016; Li, 2014; Min & Kim, 2015; Xu, Dinev et al., 2011). This study measured 
the AVE to ensure it exceeded the minimum level of 0.50 (Fornell & Larcker, 1981), 
which all did, as shown in Table 11. 
     Discriminant validity is the degree to which different constructs are unrelated. 
Throughout the reference studies, discriminant validity was assessed using the square 
root of AVE and factor loadings/cross-loadings. The square root of the AVE was 
assessed in several of the scales-aligned studies (Li et al., 2011; Li et al., 2017; Min & 
Kim, 2015; Ozdemir et al., 2017; Son & Kim, 2008; Xu, Dinev et al., 2011). This study 
found that it was greater than the correlation between that construct and any other 
constructs (Fornell & Larcker, 1981), which it was, as shown in Table 11. Factor loadings 
and cross-loadings were also assessed in several scales-aligned studies (Li, 2014; Li et 
al., 2017; Ozdemir et al., 2017; Xu, Dinev et al., 2011). This study assessed that items 
were loaded more strongly on their intended construct than others (Gefen & Straub, 




     Reliability refers to the internal consistency of items. Specifically, responses are 
consistent across items and participants, assessed using CR and AVE. CR was assessed in 
several scales-aligned studies (Dinev & Hart, 2006; Li et al., 2011; Li et al., 2017; Min & 
Kim, 2015; Ozdemir et al., 2017; Son & Kim, 2008). This study exceeded 0.70 (Bagozzi 
& Yi, 1988; Fornell & Larcker, 1981) as shown in Table 11. AVE was assessed in 
several scales-aligned studies (Dinev & Hart, 2006; Li, 2014; Li et al., 2011; Li et al., 
2017; Ozdemir et al., 2017). This study exceeded 0.5 for all items (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988; 
Fornell & Larcker, 1981), as shown in Table 11. 
P1: Data Analysis, Partial Least Squares (PLS) 
     To measure the (a) influence of DTVP on situation-specific Internet privacy concerns 
and (b) situation-specific Internet privacy concerns on a user's intention to engage in 
privacy-protecting behaviors (modify their profile settings or keywords), the quantitative 
analysis utilized Partial Least Squares (PLS). Of the three studies investigating the 
influence of dispositional privacy concerns and site/situation-specific privacy concerns, 
all three utilized PLS. Of the 19 studies investigating the influence of privacy concern on 
intention 11 utilized PLS (Gu et al., 2017; Ku et al., 2013; Li, 2014; Li et al., 2011; Li et 
al., 2017; Li & Unger, 2012; Mao & Zhang, 2013; Osatuyi, 2015; Ozdemir et al., 2017; 
Xu, 2010; Xu & Gupta, 2009). Of the nine studies utilizing the same scales, six utilized 
PLS (Kayhan & Davis, 2016; Li, 2014; Li et al., 2011; Li et al., 2017; Ozdemir et al., 
2017; Xu, Dinev et al., 2011). However, while only one study fell into all three of the 
alignment areas for using PLS (Li, 2014), two fell into more than one alignment area (Li, 
2014; Mao & Zhang, 2013). The usage of PLS in a quantitative approach, especially 




studies had at least one hypothesis related to privacy concern, of which 16 used PLS. 
Thirteen of the 21 aligned reference studies utilized PLS. 
     Initially, it was assumed that a sample size of 65 would be adequate, since, as noted by 
Li et al. (2011), "PLS requires a much smaller sample size than other structural equation 
modeling (SEM) techniques" (p. 439). However, to validate this a software solution 
called G*Power 3.1 was used to calculate the number of participants needed for PLS 







     Before the analysis, the data were normalized for ingestion into the software. 
Specifically, fields were renamed to match the construct names and break out categorical 
control variables (age and sex) into dummy variables to incorporate into the model and 
were ingested with no errors. The analysis utilized the SmartPLS software application, 
and analysis was conducted using both the Consistent PLS Algorithm (PLSc) and 
Consistent PLS Bootstrapping as the model uses reflective factors. Specific settings for 
each analysis are provided in Table 12. 
Table 12 
SmartPLS Configurations 
SmartPLS Setting Bootstrap PLSc 
Initial Calculations Connect all LV’s for 
Initial Calculation 
Connect all LV’s for 
Initial Calculation 
Weighting Scheme Path Path 
Maximum Iterations 1000 1000 
Stop Criterion 7 7 
Subsamples 5000  
Amount of results Complete Bootstrapping  




Test Type Two-Tailed  
Significance Level 0.05  
   
P1: Structural Model Findings 
     Path coefficients and path significance for the two hypotheses are shown in Figure 3 






Research Model with Results and Significance 
 
Note. As each of these control variables was categorical, each category was modeled as dummy 
(binary) variables; age used five dummy variables, and sex used two.  Four dummy variables (30-
39, 20-29, <20, and female) had insufficient analysis samples. 
Table 13 
Hypothesis Testing Results 
Hypothesis Path Coefficients t value p-value Supported? 
H1 0.738 8.802 < 0.001 y 
H2 -0.549 5.353 < 0.001 y 
Age → BITN (50+) 0.302 1.492 0.136  
Age → BITN (40-49) 0.300 1.631 0.103  
Sex → BITN (Male) 0.151 1.389 0.165  
 
     Hypothesis One (H1) predicted that as a person's disposition to value privacy 
increased, their situation-specific Internet privacy concerns would also increase. The 
effect of DTVP on SIPC was shown to be both positive and significant (B=0.738, 




situation-specific Internet privacy concerns increased, their willingness to continue 
sharing information publicly on LinkedIn would decrease. The effect of SIPC on BITN 
was negative and significant (B=-0.549, p<0.001), therefore supporting H2. 
     Path coefficients and path significance for the control variables are also illustrated in 
Figure 3. The control variables of age and sex were analyzed for their effect on BITN, 
and neither affected BITN significantly. Only two age groups were modeled 50+ 
(B=0.302, p=0.136) and 40-49 (B=0.300, p=0.103); however, there were insufficient 
samples in the other three age groups (30-39, 20-29, and 19 or less) to analyze. Being 
male also had no significant effect on BITN (B=0.151, p=0.103); again, there was an 
insufficient number of females to analyze. 
Phase 2 (P2): Qualitative Data Results 
     This section provides a discussion of the qualitative findings. Creswell and Plano 
Clark (2018) describe the purpose of the integration as connecting the quantitative and 
qualitative phases. The first part of the section reviews the validity, reliability, and 
consistency findings from the interview data, followed by a discussion of the sequential 
integration methodology. Finally, the section concludes with an elaboration of the 
qualitative analysis results, including the integrated results. 
P2: Measurement Model Findings 
     Creswell and Plano Clark (2018) note, "In general, reliability plays a minor role in 
qualitative research because the inquirer instead emphasizes the value of his or subjective 
interpretations" (p. 217). Thus, validation focused on two primary goals, transcription 




Otter.ai tool to ensure that transcriptions were accurate. The validator reviewed each 
transcription within the tool and agreed with transcriptions. 
     In addition, two rounds of code-snippet validation were also conducted. First, six 
reviewers validated the code/snippet alignment by dividing it into three groups of two 
each. Each pair was aligned with both a code definition and an example snippet that best 
represented that code. The code-snippet pairs were distributed across the groups such that 
each code would receive two reviews. A simple scoring model was implemented for the 
review, asking each member to rate their concurrence with the author's alignment and 
provided example, broken out as "Agree = 1". "Good as anything = .5", or "Something 
else = 0". For "Something else," the reviewer was asked to suggest a different code. Of 
the six participants, only four completed the peer reviews: one from both groups one and 
three and two from group two; one of the reviewers from group two reviewed every item, 
thus providing three total reviews. The minimum concurrence score was set for two, and 
142/149 (95.90%) codes met or exceeded this score, as shown in Table D1. The seven 
snippets that did not meet the minimum score were dropped. 
     Second, the author created a unique ID for each snippet/code pair and tagged the 
appropriate text within each interview transcript, ensuring each snippet/code pair was 
unique. This review identified seven snippets that required de-confliction due to overlap. 
Post review, four of the seven codes were separated, and for the remaining three, one of 
the conflicting codes for each was dropped. After all the validation was completed, 139 




P2: Data Analysis, Sequential Integration 
     A sequential integration process was used to integrate the findings from both phases of 
the research. The integration's primary focus was to map shared category-code findings 
from each outcome group to the hypotheses. A final consolidated mapping provided a 
richer, more contextual understanding of the quantitative findings via a joint display, as 
shown in Table 14. Creswell and Plano Clark (2018) note, 
Researchers also need to represent the connection between the initial quantitative 
results and the following-up qualitative results with a joint display or graph. The 
purpose of such a results display is to make specific the link between the two 
connected databases and to help visualize how the qualitative findings enhance 
the understanding of the quantitative results (p 237). 
For each of the five categories, standardized methodology generated the contextual 
findings. First, code/snippet pairs were broken out by the two outcome groups. Next, the 
total number of snippets for each code/group pair was quantified, and the number of 
participants providing the associated snippets. Then, representative snippets were 
selected based on score in that the highest score of three was selected when possible. If 
multiple snippets were equal in score, best judgment was used based on the current 
context. Subsequently, an analysis was conducted to validate if the snippets and 
participants were normally distributed, then record the observations and outliers 
associated with each. 
     The hypothesis support analysis utilized the same methodology, with some additional 
steps in the beginning. First, category/code pairs were provided with their associated 




Categories for SIPC and BITN were associated with Hypothesis Two (H2). Next, only 
codes that were shared between the category pairs were selected for analysis. Finally, 
representative snippets were selected for each code-group to provide context, 
distributions analyzed, outliers identified, and observations were noted. 
     The analysis methodology was applied in three passes through the code/snippet 
pairings. First, an analysis was conducted on all codes and categories (including 
supplementary). Second, an analysis was conducted on code/snippet pairs for each 
category individually (including supplementary). Finally, an analysis was conducted on 
categories aligned with the hypotheses, and findings were integrated with the quantitative 
results. 
P2: Code Analysis Findings 
     All qualitative findings are presented in detail in Appendix D. Table D1 details all 
code-snippet pairs' findings derived from the interviews. The analysis resulted in 139 
snippets associated with 12 unique codes across two outcome groups (A and H) in a 
43.17(A)/56.83%(H) breakout. Calculations using all 12 codes and all five categories 
resulted in a distribution that did not differ significantly from the norm, as shown in 
Table A7. The following describes the specific findings by both group-participants and 
group-snippet. 
     Group-Participant: All Codes. There were six participants, all of whom were male 
and 50 or older, divided equally into the two outcome groups. Calculations using all 12 
codes and six participants resulted in a distribution that did not differ significantly from 




     Only two codes were discussed by all six participants, while various combinations of 
five participants discussed another four. All participants recognized the advantages of 
having a LinkedIn profile (benefit) and knowledge of internet collection and analysis 
activities (collection). However, only five indicated their intention (or lack thereof) to 
make changes to their profile (behavior) or their inclination to value privacy (GPCN), 
both of which were directly reflective of the underlying constructs. Five participants also 
discussed their expectations of privacy on sites (PRBF) or how their data was being used 
(usage).  
     Unlike their counterparts, Group A participants were more deliberate in their 
contentions. They did not have any codes represented by only one participant; they had 
five codes with zero snippets. However, only single participants from Group H indicated 
contributions by their decision on what/when to share (control), accuracy or inaccuracy 
of the posted data (errors), and/or personality traits. Group H was more deliberate in the 
overall number of items all members acknowledged, with a total of six (behavior, benefit, 
collection, GPCN, SPCN, and usage), as opposed to their group A counterparts at only 
four (benefit, collection, control, PRBF). As expected, with group H the least ambiguous 
representation of each variable, they were the only group to present all 12 codes; 
however, with only one participant in three codes (control, errors, PNTR). Group H was 
also the only group to indicate the influence of negative experiences (invasion), 
personality quirks (PNTR), laws (regulations), and concerns with this situation (SPCN). 
     Participants in group A did not present any notions regarding the influence of 




(PNTR), laws, regulations, or policies, or the situation (SPCN). Only single participants 
from group H indicated the influence of either errors or personality traits. 
     Group-Snippet: All Codes. There were 139 snippets separated into the two outcome 
groups in a 43.17/56.83% breakout, respectively. Calculations using all 12 codes and 
associated snippets resulted in a distribution that did not differ significantly from the 
norm, as shown in Table A7; however, group H participants contributed 64.71% more 
frequently. 
     There was a 50/50 split on the group presenting the most snippets for each of the four 
codes having more than the average (11.58) number of snippets. Group A provided the 
most snippets for the two codes having the most, 80.00% of the 25 snippets for PRBF and 
90.01% of the 22 snippets for control. However, group H provided the most snippets for 
the second two codes having the most snippets, 76.47% of the 17 snippets for usage and 
66.671% of the 12 snippets for collection. 
     Group A did not make any contributions for five codes (errors, invasion, PNTR, 
regulations, and SPCN), which would indicate that these were not a factor in the lesser 
degree representations of the variables. Group H indicated that both control and PNTR 
were underlying factors; however, two snippets only supported each. 
     Category 1: Breach of Privacy. The first interview topic sought to determine if the 
situation was a breach of privacy by stating, "For the next few minutes, let's discuss if 
this is a breach of privacy." The research design incorporated this topic to validate the 
assumption of whether the participants considered this situation a breach of privacy. 
Table A8 details the findings for this category derived from the interviews. Specifically, 




outcome groups in a 37.93(A)/62.07%(H) breakout, with neither group presenting either 
errors or PNTR. Separate calculations using all 12 codes, with all six participants and 
associated snippets, resulted in disparate distributions; the code-participant distribution 
did differ from normal, while the code-snippet distribution did not, as shown in Table A7. 
     Across both groups, 66.67% did not believe this situation was a breach of privacy, 
with the remaining indicating they were unsure. Both groups indicated that their 
inclinations to worry about privacy (GPCN) and potential for a loss of privacy (PRBF) 
were underlying factors, with group A providing 88.89% of the nine for PRBF; which 
presented at more than twice the number of snippets of the next most extensive code 
(invasion) response at four. Group A was also the only group to indicate that their ability 
to control their data was a factor. Group H had 133.33% more participant engagements at 
14 and 63.64% more snippets at 18. Consistent with their higher degree representation of 
the variables, group H also contributed 63.64% more snippets and seven unique codes 
(behavior, benefit, collection, invasion, regulation, SPCN, and usage). As stated earlier, 
invasion had the second most snippets, indicating that previous negative experiences 
were a factor for group H. 
     While both groups indicated that their inclination toward privacy was a factor, it was 
unsubstantial, with only a single participant from each group presenting a single snippet. 
Participants in group H indicated that maintaining their profile (behavior) and potential 
legalities and liabilities (regulation) were factors, again minimal as a single participant 
only presented each with a single snippet. Unlike the others in group H, one of the 




     Category 2: DTVP. The second interview topic sought to elicit the participant's 
disposition to value privacy by stating, "For the next few minutes, let's discuss your 
disposition to value privacy." Table A9 details the findings for the DTVP category 
derived from the interviews. There were 11 codes supported by 34 snippets provided by 
all six participants across the outcome groups in a 35.29(A)/64.71%(H) breakout; 
however, the code for behavior was not presented by any participant. Separate 
calculations using all 12 codes, with all six participants and associated snippets, resulted 
in distributions that did not differ significantly from the norm, as shown in Table A7.  
     Both groups discussed elements of control (what to share, how much to share, and 
when to engage in sharing), with group A providing 77.78% of the nine snippets for 
control, which presented nearly twice the next most extensive code (GPCN and PRBF) 
responses at four. Consistent with earlier trends, group H had 166.67% more participant 
engagements at 16 and 83.34% more snippets at 22. All group H members affirmatively 
expressed their inclination to value privacy (GPCN). 
     While both groups indicated that the advantages of having a LinkedIn profile were a 
factor, it was negligible, with only a single participant from each group presenting a 
single snippet. Group A did not make any contributions for six codes (collection, errors, 
invasion, PNTR, regulation, and usage), which would indicate that these were not a factor 
in the lesser degree representations of the variables. Participants in group H indicated that 
while collection, errors, invasion, and usage (four codes) were factors, all were minimal 
as a single participant only presented each with a single snippet. 
     Category 3: SIPC. The third interview topic sought to derive the participant's level of 




your level of concern regarding LinkedIn scraping/posting your data." Table A9 details 
the findings for the SIPC category derived from the interviews. There were eight codes 
supported by 28 snippets provided by all six participants, across the outcome groups in a 
39.29(A)/60.71%(H) breakout, with neither group presenting four codes (benefit, GPCN, 
invasion, and PNTR) in this category. Separate calculations using all 12 codes, with all 
six participants and associated snippets, resulted in distributions that were not normally 
distributed, as shown in Table A7.  
     During the interviews, members of both groups discussed internet collection and 
analysis activities (collection) and the ambiguity on the ultimate purpose for the scraped 
data (usage). However, group A provided 33.33% more snippets at three for collection, 
and group H provided 500.00% more snippets at six for usage. Consistent with the trend, 
group H had 66.67% more engagements at 10 and 54.55% more snippets at 17. All group 
H members affirmatively expressed privacy concerns regarding this situation (SPCN) and 
the potentially nefarious applications of their scraped data (usage). 
     Group A did not make any contributions for six codes (behavior, benefit, errors, 
GPCN, PNTR, and regulations), which would indicate that these were negligible factors 
in the lesser degree representations of the variables. Also, only a single participant from 
group A presented the only four snippets for control in this category. Group H did not 
make any contributions for five codes (benefit, control, GPCN, PNTR, and PRBF), which 
would indicate that these were minor factors in the higher degree representations of the 
variables. 
     Category 4: BITN. The fourth interview topic sought to derive the participant's 




your intention to modify your LinkedIn profile's visibility." Table A9 details the findings 
for the BITN category derived from the interviews. There were nine codes supported by 
27 snippets presented from all six participants, across the outcome groups in a 
59.25(A)/40.74%(H) breakout, with neither group presenting three codes (PNTR, 
regulations, and SPCN) by any participant in this category. Separate calculations using all 
12 codes, with all six participants and associated snippets, resulted in distributions that 
were not normally distributed, as shown in Table A7.  
     The groups diverged in their intention to modify their profiles, although both agreed 
there were advantages to having a LinkedIn profile (benefit). While benefit presented at 
100%, only 83.33% of all participants discussed their intentions to modify their profile 
(behavior, with only group H affirming this intent), resulting in the most associated 
snippets in this category. Unlike the previous categories, group A had 11.11% more 
engagements at 10 and 45.45% more snippets at 16. 
     Group A did not make any contributions for three codes (collection, errors, and 
invasion), which would indicate that these were not a factor in the lesser degree 
representations of the variables. Participants in group A also indicated three codes 
(control, GPCN, and PRBF) were factors, again irrelevant as a single participant only 
presented each with a single snippet. Group H did not make any contributions for four 
codes (control, GPCN, PRBF, and usage), which would indicate that these were 
unimportant in the higher degree representations of the variables. Participants in group H 
also indicated three codes (collection, errors, and invasion) were factors, yet irrelevant as 




     Category 5: Supplementary. The fifth interview topic sought to provide any additional 
reflections from the interview subjects by stating, "Are there any other additional 
thoughts or comments you might have?" Table A10 details the findings for the 
supplementary category derived from the interviews. There were eight codes supported 
by 21 snippets presented from only five participants across the outcome groups in a 
47.62(A)/52.38%(H) breakout, with neither group presenting four codes (behavior, 
GPCN, PNTR, and SPCN) by any participant in this category. Separate calculations 
using all 12 codes, with only five participants and associated snippets, resulted in 
distributions not normally distributed, as shown in Table A7. 
     Group A was the only group to indicate that their decisions on what/when to share 
(control) and expectations of privacy on sites (PRBF) were factors by 66.67% of the 
participants. Group H had 16.67% more participant engagements at 7 and 10.00% more 
snippets at 11; however, one group A member did not contribute to this category. Group 
H was the only group to indicate that laws (regulations) and how their data was being 
used (usage) were factors, by 66.67% of the participants. 
     While both groups indicated that knowledge of internet collection and analysis 
activities (collection) was a factor, it was unimportant. Only a single participant from 
each group presented a single snippet. A single group A participant acknowledged that 
the advantages of having a LinkedIn profile were a factor with a single snippet. Group A 
did not make any contributions for four codes (errors, invasion, regulation, and usage), 
indicating that these were not factors in the lesser degree representations of the variables. 
As mentioned earlier, one participant in group A did not contribute any snippets. Group 




would indicate that these were negligible factors in the higher degree representations of 
the variables. Participants in group H also indicated three codes (collection, errors, and 
invasion) were factors. However, again these were minimal, with a single participant only 
presenting each with a single snippet. 
P2: Sequential Integration Findings 
     Hypothesis One (H1). The quantitative analysis found significant support for H1, 
showing that DTVP has a positive effect on SIPC. Table 14 details the findings for the 
integration of results associated with H1. Overlap analysis of categories DTVP and SIPC 
resulted in seven codes supported by 40 snippets from all six participants. 
Table 14 
Sequential Integration Results 
Hypo/ 
Code OG Participants Snippets Representative Snippets 
H1/CNTL A 3 11 • “So if if I don't want uh, if if I want to be 
private, that I don't engage, that's that's the only 
way to be completely private." (11188138618, 
CNTL02, DTVP) 
• “Okay. So once again, I mean it's, it's up to me 
to be careful of what I put out there in terms of 
uh you know what content I make available." 
(11269613365, CNTL12, SIPC) 
H1/PRBF A 2 5 • “Um so uh I don't um believe that knowing my 
name, and uh, and uh knowing my disposition, 
but through conversation, either over the phone 
or uh, or in person is anything more than just um 
that person that I'm engaging with, using their 
uh, their skills and their uh techniques of a, of a 
um observation to to make a make a deduction." 
(11188138618, PRBF20, DTVP) 
• “So maybe you have a question about it, you 
know, we've been instructed to contact the 
government, if you have, if you have any 
concerns, so uh most of that stuff has been 
vetted that that I would ever talk about, I have 








Code OG Participants Snippets Representative Snippets 
H1/COLL H 1 3 • “I, I suspect the bigger the bigger issue and bigger 
concern um would be to take uh the information 
from the OPM or some of the other databases that 
have been breached and and kind of uh meld them 
together if you will." (11251351842, COLL09, 
DTVP) 
• “So uh I think I need some questions answered, 
um before I can move forward in having worked in 
the IC community for a short period of time, just a 
couple years, I know the capabilities of what they 
can do and and uh things they can look at." 
(11224014306, COLL05, SIPC) 
H1/ERRS H 1 2 • “Professional reasons I had to and uh but every 
now and then I go back in there and I make some 
adjustments, make some updates, take some stuff 
off that are no longer relevant." (11205114603, 
ERRS01, DTVP) 
• “But uh, but for me, I have no need to be in that 
um in that world anymore. Uh, so as time goes on 
I, I remove a lot of those specific key 
terminologies simply because um that's in the past 
and it's no longer relevant." (11205114603, 
ERRS03, SIPC) 
H1/REGL H 2 4 • “And actually was a little disappointed when the 
Patriot Act was ah, I think if I'm not mistaken, I 
know it's being re-looked, I think it may have been 
approved, but I'm not sure we've made any 
adjustments on that. For our, our, our new um for 
this period, any updates, if you will, excuse me." 
(11224014306, REGL05, DTVP) 
• “Um um but but looking at the some of the 
previous models, um especially with uh Chelsea 
Manning, and and uh and others. Um it it certainly 
did harmful and uh severe damage to the US 
government writ large." (11251351842, REGL01, 
SIPC) 
H1/SPCN H 3 8 • “I become quite concerned, also concerned with 
little funny things that happen when ah I'm 
standing around talking about a subject and it 
shows up on my ah Amazon feed or something of 
that nature." (11224014306, SPCN08, DTVP) 
• “Okay, yeah, that was a surprise to me. Um, I, at 
first I was I was uh, I was quite unhappy about 
that. But on the other end, I went back to my 
original philosophy. Well, I put the stuff out 












Code OG Participants Snippets Representative Snippets 
H1/USGE H 3 7 • “So ah somebody's grabbing my information, ah 
somebody's using it for whether it's sales, or 
whether to rob me or use my uh uh social security 
number." (11224014306, USGE12, DTVP) 
• “Uh, for whatever purposes um, you know, could 
be nefarious, it could simply be trying to find the 
right people for the right position across the IC uh 
or other other agencies, private and public." 
(11205114603, USGE10, SIPC) 
H2/CNTL A 1 7 • “Okay. So once again, I mean it's, it's up to me to 
be careful of what I put out there in terms of uh 
you know what content I make available." 
(11269613365, CNTL12, SIPC) 
• “If I'm worried about it, it's gonna be a situation 
where I'll push it to the guy. And it won't be 
through the site, it'll be through an email or 
something a little bit more secure." (11269613365, 
CNTL11, BITN) 
H2/PRBF A 2 6 • “So, you know, again uh, you know, I made the 
conscious effort, uh the conscious decision that 
that what they were going to be able to ascertain 
from me was uh not going to directly uh um affect 
me and uh in a negative way and and not to 
negatively uh affect me in an indirect ways either. 
Um I don't think that a uh bad actor could um 
necessarily get enough information to do do me or 
my um family harm." (11188138618, PRBF14, 
SIPC) 
• “I also realize that people that know know people 
that I know can see my some of my stuff because 
they, they share it. So, once again, I uh it's my 
assumption that anything that's on those sites is 
going to be open source to anybody." 
(11269613365, PRBF11, BITN) 
H2/USGE A 2 3 • “Uh I believe that IC I don't know where 
ICWATCH is located or the people that are 
involved in it, but they potentially make it easy for 
enemies of the United States to assemble 
information." (11223476508, USGE09, SIPC) 
• “And I believe that uh people generally generally 
are doing the right thing and abiding by the terms 
of service and uh and why they're using the 
system. But I know that that is not always the 
case." (11223476508, USGE06, BITN) 
H2/BEHV H 3 6 • “And I think I went back there and uh did a 
general scrub and use more general terminology, 
because I'm not I'm no longer in that in that 
profession." (11205114603, personal 
communication, BEHV02, SIPC) 
• “So I I toned that thing down. An I uh think I uh I 
uh may be doing the same with uh LinkedIn." 






Code OG Participants Snippets Representative Snippets 
H2/COLL H 1 3 • “So uh I think I need some questions answered, 
um before I can move forward in having worked in 
the IC community for a short period of time, just a 
couple years, I know the capabilities of what they 
can do and and uh things they can look at." 
(11224014306, COLL05, SIPC) 
• “Um again, I don't know, they're we're looking at 
if they've taken everything, um IP addresses, any 
phone numbers that may or may not be in there.  
Anything, anything I may have said." 
(11224014306, COLL08, BITN) 
H2/ERRS H 1 2 • “But uh, but for me, I have no need to be in that 
um in that world anymore. Uh, so as time goes on 
I, I remove a lot of those specific key 
terminologies simply because um that's in the past 
and it's no longer relevant." (11205114603, 
ERRS03, SIPC) 
• “Um, as I mentioned before, I'm definitely uh 
steering away from uh the IC community because 
uh I haven't been involved in in quite a while 
there's really no point it's actually misleading. For 
those who see that language. Um, I don't want to 
waste anybody's time. And uh really, um but it's 
it's a constant care and feeding of my public 
profile to present the most accurate up to date and 
uh harmless um public presentation that I can um 
you uh to uh you know benefit those in my 
network and uh and myself to be honest." 
(11205114603, ERRS02, BITN) 
Note. Codes for behavior and SPCN, which directly reflect the underlying constructs and topics, 
support/refute the associated hypotheses. Only one participant provided a single snippet for COLL or 
ERRS in SIPC, accounting for the duplication. Snippet details provided after each in the following 
format: Participant ID, Code ID, Category. Code ERRS03 intentionally used twice. 
 
     There were no codes shared between the two groups; six codes were overlapped 
within the groups (collection control, errors, PRBF, regulations, and usage) and across 
the categories, with 66.67% participant representation in four (control, PRBF, 
regulations, and usage). Both groups also overlapped on the code SPCN, which reflects 
statements directly related to one of the hypothesis constructs and discussion topics, with 
a 66.67% representation. There was overlap on two codes for group A, indicating that 
decisions on what/when to share (control) and expectations of privacy on sites (PRBF) 




100% of participants for control and 66.67% for PRBF. There was overlap on five codes 
for group H (collection, errors, regulation, SPCN, and usage) for the higher degree 
representation group, with 100% of participants for both SPCN and usage, each having 
the second-largest number of snippets, eight and seven, respectively. Support for 
regulation was at the 66.67% participation level.  
     Group H indicated both knowledge of internet collection and analysis activities 
(collection) and notions about inaccuracies (errors), but a single participant only 
presented each with a single snippet. This would indicate that these were not relevant 
factors in the higher degree representations of the variables. 
     Hypothesis Two (H2). The quantitative analysis found significant support for H2, 
showing that SIPC has a negative effect on the intention (BITN) to continue sharing 
information publicly on LinkedIn. Table 14 details the findings for the integration of 
results associated with H2. Overlap analysis of categories SIPC and BITN resulted in six 
codes supported by 27 snippets presented from all six participants. 
     Again, there were no codes shared between the two groups; five codes were 
overlapped within the groups (collection, control, errors, PRBF, and usage) and across 
categories, with 66.67% representation in two code, PRBF and usage. Both groups also 
overlapped on the code behavior, reflecting statements directly related to one of the 
hypothesis constructs and discussion topics, with an 83.34% representation. There was a 
50/50 split of the six associated codes between the two groups. There was overlap on 
three codes for group A (control, PRBF, and usage), which may antecede or moderate 
this hypothesis for the lower degree representation group, with 66.67% of participants for 




collection, and errors) for the higher degree representation group, with 100% of 
participants for behavior. 
     There was overlap on one code for group A, indicating that decisions on what/when to 
share (control), but a single participant only presented each with a single snippet. This 
would indicate that these were not substantial factors in the higher degree representations 
of the variables. The same outliers for group H associated with Hypothesis One (H1) also 
apply here, single contributions for both collection and errors. 
Summary of Results 
     The mixed methodology approach produced two datasets, quantitative and qualitative, 
which were then integrated. The following summarizes whether the hypotheses were 
supported and significant, which other factors potentially underlie the study's 
unidimensional constructs, and which other factors potentially influenced the hypotheses. 
Constructs 
     Breach of privacy. 66.68% of the participants did not indicate they believed this to be 
a breach of privacy. When discussed, both groups indicated that this might be more 
relevant to privacy risk beliefs (66.67%) and general privacy concerns (33.33%). 
However, the groups diverged on other influencing factors. Two-thirds of group A 
implied that control might influence this. Two-thirds of group H implied that several 
other factors might influence this, including benefit, collection, invasion, situational 
privacy concern, and usage. 
     DTVP. When discussed, only 66.67% of the participants affirmed privacy concerns 




(66.667%), and PRBF (50.00%). However, group H at 66.67% representation indicated 
that specific (SPCN) versus general privacy concerns may be meaningful in the lower 
degree of the variables.  
     SIPC. When discussed, both groups indicated that this might be influenced by 
collection (50.00%) and usage (66.667%). However, the groups diverged on other 
influencing factors. Additionally, group A at 66.67% representation indicated that usage 
may be important in the lower degree of the variables. All members of Group H made 
reflective statements regarding SPCN bolstering support in the higher degree of the 
variables. 
     BITN. When discussed, both groups at 100% of all participants indicated that the 
advantages of having a profile (benefit) might be influential. However, only 83.33% of 
all participants discussed their intentions to modify their profile (behavior, with only 
group H affirming this intent). Additionally, group A at 66.67% representation indicated 
that usage may be meaningful in the lower degree representations of the variables. 
     Supplementary. When allowed to provide additional reflections not explicitly related 
to any topic, the groups diverged on other influencing factors. Group A indicated, with 
66.67% representation, that control and PRBF may be meaningful in the lower degree 
representations of the variables. However, group H indicated, with 66.67% 
representation, that regulations may be meaningful in the higher degree representations of 
the variables. 
Hypotheses 
     Hypothesis One (H1). H1 had significant support and showed that DTVP influenced 




A had two shared codes bridging the hypothesis constructs, control (100%) and PRBF 
(66.667%). Group H also had three shared codes, regulation (66.67%) and usage (100%), 
as well as SPCN (100%), which was reflective of both a construct and topic. 
     Hypothesis Two (H2). H2 had significant support and showed that SIPC did influence 
BITN as expected. Again, the groups diverged on potential influencing factors. Group A 
had two shared codes bridging the hypothesis constructs, PRBF (66.67%) and usage 
(66.67%). Group H only had one code behavior (100%), indicating their unanimity 
towards modifying their profile. 
     Control variables. Neither of the control variables, age or sex, influenced BITN. 








Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, Summary 
     The chapter presents the conclusions drawn from the mixed methods design and 
subsequent findings, providing a discussion on accomplishing the objectives, alternative 
explanations, strengths, weaknesses, and limitations. From there, an elaboration of the 
findings' implications regarding their contributions and impacts on the field of study. 
Then, it furnishes recommendations for future research and the application to 
professional practice. Finally, the chapter culminates in a full summary of the research 
study. 
Conclusions 
     The mixed method approach was completed in two phases. The quantitative portion 
utilized a survey instrument and PLS model analysis, while the qualitative portion used 
interviews followed by sequential integration. Overall, the analysis showed clear support 
for the underlying research questions, all of which were grounded in the context of 
providing empirical justification for a relationship between privacy concern and behavior 
intention in an actual privacy-centric situation. The second phase of the mixed method 
approach provided context to the research questions, resulting in strong representation for 
several antecedents or moderating factors, often spread unequally across the two groups 
characterizing the low and high degree of variable representations. Across the entire 




(privacy risk belief) that bridged across both hypotheses. It was evident that more factors 
influenced group H participants (higher degree of variables), presenting all 12 codes, five 
more than group A. Group H appeared to be additionally influenced by factors such as 
the inaccuracy of their information (errors), negative experiences on the Internet 
(invasion), their personality quirks (personality traits), existing laws (regulations), and 
concerns about ICWATCH or the situation (specific privacy concerns). 
     When allowed to provide additional reflections not explicitly related to any topic, both 
groups were again divided on the underlying factors influencing the situation. Group A 
again commented on the influence of choosing what to share (control, 66.67%) and the 
expectation of privacy on LinkedIn (privacy risk belief, 66.67%). Group H also reiterated 
that influences regarding applicable laws (regulation, 66.67%) were still present. Lastly, 
for each of the hypotheses, the groups continued to diverge on the underlying factors. 
     The two groups personified the opposite degrees of the relationships between the 
hypothesis variables. The only exact point of agreement between the two groups was the 
advantages of having a LinkedIn profile. Group A members had the least concern for 
privacy in general and none with the situation and had no plans nor intention to change 
their profile. Their ability to select what, when, and where to share was the most 
expressed, at 10 times the amount of comments of their counterparts. While they knew 
their information was being collected on the internet, they did not expect privacy. 
     On the other hand, group H members valued the right to be left alone. They were 
concerned when they saw this situation and expressed an intent to "tone it down" (profile) 
or "take another look." They also revealed more latent factors influencing both their 




may not reflect their current resume accurately. They had previously had an account 
hacked, or money was stolen. They were introverted or uninteresting, or they were not 
sure that protections provided by laws and regulations (e.g., Patriot and Privacy Acts) 
were enough. They acknowledged that there was no expectation of privacy on the 
internet, but at four times as much as their counterparts. While they also knew their data 
was being collected and had no expectation of privacy, they expressed these sentiments at 
twice their counterparts' rate. 
Hypothesis One (H1) 
     The quantitative analysis showed strong support for the first hypothesis, that general 
privacy concerns influence situation-specific privacy concerns in actual privacy-centric 
situations. Again, different factors were exposed to be either antecedent or moderating 
between the different degrees of each associated variable. Group A expressed support for 
the influence of both control and privacy risk belief (66.67%). Participants in this group 
expressed a conscious choice to both participate and what information to share on 
LinkedIn (control), as expressed by Participant 11188138618, “…if I want to be private, 
that I don't engage … that's the only way to be completely private." They also expressed 
sentiments regarding the conscious decisions made when posting information to LinkedIn 
and that the data was either already sanitized appropriately or not sensitive (privacy risk 
belief); as voiced by Participant 11188138618, “…I made the conscious effort, uh the 
conscious decision … I don't think that a uh bad actor could um necessarily get enough 
information to … do me or my um family harm." 
 Group H conveyed support for the influence of regulation (66.67%), specific 




apparent lack of application of existing regulations (Constitutional amendments, Patriot 
Act, and Privacy Act), as well as a lack of government action (regulation), as disclosed 
by Participant 11251351842, "… the fact that ICWATCH has violated personal privacy 
in the past … the US Government's [lack of] resolve to do anything about it." 
They also expressed concern when they became aware of the situation (specific privacy 
concerns), as revealed by Participant 11251351842, "… their [ICWATCH] behavior 
certainly raises red flags." Finally, they indicated a lack of understanding as to what 
ICWATCH was doing with their data, expressing that it may be inappropriate (usage), as 
expressed by Participant 11224014306, "… if I'd summed up in one statement, what are 
you [ICWATCH] doing with it?" 
Hypothesis Two (H2) 
     The quantitative analysis also showed strong support for the second hypothesis, that 
situation-specific privacy concerns influence behavior intention in actual privacy-centric 
situations, again with diverging underlying factors. Group A indicated support for the 
influence of both privacy risk belief (66.67%) and usage (66.67%). Participants in this 
group indicated that a conscious choice was made to post information they knew could be 
shared and seen by others, and the risk had been evaluated (privacy risk belief), as 
disclosed by Participant 11269613365, "… it's my assumption that anything that's on 
those sites is going to be open source to anybody." They also expressed notions 
indicating they recognized their data was probably being used in ways they did not fully 
understand (usage), as voiced by Participant 11223476508, "And I believe that uh people 
… are doing the right thing and abiding by the terms of service …. but I know that that is 




planned to revisit their profile on LinkedIn, as expressed by Participant 11205114603, 
"…. I plan on I don't do it as frequently as I should. …. But yeah, before the weekend. I'll 
probably go back in there [LinkedIn]." 
Breach of Privacy 
     It was clear that while this was a privacy-centric situation that was of privacy concern, 
it was not a breach of privacy. When discussed, both groups indicated an influence by 
privacy risk beliefs (66.67%). Participants in both groups indicated that there was no 
expectation of privacy, as people are essentially putting their information in the public 
domain (privacy risk belief), as disclosed by Participant 11269613365, "But I think if you 
go out to social media sites … you don't have any uh, any expectation of privacy at that 
point." (11269613365, personal communication, March 28, 2020). However, the groups 
differed on other elements. Group A conveyed support for the influence of control 
(66.67%) in that participants could choose what to share, as voiced by Participant 
11223476508, "… my resume is an assemblage of my life experience and I have not 
divulged any classified information. In fact, that resume was scrubbed and approved for 
release prior to it being posted anywhere or used for my job search." 
     However, Group H indicated support for the influence of collection (66.67%) and 
usage (66.67%). Participants noted the potential naïveté of Internet users (collection) and 
the sophistication of Internet aggregation, as indicated by Participant 11205114603, 
"...I'm not sure many people realize that whatever they put out there is being scooped up 
... to assist whatever agency creates those aggregators." They also conveyed that 
providers and others are using data without permission and for undesirable and/or 




and uh puts it in, in the public under a false light … for some sort of uh, uh commercial 
advantage." 
Constructs 
     The qualitative findings also provided insight into each of the antecedents or 
moderators of the individual constructs. For DTVP, both groups indicated the underlying 
influence of both the decision of when/what to share (control, 66.67%) and the 
expectation of losing privacy on LinkedIn (PRBF, 50.0%), with 66.67% making 
statements reflective of their inclination to worry about privacy (GPCN). However, group 
H indicated that associated laws (regulations, 66.67%) and concerns regarding the 
ICWATCH situation (SPCN, 66.67%) also exert influence. For SIPC, both groups 
indicated that this was influenced by their information being collected and analyzed 
(collection, 50.0%) and what purposes their data was being used for (usage, 66.667%). 
Consistent with the trend, the groups diverged on other influencing factors. Group A 
described the influence of PRBF (66.67%), while 100% of group H made comments 
directly reflective of situational privacy concerns (SPCN). For BITN, both groups 
indicated the influence regarding the advantages of the data available in the profile 
(benefit, 100%), with 83.33% discussing their choice to modify their profile (behavior). 
However, group A also implied that ambiguity regarding how the data was employed 
(usage, 66.67%) influenced their perspective. 
Objectives 
     The results of the study met the three goals associated with the research. The first goal 




justification for a relationship between privacy concerns and behavior intention in an 
actual privacy-centric situation. As in the literature, the results demonstrated that the 
resulting significance was similar, whether applied to an actual situation or contrived 
scenarios. For Hypothesis One (H1) DTVPàSIPC, this study found a p<.001 
significance. Kayhan & Davis (2016) and Li (2014) found similar levels of significance 
for similar constructs, p<.01 and p<.05 levels, respectively. For Hypothesis Two (H2), 
SIPCàBITN, this study found a p<.001, which was similar to that found by Li (2014) at 
p<.01. The second and third goals were that the research would justify the 
appropriateness of the constructs and scales regarding usage in actual situations. With 
valid findings for the research model analysis and tests of measurement items, the 
constructs and scales remain valid and applicable in an actual context. The qualitative 
results provided further justification as each construct was equated with a category and 
discussed with participants, with no noted issues. The author informed interview 
participants at the outset that they could ask for clarification at any time and was 
provided the opportunity to add additional reflections at the end, yet did not. 
Alternative Explanations 
     Other factors may have contributed to findings of which privacy concerns were only 
antecedent or moderating. The sentiments expressed regarding the advantages of sharing 
information on LinkedIn (benefit) had 100% representation by all the interview 
participants. The population for the study consisted of 1st- and 2nd-degree LinkedIn 
connections to the author. A potential population skew existed as there was no way to 




of factors associated with any individual's profile (e.g., sex, age, education, industry, 
number of connections, etc.) and no insight into the search algorithm itself. 
     Limited participation may have also skewed the results in real privacy-centric 
situations. The participation of only 65 out of 1,310 (4.96%) possible responders to 
complete the survey and 44 volunteering for follow-up interviews (3.35%) may not be 
surprising. Only the most concerned individuals may have volunteered (i.e., the most 
robust representation of the variable), accounting for the lack of representation in other 
outcome groups. Males overrepresented females by 612.50%, and the age category of 
older than 50 years overrepresented all other age categories combined by 50%. 
Chakraborty et al.’s (2013) work was indicative of this response. His work on Facebook 
found partial support for older males and females, making different sharing decisions. 
Similarly, Zhang et al. (2013) discovered a positive correlation between age and privacy 
concerns (multidimensional; in an m-commerce context), as well as support for age 
influencing behavior (specifically younger users' willingness to conduct mobile 
commerce [m-commerce] activities). Either or both of these could account for the 
significance of the findings. 
Strengths, Weaknesses, Limitations 
     Strengths. While not a breach of privacy, both groups' revelations of their expectation 
of losing privacy on LinkedIn (privacy risk belief) supports labeling this situation as 
privacy-centric. The qualitative codes were operationalized using items adapted from 
validated constructs in the existing literature. This alignment was appropriate as this 
study sought to validate the unidimensional privacy concerns, which resulted in evidence 




significance from contrived scenarios (p<.05 and p<.01) to actual (p<.001) bolstered the 
validity of the findings. 
     Weaknesses. The study utilized a convenience population, limiting the generalizability 
of results, which was exacerbated by a sample size of only 65 (a 4.96% participation rate) 
and skewed heavily towards men over 50 years of age. The interview methodology front-
loaded the breach of privacy topic at the onset of the interview. While necessary to 
validate the research's underlying assumption, it may have framed the discussion, thereby 
skewing the presented factors and the final qualitative results. While only two outcome 
groups reached the 5% level, other non-represented outcome groups may have presented 
different unique factors during the interviews, changing the factors underlying each 
hypothesis. Four codes were represented weakly across all six interview participants, 
errors (16.67%), invasion (33.34%), PNTR (16.67%), and regulations (33.34%), which 
may have been more weighty with more participants. Lastly, while group H presented 
homogenously for both SPCN (100%) and usage (100%), several snippets had qualifiers 
indicating that it was not surprising upon reflection, as revealed by Participant 
11205114603, “… the more I thought about it, the more I realized, well, that's to be 
expected." 
     Limitations. Access to demographic diversity may continue to be problematic in real 
situations. For this study, the Intelligence Community was the target of the privacy-
centric situation; however, of the 16 agencies comprising the Intelligence Community, 
more than half (9) fell under the Department of Defense (DoD) (Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence [ODNI], n.d.). Considering this, approximately 16% of the active-




assessing actual behavior, not merely intention, may be problematic. Initially, the 
deployed methodology only assessed if participants modified their profiles; actual 
behavior regarding privacy concerns had little representation in the literature. However, 
once LinkedIn changed its security settings, the author lacked a viable way to validate 
that while the hypothesis was supported, people subsequently modified their profile. 
Also, locating actual privacy-centric situations and their identifiable populations is 
problematic as well. The study focused on a specific situation, which could infer the 
findings were only relevant in this particular instance. Finally, no specific methodology 
approximated the population demographics at the onset. Informally, the author assumed 
that the age and sex of the population would be equally distributed. Such was not 
supported in this study. 
Implications 
     This research provides valuable contributions to the existing literature gaps regarding 
general and specific privacy concerns and their influence on behavior intention in a real 
situation. In contrast, the literature is primarily based on studies using contrived 
approaches. This study used individuals in actual situations and evaluated their 
behavioral intention on a specific action available to them. 
     The results provide empirical support for the influence of other factors in actual 
privacy-centric situations. As there may be limited opportunities to investigate actual 
privacy-centric situations, underlying factors expressed here lend support to prioritizing 





     An assumption that researchers need to find a breach of privacy to best model a 
privacy-centric situation may not be necessary. Qualitative findings indicated a breach 
was not required. Support for the hypotheses and associated qualitative factors only 
indicate that situations be privacy-centric. The findings also support utilizing 
multidimensional constructs for privacy concerns in actual situations versus 
unidimensional. This study modeled the literature trend of broad to specific and found 
good support for a unidimensional application. However, the qualitative portion revealed 
factors such as collection, invasion, errors, and usage, which typically align with 
multidimensional privacy concerns, such as CFIP. There was a lack of overlap in the 
shared codes across the two hypotheses and only full participant support for one code, 
implying that various factors may influence the entire situation. Compounding this 
possible scenario is that each group, representing different degrees of the variables, 
presented different codes for each hypothesis, with only a single code (PRBF) bridging 
for the low representation of the variables. 
     The results also have implications for the populations associated with research on 
actual privacy situations regarding demographics and participation. The general 
assumption that a relatively equal distribution of sex and age will be available is likely 
not realistic in real situations. As these situations are unpredictable, researchers may need 
to aggregate individual cases to accommodate diverse demographics fully. The necessary 
rate of participation may also pose challenges. Although 78 individuals were willing to 
engage at some level, which implies that these situations can yield viable populations, it 
may be unpredictable. As Participant 11269613365 stated, "I don't friend everybody 




Research into actual privacy situations may need to modify participation assumptions to 
accommodate lower participation rates. This study expected a participation rate of 19% 
using LinkedIn, based on results from Claybaugh and Haseman (2015), yet only achieved 
a 4.96% rate. 
Recommendations 
 
     Based on this study's population demographics, future researchers may want to over-
sample a specific demographic intentionally to compensate for a lower participation rate, 
as was the case in this study, with women participation at just 6.04%. While not an 
entirely reliable method, something akin to the post-population analysis using popular 
baby names, could help ensure a more equitable participation distribution. Xu, Dinev et 
al. (2011) noted that using a more diverse sample increased generalizability to the general 
population. 
     Actual privacy situations require further research. While the findings support the 
hypotheses in this real privacy-centric situation, additional studies should address if the 
results are unique to this particular situation. Applying a mixed method approach would 
also address whether the same qualitative factors are present or changed in different 
situations. Future studies using a mixed method approach should also consider using a 
more open interview process. While a semi-structured approach was a reasonable trade-
off between structured and open for this initial study into an actual situation, an open 
interview process may have revealed other latent factors. 
     While all group H members presented supportive codes for both behavior and SPCN 




of benefit and usage, which also had 100% representation. While the groups representing 
different degrees of the variables diverged on provided codes, prioritizing the higher 
degree group's factors should be considered. From a full model perspective, the 
advantages (benefit) in having a LinkedIn profile may indicate a privacy paradox for 
participants (Wakefield, 2013; Xu, Luo et al., 2011). While it did not factor directly into 
the hypothesis support, this high degree of representation suggests its influence, as 
expressed by Participant 11269613365, "So that to me is a social media site's all about us 
out there trying to basically generate a network." 
     For OSN providers, the results indicate that while the participants did not express an 
intention to discontinue using the platform, it was evident that external actors may 
influence what information they choose to share/continue sharing based on external 
visibility. As noted by Kayhan & Davis (2016), "Increased awareness of the factors that 
contribute to situational privacy concerns will enable online service providers to be more 
proactive in mitigating concerns" (p. 233). 
Summary of Results 
     Both the government and large public organizations (i.e., Google, Facebook, and 
Amazon) have recently encountered news-worthy privacy issues regarding the massive 
amounts of data each collects, transmits, and stores. However, private entities, such as 
ICWATCH, also use available information for profiling purposes. Multiple studies have 
explored both the contextual and situational aspects of privacy, as well as its paradoxical 
nature. However, there remains a gap in understanding if the influence of privacy 
concerns on behavior intention can be extended to actual situations, especially since an 




     This study had three goals focused on extending the existing literature onto an actual 
privacy-centric situation. Specifically, providing empirical justification for the 
established relationship between privacy concern and behavior intention, appropriateness 
of existing constructs, and suitability of existing scales. The study also sought to answer 
three research questions grounded in an actual situation. First, what is the user's 
disposition towards privacy? Second, to what extent does this influence users' privacy 
concerns regarding the inclusion of their LinkedIn profile information within 
ICWATCH? Third, to what extent do these concerns influence their stated intention to 
modify their LinkedIn profile/settings to minimize/eliminate this inclusion? 
     The study was relevant as it progressed the field into an actual situation and modeled 
the broad to specific approach in the existing literature. Researchers poorly understood 
these underlying problems in the context of an actual situation. It was not clear what 
other factors might influence findings from previous research. This study was unique. It 
evaluated what participants declared they would do (well covered in the literature) but 
what individuals might do in the context of an actual privacy-centric situation (little 
coverage in literature). Opportunities to study real privacy-centric situations are 
problematic as such situations are ad-hoc in nature, and affected populations may not be 
identified easily. 
     A few issues were evident from the privacy literature. A variety of factors influence 
privacy concerns and apprehension regarding the use of convenience populations. The 
author assumed that users were unaware of this situation. As such, it was appropriate to 
evaluate privacy concerns as a unidimensional construct and that the actual situation 




research. The reliance on external services (i.e., LinkedIn and ICWATCH) and 
new/ongoing Internet security events might influence the study. This cautious approach 
constrained the research scope by limiting it to a single behavior, two control variables 
(age and sex), two degrees of connections via LinkedIn, and a 30-day window 
disqualifier question. 
     The research included three constructs well represented in the literature, disposition to 
value privacy, situation-specific Internet privacy concerns, and behavior intention. The 
study included both privacy concern constructs as unidimensional in order to model the 
broad-to-specific approach, even though multidimensional privacy concern constructs 
were available (i.e., CIFP and IUIPC). The construct for behavior was specifically 
narrowed to intention (i.e., future action), ignoring both current and past variations. This 
study's strength rested with its underlying foundation of consistent results from the 
utilized scales, constructs, and methodologies in the literature. The relevant gap was the 
minimal investigation grounded in actual situational influences associated with privacy 
concerns and behavior. 
     The research design employed an explanatory sequential mixed methods design with 
interview follow-up, which involved collecting quantitative data first and then 
contextualized the quantitative results with qualitative data. The first quantitative phase 
of the study used survey methodology. The instrument variables were operationalized 
using items adapted from validated scales, with items re-worded to fit the research 
context. The researcher measured each of the three constructs with a seven-point scale, 
the control variables by a single item each, with an additional binary scale question as a 




LinkedIn before administering the survey to 1,310 individuals thru LinkedIn directly. 
There were 65 valid responses, resulting in a 4.96% participation rate, heavily skewed 
towards males (87.69%) over 50 years of age (60.00%). 
     The second qualitative phase of the study utilized follow-up semi-structured 
interviews. The interview, structured around four topics aligned to assumptions or 
constructs in the research, was supplemented with a fifth category to capture participants’ 
reflections. The valid survey respondents from the previous phase, who indicated a 
willingness to participate, comprised the interview population. Survey participants were 
assigned to one of eight possible outcome groups, characterizing each variable's least 
ambiguous representation derived from a simple scoring model. The researcher invited 
the most representative scoring participants for follow-up interviews from the only two 
groups meeting the established 5% sample threshold per group. Six participants, all-male 
and over 50, were interviewed from two groups representing different degrees of 
variables (i.e., less/more concerned and not likely/likely to modify profile). The resulting 
snippets were analyzed and aligned with 12 codes, operationalized with existing 
constructs in the literature. After a code-snippet validation, the resulting data set was 139 
code-snippet pairs. 
     The quantitative phase utilized SmartPLS to perform the partial least squares analysis 
and derive both the measurement and structural model findings. A second software 
solution called G*Power indicated that 65 samples were enough for PLS analysis, 
calculating that 62 was the minimum threshold. The measurement model analysis 
assessed both the convergent and discriminant validity and reliability, with all results 




One (H1) had significant support that DTVP did influence SIPC as expected. Hypothesis 
Two (H2) also had significant support showing that SIPC did influence BITN as 
expected. However, there was no significance for any influence of either age or sex on 
behavior intention, although neither could be modeled fully. 
     The qualitative phase utilized sequential integration to contextualize the findings from 
the previous phase. First, the author mapped each of the code-snippet pairs to the topics 
and constructs and noted observations and outliers. The majority of participants did not 
indicate a breach of privacy with shared expressions on the influence of privacy risk 
belief and general privacy concerns, and diverging opinions across seven other factors. 
Both groups also indicated that DTVP might be influenced by benefit, control, and 
privacy risk beliefs and diverged on the influence of specific privacy concerns. Both 
groups indicated that SIPC might be influenced by collection and usage and diverged on 
two other factors. Lastly, both groups indicated that BITN might be influenced by benefit 
but diverged on the influence of usage. 
     Next, shared code-snippet pairs between each hypothesis were mapped, and 
observations and outliers were noted; however, there were no shared codes between the 
two groups on either hypothesis. For Hypothesis One (H1), the lesser degree group 
expressed the influence of control and privacy risk beliefs, while the higher group 
indicted regulation and usage. For Hypothesis Two (H2), the lesser degree group 
indicated that privacy risk belief and usage might have influence. Only one shared code 
(privacy risk beliefs) was shared across the lesser degree group's hypotheses. 
     Ultimately, the results of the study showed both support for the hypotheses and the 




with the situation did not intend to modify their LinkedIn profile; however, they indicated 
that control and privacy risk belief might exert influence. Those participants who were 
more inclined and more concerned about the situation did express an intent to modify 
their profile and revealed influencing factors such as regulations and usage. The results 
provided empirical justification for the established relationship between privacy concern 
and behavior intention, appropriateness of existing constructs, and suitability of existing 
scales in an actual situation. The methodology and results also revealed challenges with 
achieving population demographic equitability when investigating actual privacy-centric 
situations. Finally, the qualitative findings established a foundation for using 
multidimensional scales and prioritizing other constructs, such as benefit, when 







Appendix A  
Supporting Tables 
Table A1 
Research Contributions Based on Variable Outcomes 
Outcome-
Group 
BITN(-) DTVP(+) SIPC(+) Contribution 
OG-A H L L 
Full hypothesis support. The participant indicated 
they were more likely to continue sharing their 
profile, as they were both less disposed to value 
privacy and less concerned about the situation. 
Interviews may expose influencing factors, 
underrepresented in current research, which are 
only apparent in an actual privacy-centric 
situation. 
OG-B L L L 
Partial hypothesis support. The participant 
indicated they were more likely to stop sharing 
their profile even though they were both less 
disposed to value privacy and less concerned about 
the situation. Interviews may help explain the 
contradictory findings for the established 
relationship between SPC > BITN. 
OG-C H L H 
No hypothesis support. The participant indicated 
they were more likely to continue sharing their 
profile as they were less disposed to value privacy 
and yet, more concerned about the situation. 
Interviews may help explain the contradictory 
findings between the established relationships for 
both DTVP > SPC, as well as SPC > BITN. 
OG-D L L H 
Partial hypothesis support. The participant 
indicated they were more likely to stop sharing 
their profile, even though they were less disposed 
to value privacy and yet more concerned about the 
situation. Interviews may help explain the 








BITN(-) DTVP(+) SIPC(+) Contribution 
OG-E H H L 
Partial hypothesis support. The participant 
indicated they were more likely to continue 
sharing their profile, even though they were more 
disposed to value privacy and yet less concerned 
about the situation. Interviews may help explain 
the contradictory findings between DTVP > SPC. 
OG-F L H L 
No hypothesis support. The participant indicated 
they were more likely to stop sharing their profile 
as they were more disposed to value privacy and 
yet less concerned about the situation. Interviews 
may help explain the contradictory findings 
between the established relationships for both 
DTVP > SPC, as well as SPC > BITN. 
OG-G H H H 
Partial hypothesis support. The participant 
indicated they were more likely to continue 
sharing their profile even though they were both 
more disposed to value privacy and more 
concerned about the situation. Interviews may help 
explain the contradictory findings between SPC > 
BITN. 
OG-H L H H 
Full hypothesis support. The participant indicated 
they were more likely to stop sharing their profile 
as they were both more disposed to value privacy 
and more concerned about the situation. Interviews 
may expose influencing factors, underrepresented 
in current research, which are only apparent in an 
actual privacy-centric situation. 







Theories in Privacy Research 





between the principal 
whom delegates 
actions to an agent; 
specifically, conflict 
in desires and goals, 
and/or validation of 
the agent’s actions 






The social norms 
shared between two 
parties and their 
associated rights and 
responsibilities 
Li et al., 2010 
Theory of Reasoned 
Action (TRA) and 
Theory of Planned 
Behavior (TBP) 
Beliefs and attitudes 
determine behavior; 
TBP adds behavioral 
control as a factor 
Behavioral 
consequences 
Bansal et al., 2016; 








Behavior is based on 
a performed calculus 
based on weighed 
factors 
Trade-offs 
Bansal et al., 2010; 
Bansal et al., 2016; 
Cichy et al., 2014; 
Dinev et al., 2008; Li 
et al., 2011; Li, 2014; 
Miltgen & Peyrat-
Guilard, 2014; Min 
& Kim, 2015 
Procedural Fairness 
Theory 
Fairness (aka justice) 
intermediates in the 
trust between 
principals and 
agents, in that the 
actions taken on 
behalf of the 

























Fear appeals on 
attitudes and 
behaviors from 








generating rules for 
disclosing 





Choi & Land, 2016; 
Xu, Dinev et al., 
2011 
personality theories Personality traits 
influence privacy 
behaviors 
Li, 2014; Osatuyi, 
2015 
Note. Adapted from Li, Y. (2012) Theories in online information research: A critical review 






DTVP Measurement Items 
Reference Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 
Kayhan & Davis, 
2016 
(p. 236) 
“Compared to others, 
I am more sensitive 
about the way my 
personal information 
is handled.” 
“Compared to others, 
it is more important 
for me to keep my 
information private.” 
“Compared to others, 
I tend to be more 
concerned about 




“Compared to others, 
I am more sensitive 





“Compared to others, 




“Compared to others, 
I am less concerned 
about potential 
threats to my 
personal privacy. 
(reverse-worded)” 
Li et al., 2011 
(p. 443) 
“Compared to others, 
I am more sensitive 




“To me, it is most 
important to keep my 
privacy intact from 
online companies.” 
“I am concerned 
about threats to my 
personal privacy 
today.” 
Li et al., 2017 
(p. 1021) 
“Compared to others, 
I am more sensitive 




“To me, it is most 
important to keep my 
privacy intact from 
online companies.” 
“I am concerned 
about threats to my 
personal privacy 
today.” 
Malhotra et al., 2004 
(p. 352) 
“Compared to others, 
I am more sensitive 




“To me, it is the most 
important thing to 
keep my privacy 
intact from online 
companies.” 
“I am concerned 
about threats to my 
personal privacy 
today.” 
Xu, Dinev et al., 
2011 
(p. 823) 
“Compared to others, 
I am more sensitive 




“To me, it is the most 
important thing to 
keep my information 
privacy.” 
“Compared to others, 
I tend to be more 
concerned about 
threats to my 
information privacy.” 






Situation-Specific Internet Privacy Concern Measurement Items 
Reference Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 
Dinev & Hart, 
2006  
(p. 77) 
“In general, I am 
concerned that 
the information I 
submit on the 
Internet could be 
misused.” 
“In general, I am 
concerned that a 
person can find 
private 
information 
about me on the 
Internet.” 




because of what 
others might do 
with it.” 
“In general, I am 
concerned about 
submitting 
information on the 
Internet, because it 
could be used in a 
way I did not 
foresee.” 
Min & Kim, 
2015 
(p. 857) 






“I am concerned 
that a person can 
find private 
information 
about me on 
Facebook.” 




because of what 
others might do 
with it.” 




it could be used in 
a way I did not 
foresee.” 
Ozdemir et al., 
2017 
(p. 658) 
“I am concerned 
that the 
information I 
share through the 
Internet with 
people I know 
could be misused 
by them.” 
 





people I know, 
because of what 
they might do 
with it.” 





people I know, 
because they could 
use it in a way I 
did not foresee.” 
Son & Kim, 2008 
(p. 526) 
“I am concerned 
that the 
information I 
submit to online 
companies could 
be misused.” 
“In general, I am 
concerned that a 
person can find 
private 
information 
about me on the 
Internet.” 






because of what 
others might do 
with it.” 





because it could be 
used in a way I did 
not foresee.” 












Reference Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 
Xu et al., 2011 
(p. 823) 
“I am concerned 
that the 
information I 
submit to this 
website could be 
misused.” 
“I am concerned 
that others can 
find private 
information 
about me from 
this website.” 





because of what 
others might do 
with it.” 
“I am concerned 
about providing 
personal 
information to this 
website, because it 
could be used in a 
way I did not 
foresee.” 
Note. A mixture of five-point (Dinev & Hart, 2006; Ozdemir et al., 2017) and seven-point (Min 




Behavioral Intention Measurement Items 
Reference Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 
“The extent to which I would reveal my health 









“The extent to which I would reveal my 
financial/ health/personal information to this 
health/finance/ ecommerce website is” (Bansal 








“Please specify the extent to which you would 
reveal your personal information to this vendor.” 








“Given this hypothetical scenario, specify the 
extent to which you would reveal (the 









“Please specify the extent to which you would 
reveal your personal information such as name, 
affiliation, job, educational background on 








Note. A mixture of seven-point (Li et al., 2011; Malhotra et al., 2004; Min & Kim, 2015) 
and eleven-point (Bansal et al., 2010, 2016) scales.  






Derived Codes and Breakouts 




likelihood to perform an 
action, prior 
demonstrated action, or 
prior stated action 
(conduct) 
Bansal et al., 2010; Dinev 
& Hart, 2006; Dinev et al., 
2008; Ku et al., 2013; Li, 
2014; Li et al., 2017; Li et 
al., 2011; Li et al., 2015; 
Mao & Zhang, 2013; Min 
& Kim, 2015; Ozdemir et 
al., 2017; Schwaig et al., 
2013; Son & Kim, 2008; 
Xu, 2010; Zhang et al., 
2018 
OG-A 2 4 “But uh I’m not intending to change anything. An like I said, I accept almost all requests for access and network.” (11223476508, BEHV01) 
OG-H 3 7 “So I I toned that thing down. An I uh think I uh I uh may be doing the same with uh LinkedIn.” (11224014306, BEHV03) 
Benefit 
(BNFT) 
An advantage or profit 
gained, value to the user 
Dinev et al., 2013; Xu, 
Luo et al.,2011; Li et al., 
1024 
OG-A 3 5 
“Uh, I uh I, I may be looking for another job soon. So, I am uh going to 
um hazard to keep the the line of communicaiton open, uh no changes, 
uh updating some of my uh um CV there and uh just you know um 
reaching out to people that I deem worthy uh in my um search for a a 
better job and or uh um to further further me in the job already have." 
(11188138618, BNFT01) 
OG-H 3 6 
“I scrubbed it uh even before this couple of weeks, two three weeks ago 
uh with the intent of um ensuring um my network of IC and uh intel 
professionals recognize um the new duties and positions that I was that 
I'm currently in. And then more importantly, uh should I opt to uh 
leverage those that skill set into other arenas other commands? Um I had 
the requisite background that was uh verifiable um for potential 
recruiters and what." (11251351842, BNFT02) 
Collection 
(COLL) 
Any collection and 
processing of personal 
data, for purposes of 
influencing or managing 
those whose data have 
been garnered 
Choi & Land, 2016 
OG-A 3 4 
“Uh, you know, the things that Facebook and I, I mean, it's just it's out 
there already and people have a a limited understanding of the totality of 
the knowledge that's uh available to a company like Facebook or to 
LinkedIn or to to others who have assembled these datasets and uh 
conducted analysis on them." (11223476508, COLL07) 
OG-H 3 8 
“So uh I think I need some questions answered, um before I can move 
forward in having worked in the IC community for a short period of 
time, just a couple years, I know the capabilities of what they can do and 
and uh things they can look at." (11224014306, COLL05) 










Code Definition References Outcome- Group Participants Snippets Representative Snippet 
Control 
(CNTL) 
An individual’s beliefs in 
his or her ability to 
manage the release and 
dissemination of personal 
information 
Benson et al., 2015; Dinev 
et al., 2013; Kayhan & 
Davis, 2016; Schwaig et 
al. 2013; Xu, 2010; Xu et 
al., 2012; Xu, Dinev et al., 
2011; Chen et al., 2013; 
Choi & Land, 2016; Li et 
al., 2014; Li et al., 2017 
OG-A 3 20 
“Okay. So once again, I mean it's, it's up to me to be careful of what I put 
out there in terms of uh you know what content I make available." 
(11269613365, CNTL12) 
OG-H 1 2 “And for that reason I don’t have the only social media outlet I have is LinkedIn." (11205114603, CNTL14) 
Errors 
(ERRS) 
Deliberate or accidental 
inaccuracies 
Mao & Zhang, 2013; 
Osatuyi, 2015; Smith et 
al., 1996; Stewart & 
Segars, 2002; Xu, 2010; 
Xu & Gupta, 2009; Xu et 
al., 2012; Zhang et al., 
2013; Zhou, 2011 
OG-A 0 0 Not Represented 
OG-H 1 4 
“But uh, but for me, I have no need to be in that um in that world 
anymore. Uh, so as time goes on I, I remove a lot of those specific key 
terminologies simply because um that's in the past and it's no longer 





A user's general worry 
about personal 
information regarding its 
collection, storage, and 
usage (i.e., general 
privacy concern) 
Kayhan & Davis, 2016; 
Li, 2014; Li et al., 2017; 
Li, Luo et al., 2011; Xu, 
Dinev et al., 2011 
OG-A 2 4 “So, I, uh I value privacy." (11223476508, GPCN06) 
OG-H 3 5 “Um, I do value privacy." (11205114603, GPCN01) 
Invasion 
(INVN) 
An individual indicates 
current/past negative 
experience or outcome 
Bansal et al., 2014; Bansal 
et al., 2016; Dinev et al., 
2008; Li et al., 2014; Li & 
Unger, 2012; Xu, Luo et 
al., 2011 
OG-A 0 0 Not Represented 
OG-H 2 7 
“I've actually as an aside, I've had my identity stolen on Facebook, in one 
of these romance scam things and I had four to 500 uh fake profiles out 






distinguish an individual 





Bansal et al., 2010; Bansal 
et al., 2016; Chen, 2013a; 
Chen, 2013b; Chen & 
Sharma, 2015; Osatuyi, 
2015 
OG-A 0 0 Not Represented 
OG-H 1 2 “For me, I just don't find that myself that interesting to put so much information out there uh" (11205114603, PNTR01) 




















The expected loss 
potential associated with 
releasing personal 
information to a specific 
firm 
Bansal et al., 2010; Chen, 
2013a; Chen, 2013b; Chen 
& Sharma, 2015; Dinev & 
Hart, 2006; Dinev et al., 
2013; Gerlach et al, 2015; 
Li, 2014; Li et al., 2010; 
Li et al., 2011; Li et al., 
2014; Luo et al., 2013; 
Malhotra et al., 2004; 
Miltgen & Smith, 2015; 
Ozdemir et al., 2017; 
Treiblmaier & Chong, 
2011; Xu, Dinev et al., 
2011; Xu, Luo et al., 2011; 
Zhou, 2011; Zhou, 2015 
OG-A 3 20 
“But I think if you go out to social media sites, you gotta it's my position 
that you don't have any uh any expectation of privacy at that point." 
(11269613365, PRBF03) 
OG-H 2 5 
“Uh, but, but for me, as soon as you put information out there, you, you 
lose control of it. So just a matter of risk you're willing to accept, accept 
that risk. Go for it." (11205114603, PRBF22) 
Regulation 
(REGL) 
A binding custom or 
practice of a community: 
a rule of conduct or 
action prescribed or 
formally recognized as 
binding or enforced by a 
controlling authority 
Miltgen & Smith, 2015; 
Xu, 2010; Xu et al., 2012 
OG-A 0 0 Not Represented 
OG-H 2 9 
“Um and certainly looking through the uh amendments, probably the 
closest one that covers any sort uh of privacy information uh is both the 
14th amendment uh or more importantly the Privacy Act of 1974 uh 
which in theory should prevent the unauthorized disclosure uh held by 





A user's worry about 
personal information 
regarding its collection, 
storage, and usage by a 
specific site or service 
Bansal et al., 2010; Bansal 
et al., 2016; Benson et al., 
2015; Li et al., 2011; Li, 
2014; Luo et al., 2013; 
Mao & Zhang, 2013; 
Osatuyi, 2015; Wakefield, 
2013; Xu et al., 2012; 
Zhang et al., 2013 
OG-A 0 0 Not Represented 
OG-H 3 10 
“So I do feel that uh, a little concerned about that based on what I know 







marketing) and sharing 
Chen & Sharma, 2012; 
Chen & Sharma, 2015; Li 
& Unger, 2012; Mao & 
Zhang, 2014; Schwaig et 
al., 2013 
OG-A 2 3 
“And I believe that uh people generally generally are doing the right 
thing and abiding by the terms of service and uh and why they're using 
the system. But I know that that is not always the case." (11223476508, 
USGE06) 
OG-H 3 14 
“Um, so, the uh uh or uh in addition, takes that information and uh puts it 
in in the public under a false light. Uh, and then lastly, uh uses my name 
and or uh my personal information for some sort of uh uh commercial 
advantage." (11251351842, USGE02) 







Category/Code Distribution Analysis 
 All Codes Cat 1: Breach of Privacy Cat 2: DTVP Cat 3: SIPC Cat 4: BITN Cat 5: Supplementary 
 Categories Grp-Part Grp-Snip Part Snip Part Snip Part Snip Part Snip Part Snip 
Categories 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Codes 12* 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
Mean 9.200 1.875 5.792 24 1.208 0.917 1.417 0.667 1.667 0.792 1.125 0.542 0.875 
Median 9.000 2.00 4.500 0.833 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
StdDev 1.304 1.191 5.618 0.500 1.865 0.923 1.718 0.963 1.786 1.062 1.541 0.779 1.484 
Skewness 0.541 -0.582 1.414 0.963 2.391 0.887 1.756 1.392 1.526 1.165 1.172 1.054 1.627 
Kurtosis -1.488 -1.202 1.815 0.678 7.011 0.222 3.732 1.057 1.428 0.144 0.215 -0.430 1.113 
D-value 0.248 0.249 0.182 -0.879 0.254 0.256 0.223 0.344 0.331 0.318 0.314 0.386 0.352 
p-value 0.850 0.084 0.359 0.312 0.075 0.073 0.158 0.005 0.008 0.016 0.134 0.001 0.004 
Normal? yes yes yes 0.014 yes yes yes no no no no no no 







Category One, Breach of Privacy Breakout 
Code Outcome-Group Participants Snippets Representative Snippet 
Behavior 
(BEHV) 
OG-A 0 0 Not presented. 
OG-H 1 1 
“I'm torn on the subject. Um, after, after we, after we um engaged in our first um email 
conversation and exchange of information, I went back and looked at my stuff. And I think I 
made some adjustments and I'm still it's a constant, constant thing as, as uh life professional 
and personal changes, you you make adjustments to those public profiles you make, to adjust 
to those changes um for good or bad." (11205114603, BEHV06) 
Benefit 
(BNFT) 
OG-A 0 0 Not presented. 
OG-H 2 2 
“I, I am on LinkedIn, which is an open site and I people use that to find resumes and things 
like that. Um, so in that respect, I'm fine uh, because I'm looking for something that's 
advantageous to me." (11224014306, BNFT06) 
Collection 
(COLL) 
OG-A 0 0 Not presented. 
OG-H 2 3 
“But as time has gone by, and much more sophistication, on the ability to grab data from us 
all kinds of information." (11224014306, COLL03) 
Control 
(CNTL) 
OG-A 2 2 
“Uh, I my resume is an assemblage of my life experience and I have not divulged any 
classified information. In fact, that resume was scrubbed and approved for release prior to it 
being posted anywhere or used for my job search." (11223476508, CNTL17) 
OG-H 0 0 Not presented. 
Errors 
(ERRS) 
OG-A 0 0 Not presented. 





OG-A 1 1 
“So I post information on the internet with no expectation of privacy." (11223476508, 
GPCN04) 
OG-H 1 1 
“Um, obviously, I'm not any celebrity or public figure who could reasonably assume to be 
recognized in the public and not be protected. But I would go on to say um that As a 
nonpublic individual, I uh certainly have the right to be protected from any intrusion on my 
solitude and my private affairs." (11251351842, GPCN08) 











Code Outcome-Group Participants Snippets Representative Snippet 
Invasion 
(INVN) 
OG-A 0 0 Not presented. 
OG-H 2 4 
“I've been hacked and lost a lot of money about five or six years ago, and I thought I think it 




OG-A 0 0 Not presented. 




OG-A 3 8 
“But I think if you go out to social media sites, you gotta it's my position that you don't have 
any uh any expectation of privacy at that point." (11269613365, PRBF03) 
OG-H 1 1 
“Uh, so while while it's not a privacy issue, because you're volunteering to put your stuff out 
there, it's an argument could be made, it's in the public domain." (11205114603, PRBF06) 
Regulation 
(REGL) 
OG-A 0 0 Not presented. 
OG-H 1 1 
“So I've submitted this particular instance, they do not have have just cause and and rather um 
the privacy that's being invaded, I would have, if you will, the essence uh or legal liability or 






OG-A 0 0 Not presented. 
OG-H 2 2 
“So I do feel that uh, a little concerned about that based on what I know about Intel 
communities and sharing of information." (11224014306, SPCN07) 
Usage 
(USGE) 
OG-A 0 0 Not presented. 
OG-H 2 3 
“Uh, and then anybody that takes those, that data and disclose them in it with the intent to 
embarrass me or somehow discredit me with that private information causes us concern." 
(11251351842, USGE07) 







Categories Three thru Four Breakouts 
  Category 2: DTVP Category 3: SIPC Category 4: BITN 
Code Outcome-Group Participants Snippets Participants Snippets Participants Snippets 
Behavior 
(BEHV) 
OG-A 0 0 0 0 2 4 
OG-H 0 0 1 1 3 5 
Benefit (BNFT) OG-A 1 1 0 0 3 3 OG-H 1 1 0 0 3 3 
Collection 
(COLL) 
OG-A 0 0 2 3 0 0 
OG-H 1 1 1 2 1 1 
Control (CNTL) OG-A 3 7 1 4 1 3 OG-H 1 2 0 0 0 0 
Errors (ERRS) OG-A 0 0 0 0 0 0 OG-H 1 1 1 1 1 1 
General Privacy 
Concern (GPCN) 
OG-A 1 2 0 0 1 1 
OG-H 3 4 0 0 0 0 
Invasion (INVN) OG-A 0 0 0 0 0 0 OG-H 1 1 0 0 1 1 
Personality Traits 
(PNTR) 
OG-A 0 0 0 0 0 0 
OG-H 1 2 0 0 0 0 
Privacy Risk 
Belief (PRBF) 
OG-A 1 2 2 3 1 3 
OG-H 2 4 0 0 0 0 
Regulation 
(REGL) 
OG-A 0 0 0 0 0 0 
OG-H 2 2 1 2 0 0 
Specific Privacy 
Concern (SPCN) 
OG-A 0 0 0 0 0 0 
OG-H 2 3 3 5 0 0 
Usage (USGE) OG-A 0 0 1 1 2 2 OG-H 1 1 3 6 0 0 






Category Five, Supplementary Breakout 
Code Outcome-Group Participants Snippets Representative Snippet 
Behavior 
(BEHV) 
OG-A 0 0 Not presented. 
OG-H 0 0 Not presented. 
Benefit 
(BNFT) 
OG-A 1 1 
“So I'm not there's not a lot of hiding unless I go, you know, off grid and I'm not willing to do 
that, the benefit is worth the uh um uh the effort." (11188138618, BNFT07) 
OG-H 0 0 Not presented. 
Collection 
(COLL) 
OG-A 1 1 
“Uh um there is a way that they could probably figure out my birthday. But you know, again, 
there's so much public knowledge out there that for a few dollars at a time, you could put 
together a fairly decent um uh biography of [NAME REMOVED]." (11188138618, COLL01) 
OG-H 1 1 
“I think as we're moving forward and gaining more capabilities in our and an the ways that 
we're able to collect and store data" (11224014306, COLL06) 
Control 
(CNTL) 
OG-A 2 4 
“So people have to take a personal uh position on what they're doing, what they're posting out 
there." (11269613365, CNTL04) 
OG-H 0 0 Not presented. 
Errors 
(ERRS) 
OG-A 0 0 Not presented. 
OG-H 1 1 
“So this is for me this is a good reminder to go back in there and double check on things to 
make sure that uh the image that I'm trying to present is a s professional and uh accurate as 





OG-A 0 0 Not presented. 
OG-H 0 0 Not presented. 
Invasion 
(INVN) 
OG-A 0 0 Not presented. 
OG-H 1 1 
“And I want to cut back on some of this other stuff. Uh, especially as I get older, I don't want 
to be losing a nickel to anybody who uh may steal my stuff. I lost 25 thousand dollars a few 
years ago, though, was FDIC a little bit of a ramble there." (11224014306, INVN04) 
 













OG-A 0 0 Not presented. 




OG-A 2 4 
“So it's a social media site. So anyway, and I know there's a lot, a lot of millennials, I guess 
there's an expectation of these things to be more than what they were intended to be, I think, 
so. These expectations evolve. And I don't really know what the foundation for it is why they 
believe that." (11269613365, PRBF09) 
OG-H 0 0 Not presented. 
Regulation 
(REGL) 
OG-A 0 0 Not presented. 
OG-H 2 4 
“But, um, I think we need to relook things and starting with many of the laws that are in place 
and the ability to collect on on Americans, and then also the ability for private companies to 





OG-A 0 0 Not presented. 
OG-H 0 0 Not presented. 
Usage 
(USGE) 
OG-A 0 0 Not presented. 
OG-H 2 4 
“The probably in in in stepping back it uh this is not the first time that uh an entity agency has 
looked to scrape and or um use this information for, you know, malicious type attacks." 
(11251351842, USGE14) 








Appendix B  
Questionnaire 
     DTVP was measured using three items, SIPC was measured using four items, and 
BITN was measured using three items. All constructs were measured with a seven-point 
scale ranging from 1 to 7. A single item each measured both demographic factors (age 
and sex). Finally, as the potential existed for participants to modify their LinkedIn profile 





Participant Letter for Anonymous Surveys  
NSU Consent to be in a Research Study Entitled 
 
The Influence of an Individual’s Disposition to Value Privacy 




     A website called ICWATCH (https://icwatch.wikileaks.org/) uses scraped LinkedIn 
data to identify members of the Intelligence Community and collate them into a 
searchable database. Your LinkedIn profile was scraped and stored in ICWATCH. As 
a LinkedIn connection of yours, and as the focus of my Ph.D. dissertation, I would like 
to understand better if you believe this to be a privacy concern and if so, will you take 
action on LinkedIn to mitigate this. I hope that you will participate in a short 






The specific participant consent details should be read here Research Participant 
Consent Letter 
 
Do you understand and do you want to be in the study? 
 
If you have read the above information and voluntarily wish to participate in this 
research study, please select the consent option below. 
 
Consent (binary: I consent/I decline) 
 Do you understand and do you want to be in the study? If you have 
read the above information and voluntarily wish to participate in this 
research study, please select the consent option below. 
Control variables (one ordinal: range, one binary: 0/1); age stratification modeled 
from reference studies (Min & Kim, 2015; Zhang et al., 2018) 
Age < 20, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50+ 
Sex Female, Male 
Suitability (binary: yes/no) 
 Is any part of your LinkedIn profile publicly visible (e.g., any part of 
your LinkedIn profile can be found using a search engine such as Google 
or Bing)? 
DTVP Seven-point scales anchored with “strongly disagree” and “strongly agree” 
DTVP1 Compared to others, I am more sensitive about the way online 
companies handle my personal information. 
DTVP2 To me, it is most important to keep my privacy intact from online 
companies. 
DTVP3 I am concerned about threats to my personal privacy today. 
Situational Privacy Concerns Seven-point scales anchored with “strongly disagree” 
and “strongly agree” 
SIPC1 I am concerned that the information I submit on LinkedIn could be 
misused. 
SIPC2 I am concerned that a person can find private information about me from 
LinkedIn. 
SIPC3 I am concerned about submitting information on LinkedIn because of 





SIPC4 I am concerned about submitting information on LinkedIn because it 
could be used in a way I did not foresee. 
Behavioral Intention Seven-point scales anchored with “strongly disagree” and 
“strongly agree.” Question: Please specify the extent to which you would continue to 
share your LinkedIn profile publicly, exposing profile data to ICWATCH. 
BITN1 Unlikely/likely 
BITN2 Not probably/probable 
BITN3 Unwilling/willing 
Interview (one binary: yes/no, one participant submission: email) 
INTV1 Are you willing to be interviewed about this situation? 






Appendix C  
Raw Survey Results 
Table C1 
Raw Survey Results 
ID Consent Qualifier Age Sex Disposition to Value Privacy Situation-Specific Privacy Concern Behavioral Intention Interview DTVP1 DTVP2 DTVP3 SIPC1 SIPC2 SIPC3 SIPC4 BITN1 BITN2 BITN3 
11859463589 1 1 3 2 7 5 6 4 3 3 5 7 7 7 1 
11652267559 1 1 5 2 6 4 6 5 5 5 5 6 6 5 2 
11630105120 1 1 4 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 7 7 7 1 
11565649049 1 1 5 2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 1 
11448408267 1 1 5 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 3 3 3 2 
11445999311 1 1 5 2 6 5 6 6 3 5 6 5 5 5 2 
11431880759 1 1 4 2 5 5 7 4 5 5 6 6 6 4 2 
11430743638 1 1 4 2 6 6 6 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 1 
11424945022 1 1 5 2 6 7 5 7 7 6 7 5 5 2 1 
11423552387 1 1 3 2 6 6 7 4 5 4 4 2 3 1 1 
11420589586 1 1 4 2 6 6 7 6 5 4 6 5 4 3 1 
11420277538 1 1 4 1 4 4 4 4 4 6 6 4 4 4 1 
11420005672 1 1 5 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 1 
11388874236 1 1 5 1 6 7 6 4 4 5 7 6 6 4 2 
11336653975 1 1 5 2 7 7 6 5 5 4 4 5 6 5 2 
11292890157 1 1 4 2 6 4 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 4 2 
11292806106 1 1 3 2 6 6 6 7 6 6 6 3 3 2 1 







ID Consent Qualifier Age Sex Disposition to Value Privacy Situation-Specific Privacy Concern Behavioral Intention Interview DTVP1 DTVP2 DTVP3 SIPC1 SIPC2 SIPC3 SIPC4 BITN1 BITN2 BITN3 
11270499000 1 1 5 2 6 6 5 4 4 4 4 5 6 5 2 
11269613365 1 1 5 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 7 7 1 
11269116413 1 1 5 2 6 7 7 5 1 1 1 7 7 7 1 
11269077529 1 1 5 2 6 6 7 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 1 
11262237459 1 1 4 1 6 5 4 5 2 4 4 6 6 5 1 
11258534181 1 1 5 2 7 6 6 5 4 4 5 3 3 2 1 
11258094277 1 1 5 2 6 6 2 5 5 5 6 6 6 5 1 
11254816449 1 1 3 2 4 6 7 6 5 5 6 5 5 5 1 
11254766819 1 1 3 2 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 1 
11253964035 1 1 4 2 7 7 7 6 5 3 3 5 5 5 1 
11252427362 1 1 5 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 2 2 2 2 
11251682995 1 1 2 1 3 6 5 3 2 3 4 2 2 2 1 
11251597916 1 1 5 2 6 6 7 6 5 4 4 5 5 5 1 
11251351842 1 1 5 2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 3 3 3 1 
11250719712 1 1 4 2 6 6 7 6 5 5 5 6 6 6 2 
11250710475 1 1 5 2 6 7 6 6 6 5 5 3 5 5 2 
11248992091 1 1 5 2 4 5 5 3 1 3 3 7 7 7 1 
11248576429 1 1 5 2 5 6 6 4 3 3 3 6 6 4 1 
11246837913 1 1 5 2 7 6 6 5 5 5 6 7 7 6 1 
11242439726 1 1 3 2 6 5 6 6 3 4 6 3 5 4 2 
11240433307 1 1 3 2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 4 1 
11240361396 1 1 5 2 5 5 7 6 6 5 6 6 6 6 1 
11240246323 1 1 3 1 5 5 5 3 3 2 2 5 5 5 1 
11240219945 1 1 5 2 5 6 7 4 4 4 3 6 5 6 1 
11240201867 1 1 5 2 4 6 7 4 7 4 7 6 4 6 1 
11239357735 1 1 4 2 6 5 5 7 6 6 7 5 5 5 2 
11239279776 1 1 4 2 3 3 2 4 1 2 2 6 6 6 2 
11239144520 1 1 4 2 3 5 5 5 3 3 5 6 6 6 2 
11238329302 1 1 5 2 7 7 7 6 4 4 6 5 5 5 1 
11238118996 1 1 4 1 6 5 1 5 6 3 4 7 5 3 1 
11237599422 1 1 5 2 3 3 3 5 3 3 5 5 5 5 1 
11227298696 1 1 5 2 4 4 5 4 4 4 3 6 6 6 2 
11227117168 1 1 4 2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5 5 3 2 
11226351367 1 1 5 2 7 7 7 7 5 5 5 7 7 6 1 
11224014306 1 1 5 2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 4 4 4 1 







ID Consent Qualifier Age Sex Disposition to Value Privacy Situation-Specific Privacy Concern Behavioral Intention Interview DTVP1 DTVP2 DTVP3 SIPC1 SIPC2 SIPC3 SIPC4 BITN1 BITN2 BITN3 
11223476508 1 1 5 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 7 7 7 1 
11218350809 1 1 5 2 6 5 7 5 5 4 4 7 7 7 1 
11211977877 1 1 4 2 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 7 7 7 2 
11208486428 1 1 5 2 5 6 6 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 1 
11206905505 1 1 3 2 5 5 5 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 1 
11206505729 1 1 5 1 4 5 5 5 5 5 6 5 5 5 2 
11205114603 1 1 5 2 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 3 3 3 1 
11205018115 1 1 5 2 1 4 4 5 4 4 5 7 7 7 1 
11192764538 1 1 5 2 4 6 4 5 5 4 5 4 4 4 1 
11188138618 1 1 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 6 6 6 1 








Appendix D  
Snippet-Coding 
Table D1 
Total Snippets by Topic and Coding 
Topic Code OG Snippet 
Topic One, "For the 
next few minutes, 
let's discuss if this is 
a breach of privacy." 
BEHV  
A Not Represented 
H 
"I'm torn on the subject. Um, after, after we, after we um engaged in our first um email conversation and exchange 
of information, I went back and looked at my stuff. And I think I made some adjustments and I'm still it's a constant, 
constant thing as, as uh life professional and personal changes, you you make adjustments to those public profiles 
you make, to adjust to those changes um for good or bad." (11205114603, BEHV06, 3) 
BNFT  
A Not Represented 
H  
"I, I am on LinkedIn, which is an open site and I people use that to find resumes and things like that. Um, so in that 
respect, I'm fine uh, because I'm looking for something that's advantageous to me." (11224014306, BNFT06, 3) 
"Uh, on the one hand, people people put all sorts of stuff on their profiles um, in the effort to either get seen, get 













Topic Code OG Snippet 
Topic One, "For the 
next few minutes, 
let's discuss if this is 
a breach of privacy." 
(continued) 
COLL  
A Not Represented 
H  
"But as time has gone by, and much more sophistication, on the ability to grab data from us all kinds of 
information." (11224014306, COLL03, 3) 
"On the other hand, if you're not aware that your stuff is getting scooped up like that, maybe it's an issue for some 
um frankly." (11205114603, COLL14, 3) 
"On the other hand, uh, I'm not sure many people realize that whatever they put out there is being um scooped up by 
whatever um artificial uh aggregators for lack of a better word, um to assist uh whatever agency creates those 
aggregators." (11205114603, COLL15, S) 
CNTL  
A  
"I think I told you that my questionnaire I think that, you know, you could have as much as an individual, I could 
have as much privacy as I want." (11269613365, CNTL13, 3) 
"Uh, I my resume is an assemblage of my life experience and I have not divulged any classified information. In fact, 
that resume was scrubbed and approved for release prior to it being posted anywhere or used for my job search." 
(11223476508, CNTL17, 2) 
H Not Represented 
GPCN  
A "So I post information on the internet with no expectation of privacy" (11223476508, GPCN04, 2.5) 
H 
"Um, obviously, I'm not any celebrity or public figure who could reasonably assume to be recognized in the public 
and not be protected. But I would go on to say um that As a nonpublic individual, I uh certainly have the right to be 
protected from any intrusion on my solitude and my private affairs." (11251351842, GPCN08, 3) 
INVN  
A Not Represented 
H  
"Yes um yes and no, I'm sorry, I've have to answer it that way." (11224014306, INVN01, 3) 
"So, the um the breaches the breach of privacy is actually an intrusion into the personal life of another specifically 
without just cause." (11251351842, INVN02, 3) 
"So, so the breach of privacy is not fully satisfied, if you will, under under this particular uh situation. Under this 
particular topic, ie a breach of privacy, that they scraped my personally available information um that anybody with 
a reasonable uh basis could do you know, from uh Facebook, um and that is made to the general public, certainly. 
Uh, but does that necessarily constitute a breach of my privacy? Uh, no, not at this point." (11251351842, INVN03, 
3) 
"I've been hacked and lost a lot of money about five or six years ago, and I thought I think it was from the Chinese, 








Topic Code OG Snippet 
Topic One, "For the 
next few minutes, 
let's discuss if this is 




"Although they try to do it. I mean, it's just, I mean, I don't know how hard it would be to for their platform to work 
with uh personalized privacy settings. So I really don't expect, I have no expectation of privacy on that stuff." 
(11269613365, PRBF02, 3) 
"But I think if you go out to social media sites, you gotta it's my position that you don't have any uh any expectation 
of privacy at that point" (11269613365, PRBF03, 3) 
"There was never any expectation on my part that that information would be considered private or protected in any 
way." (11223476508, PRBF04, 3) 
"No, cuz uh and and the reason why I believe that is when you join LinkedIn, you give up inherent rights to privacy 
by stepping into LinkedIn." (11188138618, PRBF07, 3) 
"And so I was fully aware that both LinkedIn would use my information, as well as the availability of that 
information to others uh uh or whoever scraped or used or viewed that information." (11223476508, PRBF08, 3) 
"I just want to let you know, I can elaborate if you want more, but I just know that that's how I feel it just uh. You 
know, just by the term social media. So LinkedIn, Facebook, Twitter, all those are uh social media sites, and I have 
no expectation of privacy on any of those sites." (11269613365, PRBF10, 3) 
"So, I mean, that's why they're called social media, right? So uh I guess that pretty much answers my the question." 
(11269613365, PRBF18, 3) 
"I fully am aware that the information that I post to any public page is available to any person." (11223476508, 
PRBF21, 3) 
H 
"Uh, so while while it's not a privacy issue, because you're volunteering to put your stuff out there, it's an argument 
could be made, it's in the public domain." (11205114603, PRBF06, 2) 
REGL  
A Not Represented 
H 
"So I've submitted this particular instance, they do not have have just cause and and rather um the privacy that's 
being invaded, I would have, if you will, the essence uh or legal liability or legal uh ability to bring a lawsuit if 
damages or for damages that were incurred." (11251351842, REGL03, 2) 
SPCN  
A Not Represented 
H  
"Um, so, for me it's it's a double edged sword it could be construed as a privacy issue. While on the other hand, it 
might not be depending on on um the the exact nature of one your understand you as an individual your 
understanding of what those profiles are and are used for and two, the information you're putting out there." 
(11205114603, SPCN02, 3) 
"So I do feel that uh, a little concerned about that based on what I know about Intel communities and sharing of 





Topic Code OG Snippet 
Topic One, "For the 
next few minutes, 
let's discuss if this is 
a breach of privacy." 
(continued) 
USGE  
A Not Represented 
H  
"Um, so, the uh uh or uh in addition, takes that information and uh puts it in in the public under a false light. Uh, and 
then lastly, uh uses my name and or uh my personal information for some sort of uh uh commercial advantage." 
(11251351842, USGE02, 2.5) 
"Uh, and then anybody that takes those, that data and disclose them in it with the intent to embarrass me or somehow 
discredit me with that private informatioin causes us concern." (11251351842, USGE07, 3) 
"But I don't know what's going on on this site where my information is going." (11224014306, USGE13, 2.5) 
Topic Two, "For the 
next few minutes, 
let's discuss your 




"So it's, it's stuff that I wouldn't mind put it on there because I want a large number of people to be able to see it, i.e., 
my friends, so I'm not looking for any real privacy in those settings." (11269613365, BNFT09, 3) 
H "And I established that for a specific reason. Which has evolved over time." (11205114603, BNFT03, 3) 
COLL  
A Not Represented 
H 
"I, I suspect the bigger the bigger issue and bigger concern um would be to take uh the information from the OPM or 
some of the other databases that have been breached and and kind of uh meld them together if you will." 
(11251351842, COLL09, 3) 
CNTL  
A  
"So if if I don't want uh, if if I want to be private, that I don't engage, that's that's the only way to be completely 
private." (11188138618, CNTL02, 3) 
"So I feel I'm in control that. So uh if I want something to be private, then I won't put it on a social media site. So I 
mean, there's things that you look at my social media sites, I probably, I'm guessing you probably have. There's not 
much out there. So it's, uh, it's pretty vanilla. And like, I try to stay away from politics or a lot of personal opinions. 
Most of it has to do with pictures of the family and stuff like that" (11269613365, CNTL10, 3) 
"I take steps to ensure that what I post or provide to others is information that I intend to provide that, that I've 
thought about the implications of that information and the, the uh, you know, the receiver of that information and 
and uh those sorts of contingencies or outcomes." (11223476508, CNTL15, 2) 
"If I want privacy, then I don't engage that's the only way to secure absolute privacy." (11188138618, CNTL16, 3) 
"I, I do not post a lot of social media information." (11223476508, CNTL18, 3) 
"I have a Twitter account, but I don't tweet you know, I mean, I um so, I don't, I don't provide a lot of information, 
because I consider much of that private." (11223476508, CNTL19, 3) 
"If I'm looking for privacy, then I'll send you know, a personal email or letter, write someone a letter and send it." 
(11269613365, CNTL22, 3) 
H  
"Um, I don't, I don't care to put much information out about myself. That's just my nature." (11205114603, CNTL01, 
3) 






Topic Code OG Snippet 
Topic Two, "For the 
next few minutes, 
let's discuss your 
disposition to value 
privacy." (continued) 
ERRS  
A Not Represented 
H 
"Professional reasons I had to and uh but every now and then I go back in there and I make some adjustments, make 




"So that so I consider myself a very private person in that regard in that." (11223476508, GPCN05, 3) 
"So, I, uh I value privacy." (11223476508, GPCN06, 2.5) 
H  
"Um, I do value privacy." (11205114603, GPCN01, 3) 
"So, ah right now, at this point, I'm very concerned about my privacy." (11224014306, GPCN02, 3) 
"I don't feel the need to share my life with strangers." (11205114603, GPCN07, 2.5) 
"Uh, at the end of the day, I certainly value the right to be left alone." (11251351842, GPCN09, S) 
INVN  
A Not Represented 
H 
"I was ah hacked through the OPM hack a couple of years ago, and God knows who has my Social Security numbers 
and things like that." (11224014306, INVN07, S) 
PNTR  
A Not Represented 
H  
"For me, I just don't find that myself that interesting to put so much information out there uh." (11205114603, 
PNTR01, 2.5) 





















Topic Code OG Snippet 
Topic Two, "For the 
next few minutes, 
let's discuss your 




"Um so uh I don't um believe that knowing my name, and uh, and uh knowing my disposition, but through 
conversation, either over the phone or uh, or in person is anything more than just um that person that I'm engaging 
with, using their uh, their skills and their uh techniques of a, of a um observation to to make a make a deduction." 
(11188138618, PRBF20, 3) 
"And uh so um when I say that, you know, I'm gonna engage somebody um through a conversation, I'm willing, uh 
at that point I made a decision that I'm gonna give up some of my property to go uh um further. " (11188138618, 
PRBF25, S) 
H  
"Um, with that said, I do realize that uh let's let's put it this way, the, my philosophy is um, if you don't want people 
to know something, don't put it on the internet." (11205114603, PRBF05, 3) 
"Because once it's out there, you lose complete control over it. It's no longer yours. you're you're you're on someone 
else's platform, therefore, it's at least partially theirs and they can do with it. What they want. If you're okay with 
that, then the rules governing privacy are a little bit looser. Uh, if you're not okay with that, don't use a platform. " 
(11205114603, PRBF16, 3) 
"Uh my personally identifiable information is uh um thought to be at least protected from public scrutiny, especially 
as a employee of the government, uh but I think uh recent breaches with, especially with the Office of Personnel 
Management has almost made that null and void." (11251351842, PRBF17, 3) 
"Uh, but, but for me, as soon as you put information out there, you, you lose control of it. So just a matter of risk 
you're willing to accept, accept that risk. Go for it." (11205114603, PRBF22, 3) 
REGL  
A Not Represented 
H  
"And actually was a little disappointed when the Patriot Act was ah, I think if I'm not mistaken, I know it's being re-
looked, I think it may have been approved, but I'm not sure we've made any adjustments on that. For our, our, our 
new um for this period, any updates, if you will, excuse me." (11224014306, REGL05, 3) 
"Um and certainly looking through the uh amendments, probably the closest one that covers any sort uh of privacy 
information uh is both the 14th amendment uh or more importantly the Privacy Act of 1974 uh which in theory 
should prevent the unauthorized disclosure uh held by the government." (11251351842, REGL08, 2.5) 
SPCN  
A Not Represented 
H  
"I never have been that way, whether before the internet or even even today, so it's not really uh, for me, it's not 
really a privacy specific issue. It's more of a personality and I guess the nature of me issue." (11205114603, 
SPCN05, 3) 
"I become quite concerned, also concerned with little funny things that happen when ah I'm standing around talking 
about a subject and it shows up on my ah Amazon feed or something of that nature." (11224014306, SPCN08, 3) 






Topic Code OG Snippet 
Topic Two, "For the 
next few minutes, 
let's discuss your 
disposition to value 
privacy." (continued) 
USGE  
A Not Represented 
H 
"So ah somebody's grabbing my information, ah somebody's using it for whether it's sales, or whether to rob me or 
use my uh uh social security number." (11224014306, USGE12, 3) 
Topic Three, "For the 
next few minutes, 
let's discuss your 





A Not Represented 
H 
"And I think I went back there and uh did a general scrub and use more general terminology, because I'm not I'm no 
longer in that in that profession." (11205114603, BEHV02, 3) 
COLL  
A  
"Uh, you know, the things that Facebook and I, I mean, it's just it's out there already and people have a a limited 
understanding of the totality of the knowledge that's uh available to a company like Facebook or to LinkedIn or to to 
others who have assembled these datasets and uh conducted analysis on them." (11223476508, COLL07, 2.5) 
"But it does uh provide a central repository for somebody who's interested and desires to have introspection into the 
US intelligence community. Um, your thesis statement talks about, um you know, code words and different 
information and the assembly of aggregate information and, and I, I believe that that is an issue in uh general that 
the, you know, a lot can be learned from uh, from assembling different data sources and analyzing those. And um so, 
at some point, you know, we are as a, as a human race going to really have to come to grips with the understanding 
of what privacy is because because of the potential for these different data sets to be assembled." (11223476508, 
COLL12, 3) 
"So I thought, I thought that was it I just wasn't real sure ICWATCH almost sounds like a government function so 
but I'm sure the government does the same thing with my with me too also so same thing ICWATCH. I'm guessing 
the government's also doing the same thing." (11269613365, COLL13, 3) 
H  
"So uh I think I need some questions answered, um before I can move forward in having worked in the IC 
community for a short period of time, just a couple years, I know the capabilities of what they can do and and uh 
things they can look at." (11224014306, COLL05, 3) 
"Uh, it does bother me because I don't know what they're doing with I know what the NSA programs are with 
phones and things like that of gathering data uh and and uh holding on to it, but only looking specifically when they 
need something. Um, I don't feel comfortable with somebody holding on to uh critical information about me, what 











Topic Code OG Snippet 
Topic Three, "For the 
next few minutes, 
let's discuss your 







"So once again, I thought, you know if your personal responsibility to montior that, so I wouldn't expect uh uh a site, 
a social media site to be able to uh protect, I shouldn't be discussing that." (11269613365, CNTL07, 3) 
"I mean, I have a resume that's been there forever, and it's pretty vanilla. And the government's seen it. So it's uh, 
you know, once again, I'm kind of careful about that. I don't go any further than that." (11269613365, CNTL09, 3) 
"Okay. So once again, I mean it's, it's up to me to be careful of what I put out there in terms of uh you know what 
content I make available." (11269613365, CNTL12, 3) 
"So we want to talk about additional data that I make sure that we talk in a space somewhere where I know that it's, 
it's uh been SCIF'd for the discussion that we're about to have." (11269613365, CNTL20, 3) 
H Not Represented 
ERRS  
A Not Represented 
H 
"But uh, but for me, I have no need to be in that um in that world anymore. Uh, so as time goes on I, I remove a lot 




"So, you know, again uh, you know, I made the conscious effort, uh the conscious decision that that what they were 
going to be able to ascertain from me was uh not going to directly uh um affect me and uh in a negative way and and 
not to negatively uh affect me in an indirect ways either. Um I don't think that a uh bad actor could um necessarily 
get enough information to do do me or my um family harm." (11188138618, PRBF14, 3) 
"So maybe you have a question about it, you know, we've been instructed to contact the government, if you have, if 
you have any concerns, so uh most of that stuff has been vetted that that I would ever talk about, I have very little 
out there." (11269613365, PRBF15, 3) 
"Uh, again, you know I uh my concern is a, is really kind of moot um as I engage in those already um when uh when 
I decided to go onto LinkedIn, you know, I I knew um that uh there was going to be a um uh the disability because I 
I knew of this ability to scrape information and and uh um you to fit into algorithms that would be able to uh 
ascertain my likes, dislikes, and and basically pull the strings, my personality." (11188138618, PRBF19, 2) 
H Not Represented 
REGL  
A Not Represented 
H  
"Um um but but looking at the some of the previous models, um especially with uh Chelsea Manning, and and uh 
and others. Um it it certainly did harmful and uh severe damage to the US government writ large." (11251351842, 
REGL01, 3) 
"Um, so um you know, the the fact that ICWATCH has violated personal privacy in the past it has and and and, 
more importantly, the US government's resolve to do anything about it. Um um you know, has has me equally 
concerned and I say that because uh uh Julian Assange uh has been uh under um has not been brought to trial in 10 






Topic Code OG Snippet 
Topic Three, "For the 
next few minutes, 
let's discuss your 





A Not Represented 
H  
"Um, on the other hand, it was it was the more I thought about it, the more I realized, well, that's to be expected." 
(11205114603, SPCN01, 3) 
"It does bother me, when I first saw it, I was concerned." (11224014306, SPCN03, 2) 
"Okay, yeah, that was a surprise to me. Um, I, at first I was I was uh, I was quite unhappy about that. But on the 
other end, I went back to my original philosophy. Well, I put the stuff out there." (11205114603, SPCN04, 3) 
"And it makes me concerned. I just don't, uh I just don't gave enough information about it." (11224014306, SPCN06, 
3) 
"Um, surely, uh ICWATCH um their behavior certainly raises red flags." (11251351842, SPCN10, S) 
USGE  
A 
"Uh I believe that IC I don't know where ICWATCH is located or the people that are involved in it, but they 
potentially make it easy for enemies of the United States to assemble information. " (11223476508, USGE09, 2) 
H  
"Um but uh you know, his his model of behavior, not only with ICWATCH, but similar programs were designed to 
do that bring discredit on um the folks in that community. So it does raise a red flag. They could certainly be used 
um with a nefarious attack." (11251351842, USGE01, 3) 
"Well uh, what are they doing with it?" (11224014306, USGE05, 3) 
"So I guess my question, you know, if I'd summed up in one statement, what are you doing with it?" (11224014306, 
USGE08, 3) 
"Uh, for whatever purposes um, you know, could be nefarious, it could simply be trying to find the right people for 
the right position across the IC uh or other other agencies, private and public." (11205114603, USGE10, 3) 
"Um, using the WikiLeaks model as a conduit to the general public, um um it was in my mind anyways that that uh 
that breach that scraping of information that technique that model is uh designed more clear or clearly more 
designed, if you will, to harm the IC community and and writ large the US government." (11251351842, USGE11, 
3) 
"Um and at the end of the day, the question comes into uh what the intent is, um you know, is the intent malicious 













Topic Code OG Snippet 
Topic Four, "Finally, 
let's discuss your 





"But uh I'm not intending to change anything. An like I said, I accept almost all requests for access and network." 
(11223476508, BEHV01, 3) 
"So, you know, I'm not I'm not um anticipating any change." (11188138618, BEHV04, 2.5) 
"I don't I don't have plans right now." (11188138618, BEHV08, 3) 
"Uh, I do not intend to change anything. I update my resume periodically. I don't intend to change any settings." 
(11223476508, BEHV11, S) 
H  
"So I I toned that thing down. An I uh think I uh I uh may be doing the same with uh LinkedIn." (11224014306, 
BEHV03, 3) 
"Yeah, that's funny you bring that up. Uh, aside from this, I was, someone had mentioned something like this just the 
other day I forget the specific, but um I, I, I thought I was in a private mode, I'm going to have to take another look, 
not just with my LinkedIn, but also with Facebook and a few other things." (11224014306, BEHV05, 3) 
"Um, so quite honestly, I like it the way it is." (11251351842, BEHV07, 3) 
"Okay, yeah um. I plan on I don't do it as frequently as I should. But uh not, uh not because of you specifically, or 
the subject matter. But yeah, before the weekend. I'll probably go back in there and um take another look and see 
what, what not image but." (11205114603, BEHV09, 3) 
"I'm not going to be job hunting a lot more late in the next few years, but I, I think I'm going to take another look at 
it and see what is accessible. " (11224014306, BEHV10, 3) 
BNFT  
A  
"Uh, I uh I, I may be looking for another job soon. So, I am uh going to um hazard to keep the the line of 
communicaiton open, uh no changes, uh updating some of my uh um CV there and uh just you know um reaching 
out to people that I deem worthy uh in my um search for a a better job and or uh um to further further me in the job 
already have." (11188138618, BNFT01, 3) 
"I acccept nearly all requests to uh know whenever it's not a friend request that leaded at LinkedIn but but I think 
there's value in networking." (11223476508, BNFT05, 3) 
"So that to me is a social media site's all about us out there trying to basically generate a network." (11269613365, 
BNFT08, 2) 
H  
"I scrubbed it uh even before this couple of weeks, two three weeks ago uh with the intent of um ensuring um my 
network of IC and uh intel professionals recognize um the new duties and positions that I was that I'm currently in. 
And then more importantly, uh should I opt to uh leverage those that skill set into other arenas other commands? Um 
I had the requisite background that was uh verifiable um for potential recruiters." (11251351842, BNFT02, 2.5) 
"What public profile of me I want out there to strengthen or expand my network. Take it in the direction I want it to 
go." (11205114603, BNFT04, 3) 
"I don't have a lot of information on there except of who I am, uh jobs I've held, which is advantageous to me." 






Topic Code OG Snippet 
Topic Four, "Finally, 
let's discuss your 





A Not Represented 
H 
"Um again, I don't know, they're we're looking at if they've taken everything, um IP addresses, any phone numbers 
that may or may not be in there. Anything, anything I may have said." (11224014306, COLL08, 2) 
CNTL  
A  
"So I don't I don't perceive any, any uh expectation of privacy when dealing with those sites but if I want to be 
private, then I'll write an email, I won't, it won't be on some kind of uh, I guess it's, you know, there's a push-pull 
arrangement, right? It won't be on a site where people can pull data." (11269613365, CNTL06, 2) 
"If I'm worried about it, it's gonna be a situation where I'll push it to the guy. And it won't be through the site, it'll be 
through an email or something a little bit more secure." (11269613365, CNTL11, 2.5) 
"I know everybody that's on my site." (11269613365, CNTL21, 3) 
H Not Represented 
ERRS  
A Not Represented 
H 
"Um, as I mentioned before, I'm definitely uh steering away from uh the IC community because uh I haven't been 
involved in in quite a while there's really no point it's actually misleading. For those who see that language. Um, I 
don't want to waste anybody's time. And uh really, um but it's it's a constant care and feeding of my public profile to 
present the most accurate up to date and uh harmless um public presentation that I can um you uh to uh you know 
benefit those in my network and uh and myself to be honest." (11205114603, ERRS02, 3) 
GPCN  
A 
"I don't friend everybody asked to be friended I think you asked and I did for you. But uh just because of the topic 
you were working on, buty yeah, I mean, I don't if I don't know the person" (11269613365, GPCN03, 3) 
H Not Represented 
INVN  
A Not Represented 
H 
"I've actually as an aside, I've had my identity stolen on Facebook, in one of these romance scam things and I had 
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"I also realize that people that know know people that I know can see my some of my stuff because they, they share 
it. So, once again, I uh it's my assumption that anything that's on those sites is going to be open source to anybody. " 
(11269613365, PRBF11, 2) 
"No, once again, I just it's my opinion that if I put something on a link on a link like LinkedIn so I would say 
something like clearancejobs.com all of them. Yeah, I mean it would I follow the rules the government has given me 
and that and then I would expect it to be open source anybody that looks at those sites that once again, I don't let 
every I don't." (11269613365, PRBF13, 2.5) 
"Even when you send an email, you know, to a friend, you're not necessarily secure all the time, but that's a whole 
different problem where people have hacked into people's email accounts." (11269613365, PRBF23, 3) 
H Not Represented 
USGE  
A  
"I don't know what they're doing with the data, then I'm pretty I close it down pretty, pretty uh tightlly." 
(11269613365, USGE03, 3) 
"And I believe that uh people generally generally are doing the right thing and abiding by the terms of service and uh 
and why they're using the system. But I know that that is not always the case." (11223476508, USGE06, 3) 
H Not Represented 
Topic Five, "Are 
there any other 
additional thoughts 




"So I'm not there's not a lot of hiding unless I go, you know, off grid and I'm not willing to do that, the benefit is 
worth the uh um uh the effort." (11188138618, BNFT07, 3) 
H Not Represented 
COLL  
A 
"Uh um there is a way that they could probably figure out my birthday. But you know, again, there's so much public 
knowledge out there that for a few dollars at a time, you could put together a fairly decent um uh biography of 
[NAME REMOVED]." (11188138618, COLL01, 3) 
H 
"I think as we're moving forward and gaining more capabilities in our and an the ways that we're able to collect and 
store data." (11224014306, COLL06, 3) 
CNTL  
A  
"They uh you know, do I give them my social security number? No, do I give them my uh um birthday?" 
(11188138618, CNTL03, 3) 
"So people have to take a personal uh position on what they're doing, what they're posting out there." (11269613365, 
CNTL04, 2) 
"So you gotta, you kind of gotta filter what you're saying and doing and uh uh its kinda, I don't think ther's any 
expectation." (11269613365, CNTL05, 2.5) 
"I don't give out explicit personal information but um you know, people know my phone number because uh they 
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A Not Represented 
H 
"So this is for me this is a good reminder to go back in there and double check on things to make sure that uh the 
image that I'm trying to present is a s professional and uh accurate as possible." (11205114603, ERRS04, S) 
INVN  
A Not Represented 
H 
"And I want to cut back on some of this other stuff. Uh, especially as I get older, I don't want to be losing a nickel to 
anybody who uh may steal my stuff. I lost 25 thousand dollars a few years ago, though, was FDIC a little bit of a 
ramble there." (11224014306, INVN04, 3) 
PRBF  
A  
"I'm uh basically I'm hiding in the, in the in the vast, you know, expanse I mean than vice trying to make it active uh 
[undecipherable distortion]." (11188138618, PRBF01, 2.5) 
"So it's a social media site. So anyway, and I know there's a lot, a lot of millennials, I guess there's an expectation of 
these things to be more than what they were intended to be, I think, so. These expectations evolve. And I don't really 
know what the foundation for it is why they believe that." (11269613365, PRBF09, 3) 
"Um nuh nothing but to, you know to say in my viewpoint and I think this is pretty clear from the interview, I I deem 
any anytime that I enter into the internet, whether it's through LinkedIn or Facebook or uh an email, or whatever, um 
I do not consider unless I go to extreme means to encrypt and uh hide emails uh through VPN or encryption 
software. And I don't I don't consider uh um myself to be as secure. So whatever I'm saying or doing, uh um I I fully 
intend to be looked at." (11188138618, PRBF12, 3) 
"I don't have any expectation of privacy on any of those sites." (11269613365, PRBF24, S) 
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A Not Represented 
H  
"And and um I guess it's frustrating from a jurisprudence perspective on the exactly what mechanisms are in place to 
um prosecute, uh certainly into the, you know, the digital cyber realm, um which, which is tough to, and then the 
content could potentially be classified, which adds another uh layer to another dimension to prosecution. Uh and 
again, I think uh, using Julian Assange um and the Wikileaks program as as a whole, using that model, uh and then 
seeing that uh its taken 10 years to to bring him to trial, uh I think speaks poorly of, of our um our government's 
ability to uh provide ramifications for such activities." (11251351842, REGL02, 2.5) 
"But, um, I think we need to relook things and starting with many of the laws that are in place and the ability to 
collect on on Americans, and then also the ability for private companies to collect on us also." (11224014306, 
REGL04, 3) 
"I know we sign an I agree thing, but nobody reads any of that stuff. Uh, I think that is us that's very concerning to 
me." (11224014306, REGL06, 3) 
"Uh, American and American lawmakers need to take a look at uh what we're allowing companies to do and selling 
data." (11224014306, REGL09, S) 
USGE  
A Not Represented 
H  
"I do think there needs to be a very hard look at what they can do with our stuff without permission." (11224014306, 
USGE04, 2.5) 
"The probably in in in stepping back it uh this is not the first time that uh an entity agency has looked to scrape and 
or um use this information for, you know, malicious type attacks." (11251351842, USGE14, 3) 
"Uh, you know, we just another point, I have friends who do this DNA testing, which I will never do because I don't 
know who's going to get ahold or protect my DNA somewhere. Might be some guy in China walking around with 
my DNA, so I don't do that." (11224014306, USGE15, 2.5) 
"Uh, and I know they do that at Facebook for promotional concerns and stuff like that." (11224014306, USGE17, S) 










Appendix E  
Interview Transcripts 
     The following are transcripts of the six Phase 2 interviews. Each interview was 
recorded via Zoom. The audio files were uploaded to a transcription service call Otter.ai.  
Using the real-time editing tools, transcripts were reviewed through multiple rounds to 
ensure accuracy. A subsequent validation review was conducted by an independent 
auditor to ensure transcription accuracy. A separate validation review was conducted to 
ensure that individual snippets were uniquely associated with only a single code, and 
highlighted. 
Interview 11188138618 
     Sat, 4/18 8:33AM 
SPEAKERS 
John Marsh, 11188138618 
 
John Marsh  15:17 
Hello. 
 
11188138618  15:17 
Hello, Hey, how you doing Mr. Marsh? 
 
John Marsh  15:23 
Very well, thank you. Are you participant 11188138618? 
 
11188138618  15:32 
Yes. 
 
John Marsh  15:34 





11188138618  15:38 
Yes, I do. 
 
John Marsh  15:40 
And do you consent to this interview being recorded? 
 
11188138618  15:43 
Yes. 
 
John Marsh  15:45 
Perfect, so please allow me to explain this study for a few minutes briefly. Its purpose is 
to investigate the linkages between privacy and behavior in an actual privacy specific 
scenario. If you will recall you previously took a survey regarding your LinkedIn profile 
data being scraped and posted to a third party's website called ICWATCH. Per their 
website, ICWATCH is a project to collect and analyze resumes of people working in the 
intelligence community. People working for intelligence contractors, the military and 
intelligence agencies frequently mention secret code words and surveillance programs in 
public resumes. These resumes are useful for uncovering new surveillance programs, 
learning more about known code words, identifying which companies help with which 
surveillance programs, examining trends in the intelligence community and more. This 
study is designed to examine the level of an individual's disposition to value privacy, how 
this influences their situational privacy concerns regarding their information being 
scraped, and posted by ICWATCH, and ultimately, its influence on the users intentions 
modify their LinkedIn account settings. So now I will capture your feedback on several 
topics for a few minutes each.  You are welcome to ask me to rephrase or explain 
anything. Are you ready to proceed? 
 
11188138618  17:06 
Yes, sir. 
 
John Marsh  17:08 
Perfect. Uh, so topic one, for the next few minutes let's discuss if this situation is a breach 
of privacy. What are your thoughts? 
 
11188138618  17:20 
The situation that we're in now? 
 
John Marsh  17:22 
Uh the your information being scraped from LinkedIn and being posted on ICWATCH. 
 
11188138618  17:29 
•[PRBF07]No, cuz uh and and the reason why I believe that is when you join LinkedIn, you 
give up inherent uh um rights to privacy by stepping into LinkedIn. 
 




All right, give me one moment. All right, uh topic two. For the next few minutes, let's 
discuss your disposition to value privacy. What are your thoughts? 
 
11188138618  18:02 
•[CNTL16]Um, if I want privacy, then I don't engage that's the only way to secure absolute 
privacy. •[PRBF20]Um so uh I don't um believe that knowing my name, and uh, and uh 
knowing my disposition, but through conversation, either over the phone or uh, or in 
person is anything more than just um that person that I'm engaging with, using their uh, 
their skills and their uh techniques of a, of a um observation to to make a make a 
deduction. •[CNTL02]So if if I don't want uh, if if I want to be private, that I don't engage, 
that's, that's the only way to be completely private. •[PRBF25]And uh so um when I say that, 
you know, I'm gonna engage somebody um through a conversation, I'm willing, uh at that 
point I made a decision that I'm gonna give up some of my property to go uh um further. 
So um I'm, I I engage clients all day long with uh conversations regarding, uh you know, 
products and services, uh and [undecipherable distortion] then sometimes make 
connections and I'm always looking at them to uh get [undecipherable distortion] um uh 
fissures into their, um uh I guess, into their uh, their their [undecipherable distortion], to 
make a um determination on uh you know, most effective to get uh my across and to get 
them to uh um uh be sympathetic, if not absolutely um uh convinced that I have the best 
product for them. 
 
John Marsh  20:17 
Alright, perfect. Uh, for the next few minutes, let's discuss your level of concern 
regarding ICWATCH scraping and posting your data. 
 
11188138618  20:26 
•[PRBF19]Uh, again, you know I uh my concern is a, is really kind of moot um as I engage 
in those already um when uh when I decided to go onto LinkedIn, you know, I I knew um 
that uh there was going to be a um uh the disability because I I knew of this ability to 
scrape information and and uh um you to fit into algorithms that would be able to uh 
ascertain my likes, dislikes, and and basically pull the strings, my personality. •[PRBF14]So, 
you know, again uh, you know, I made the conscious effort, uh the conscious decision 
that that what they were going to be able to ascertain from me was uh not going to 
directly uh um affect me and uh in a negative way and and not to negatively uh affect me 
in an indirect ways either. Um I don't think that a uh bad actor could um necessarily get 
enough information to do do me or my um family harm. Um, but you know, I'm I am 
semi prepared uh if if that case ever comes to fruition. 
 
John Marsh  22:04 
Alright, give me ne moment. Just taking some notes.  
 
11188138618  22:13 
Sure.  
 




Alright then topic four. Finally, let's discuss your intention to modify your LinkedIn 
profiles visibility. 
 
11188138618  22:25 
•[BEHV08]I don't I don't have plans right now. •[BNFT01]Uh, I uh I, I may be looking for 
another job soon. So, I am uh going to um hazard to keep the the line of communication 
open, uh no changes, uh updating some of my uh um CV there and uh just you know um 
reaching out to people that I deem worthy uh in my um search for a a better job and or uh 
um to further further me in the job already have. •[BEHV04]So, you know, I'm not I'm not 
um anticipating any changes. 
 
John Marsh  23:12 
Alright. And uh do you have any final thoughts or additional comments on anything we 
discussed? 
 
11188138618  23:21 
•[PRBF12]Um nuh nothing but to, you know to say in my viewpoint and I think this is pretty 
clear from the interview, I I deem any anytime that I enter into the internet, whether it's 
through LinkedIn or Facebook or uh an email, or whatever, um I do not consider unless I 
go to extreme means to encrypt and uh hide emails uh through VPN or encryption 
software. And I don't I don't consider uh um myself to be as secure. So whatever I'm 
saying or doing, uh um I I fully intend to be looked at and •[PRBF01]I'm uh basically I'm 
hiding in the, in the in the vast, you know, expanse I mean than vice trying to make it 
active uh [undecipherable distortion]. •[CNTL08]And I don't give. I don't give out explicit 
personal information but um you know, people know my phone number because uh they 
know my phone number or they know my address because it's public record. 
•[CNTL03]They uh you know, do I give them my social security number? No, do I give 
them my uh um birthday? •[COLL01]Uh um there is a way that they could probably figure 
out my birthday. But you know, again, there's so much public knowledge out there that 
for a few dollars at a time, you could put together a fairly decent um uh biography of 
[NAME REMOVED]. •[BNFT07]So I'm not there's not a lot of hiding unless I go, you 
know, off grid and I'm not willing to do that, the benefit is worth the uh um uh the effort. 
 
John Marsh  25:23 
All right. Uh well, thank you again for your participation. This concludes my data 
collection. 
 
11188138618  25:29 






     Sat, 3/28 2:49PM 
SPEAKERS 
John Marsh, 11205114603 
 
John Marsh  07:21 
Hello, 
 
11205114603  07:23 
Hello, can you hear me? 
 
John Marsh  07:26 
I can. Can you hear me? 
 
11205114603  07:27 
I sure can took me a minute to figure out this contraption but I got it. 
 
John Marsh  07:32 
Oh no worries whatsoever. So I just want to confirm that you are participant 
11205114603 
 
11205114603  07:43 
That is correct. 
 
John Marsh  07:46 
And do you consent to be interviewed? 
 
11205114603  07:51 
Yes, yes I do. 
 
John Marsh  07:53 
Okay, and do you consent to this interview being recorded?  
 
11205114603  07:57 
Yes.  
 
John Marsh  07:59 
Perfect. Uh, so please allow me to explain this study for a few minutes briefly. Its 
purpose is to investigate the linkages between privacy and behavior in an actual privacy 
specific scenario. If you will recall, you previously took a survey regarding your 
LinkedIn profile data being scraped and posted to a third party website called 
ICWATCH. Per their website ICWATCH is a project to collect and analyze resumes of 
people working in the intelligence community, people working for the intelligence 




and surveillance programs in public resumes. These resumes are useful for uncovering 
new surveillance programs, learning more about known code words identifying which 
companies help with which surveillance programs examining trends in the intelligence 
community and more. This study is designed to examine the level of an individual's 
disposition to value privacy. How this is influences their situational privacy concerns 
regarding their information being scraped, and posted by ICWATCH, and ultimately, its 
influence on the user's intention to modify their LinkedIn account settings. So now I will 
capture your feedback on several topics for a few minutes each. You are welcome to ask 
me to rephrase or explain any of the questions or topics. Are you ready to proceed?  
 
11205114603  09:26 
Yes.  
 
John Marsh  09:28 
All right, perfect. So for the next few minutes, let's discuss if this situation is a breach of 
privacy. What, what are your thoughts on that? 
 
11205114603  09:42 
Oh, this situation you described? 
 
John Marsh  09:45 
Correct. 
 
11205114603  09:46 
Um, yes and no. Um, and I'll explain that real quick. •[BNFT10]Uh, on the one hand, people 
people put all sorts of stuff on their profiles um, in the effort to either get seen, get 
approached for work, establish a professional network or any number of things. 
•[COLL15]On the other hand, uh, I'm not sure many people realize that whatever they put 
out there is being um scooped up by whatever um artificial uh aggregators for lack of a 
better word, um to assist uh whatever agency creates those aggregators. •[PRBF06]Uh, so 
while while it's not a privacy issue, because you're volunteering to put your stuff out 
there, it's an argument could be made, it's in the public domain. •[COLL14]On the other 
hand, if you're not aware that your stuff is getting scooped up like that, maybe it's an 
issue for some Um, frankly, •[BEHV06]I'm torn on the subject. Um, after, after we, after we 
um engaged in our first um email conversation and exchange of information, I went back 
and looked at my stuff. And I think I made some adjustments and I'm still it's a constant, 
constant thing as, as uh life professional and personal changes, you you make 
adjustments to those public profiles you make, to adjust to those changes um for good or 
bad or however •[SPCN02]Um, so, for me it's it's a double edged sword it could be construed 
as a privacy issue. While on the other hand, it might not be depending on on um the the 
exact nature of one your understand you as an individual your understanding of what 
those profiles are and are used for and two, the information you're putting out there. 
 
John Marsh  12:05 





11205114603  12:16 
Okay. Is it a question?  
 
John Marsh  12:21 
What are your, this is mostly topics. So really what I want to know is, you know, how do 
you value privacy and uh what is your approach to or your feelings about privacy online, 
personally? 
 
11205114603  12:39 
•[GPCN01]Um, I do value privacy. •[CNTL14]And for that reason I don't have the only social 
media outlet I have is LinkedIn. •[BNFT03]And I established that for a specific reason. 
Which has evolved over time. •[CNTL01]Um, I don't, I don't care to put much information 
out about myself. That's just my nature. •[SPCN05]I never have been that way, whether 
before the internet or even even today, so it's not really uh, for me, it's not really a privacy 
specific issue. It's more of a personality and I guess the nature of me issue. •[PNTR02]I'm 
not a very uh outgoing or extroverted person, •[GPCN07]I don't feel the need to share my life 
with strangers. •[PRBF05]Um, with that said, I do realize that uh let's let's put it this way, 
the, my philosophy is um, if you don't want people to know something, don't put it on the 
internet. •[PRBF16]Because once it's out there, you lose complete control over it. It's no 
longer yours. you're you're you're on someone else's platform, therefore, it's at least 
partially theirs and they can do with it. What they want. If you're okay with that, then the 
rules governing privacy are a little bit looser. Uh, if you're not okay with that, don't use a 
platform. •[PRBF22]Uh, but, but for me, as soon as you put information out there, you, you 
lose control of it. So just a matter of risk you're willing to accept, accept that risk. Go for 
it. I or, •[PNTR01]for me, I just don't find that myself that interesting to put so much 
information out there uh for •[ERRS01]professional reasons I had to and uh but every now 
and then I go back in there and I make some adjustments, make some updates, take some 
stuff off that are no longer relevant. Um, but that's, that's my uh, that's my take on on it, 
especially with regard to the internet and LinkedIn. 
 
John Marsh  14:54 
All right, perfect. Um, so for the next few minutes, let's discuss your level of concern 
regarding ICWATCH scraping and posting your data. 
 
11205114603  15:04 
•[SPCN04]Okay, yeah, that was a surprise to me. Um, I, at first I was I was uh, I was quite 
unhappy about that. But on the other end, I went back to my original philosophy. Well, I 
put the stuff out there. Um, and I immediately went back in there and looked to see what 
terms and words I used to attract potential recruiters. •[BEHV02]And I think I went back 
there and uh did a general scrub and use more general terminology, because I'm not I'm 
no longer in that in that profession. So there's, there's really no need to attract that 
attention. •[SPCN01]Um, on the other hand, it was it was the more I thought about it, the 
more I realized, well, that's to be expected. •[USGE10]Uh, for whatever purposes um, you 
know, could be nefarious, it could simply be trying to find the right people for the right 




for me, I have no need to be in that um in that world anymore. Uh, so as time goes on I, I 
remove a lot of those specific key terminologies simply because um that's in the past and 
it's no longer relevant. 
 
John Marsh  16:34 
Perfect. Uh, and then finally, let's discuss your intention to modify your LinkedIn profiles 
visibility. 
 
11205114603  16:42 
•[BEHV09]Okay, yeah um. I plan on I don't do it as frequently as I should. But uh not, uh not 
because of you specifically, or the subject matter. But yeah, before the weekend. I'll 
probably go back in there and um take another look and see what, what not image but 
•[BNFT04]what public profile of me I want out there to strengthen or expand my network. 
Take it in the direction I want it to go. •[ERRS02]Um, as I mentioned before, I'm definitely 
uh steering away from uh the IC community because uh I haven't been involved in in 
quite a while there's really no point it's actually misleading. For those who see that 
language. Um, I don't want to waste anybody's time. And uh really, um but it's it's a 
constant care and feeding of my public profile to present the most accurate up to date and 
uh harmless um public presentation that I can um you uh to uh you know benefit those in 
my network and uh and myself to be honest. So yes, before probably before the weekend 
is out, I will have gone back in there and taken another look. 
 
John Marsh  18:19 
All right. Um, so is there any uh other thoughts or additional comments you'd like to add 
based on uh some of the topics you've discussed? 
 
11205114603  18:28 
Um, I think if anything is pretty cut and dry to me, I think I've explained my position and 
the thinking behind it. And the uh in my approach going forward. Um, It's good to have 
these reminders that there are constantly organizations and people out there looking 
looking at the at the things you put online. Um, It's a constant uh reminder that care 
should be taken not only for um the profession, but also, uh you know, in your personal 
life. Um, you don't want to um you don't want to drag your baggage out in the real world 
because it will it will come back to haunt you um especially as you're seeking um 
professional uh expertise and, and uh work and things like that. •[ERRS04]So this is for me 
this is a good reminder to go back in there and double check on things to make sure that 
uh the image that I'm trying to present is as professional and uh accurate as possible. 
 
John Marsh  19:53 
Perfect. uh so uh, thank you again for your participation. Uh this concludes my data 
collection. 
 
11205114603  20:01 






     Sat, 3/28 2:56PM 
SPEAKERS 
John Marsh, 11223476508 
 
John Marsh  11:04 
Hello. 
 
11223476508  11:06 
Hi there. How are you?  
 
John Marsh  11:08 
Oh, very well. Uh, good evening are you participant 11223476508? 
 
11223476508  11:17 
I, I'm assuming so that was in the email. 
 
John Marsh  11:21 
Okay. Fair enough. And do you consent to be interviewed?  
 
11223476508  11:26 
Yes, I do.  
 
John Marsh  11:28 
And do you consent to this interview being recorded? 
 
11223476508  11:31 
Uh, yes, I do. 
 
John Marsh  11:34 
Perfect. Uh, so please allow me to explain this study for a few minutes briefly. Um its 
purpose is to investigate the linkages between privacy and behavior in an actual privacy 
specific scenario. If you will recall, you previously took a survey regarding your 
LinkedIn profile data being scraped and posted to a third party website called 
ICWATCH. Per their website, ICWATCH as a project to collect and analyze resumes of 
people working in the intelligence community. People working for intelligence 
contractors, the military and intelligence agencies frequently mention secret code words 
and surveillance programs in public resumes. These resumes are useful for uncovering 
new surveillance programs, learning more about known code words, identifying which 
companies help with which surveillance programs, examining trends in the intelligence 
community and more. This study is designed to examine the level of an individual's 
disposition to value privacy, how this influences their situational privacy concerns 
regarding their information being scraped, and posted by ICWATCH. And ultimately, its 




capture your feedback on several topics for a few minutes each. You're welcome to ask 
me to rephrase or explain anything? Are you ready to proceed? 
 
11223476508  13:05 
I am. Yes. 
 
John Marsh  13:07 
Perfect. So for topic one, uh for the next few minutes, uh let's discuss if the situation is a 
breach of privacy, what are your thoughts? 
 
11223476508  13:18 
•[GPCN04]So I post information on the internet with no expectation of privacy. •[PRBF21]I 
fully am aware that the information that I post to any public page is available to any 
person. •[CNTL17]Uh, I my resume is an assemblage of my life experience and I have not 
divulged any classified information. In fact, that resume was scrubbed and approved for 
release prior to it being posted anywhere or used for my job search. •[PRBF08]And so I was 
fully aware that both LinkedIn would use my information, as well as the availability of 
that information to others uh uh or whoever scraped or used or viewed that information, 
•[PRBF04]there was never an expectation on my part that that information would be 
considered private or protected in any way. 
 
John Marsh  14:33 
All right. Um, so for topic number two, for the next few minutes, let's discuss your 
disposition to value privacy. 
 
11223476508  14:45 
•[GPCN06]So, I, uh I value my privacy, and •[CNTL15]I take steps to ensure that what I post or 
provide to others is information that I intend to provide that, that I've thought about the 
implications of that information and the, the uh, you know, the receiver of that 
information and and uh those sorts of contingencies or outcomes, and so um and 
•[GPCN05]so that so I consider myself a very private person in that regard in that. •[CNTL18]I, 
I do not post a lot of social media information. •[CNTL19]I have a Twitter account, but I 
don't tweet you know, I mean, I um so, I don't, I don't provide a lot of information, 
because I consider much of that private. 
 
John Marsh  15:57 
Perfect. Uh, for topic number three For the next few minutes, let's discuss your level of 
concern regarding ICWATCH scraping, posting your data. 
 
11223476508  16:10 
So, so in regard to the topic that we're discussing, I have no concern at all about my 
information being posted. •[USGE09]Uh I believe that IC I don't know where ICWATCH is 
located or the people that are involved in it, but they potentially make it easy for enemies 
of the United States to assemble information. Now, that information is obviously, you 
know, available out there. •[COLL12]But it does uh provide a central repository for 




community. Um, your thesis statement talks about, um you know, code words and 
different information and the assembly of aggregate information and, and I, I believe that 
that is an issue in uh general that the, you know, a lot can be learned from uh, from 
assembling different data sources and analyzing those. And um so, at some point, you 
know, we are as a, as a human race going to really have to come to grips with the 
understanding of what privacy is because because of the potential for these different data 
sets to be assembled and for people to resolve and to make different judgments and 
understand different aspects of life, how people live, what they do, how they think um, 
and it happens now in the ad tech world. •[COLL07]Uh, you know, the things that Facebook 
and I, I mean, it's just it's out there already and people have a a limited understanding of 
the totality of the knowledge that's uh available to a company like Facebook or to 
LinkedIn or to to others who have assembled these datasets and uh conducted analysis on 
them. 
 
John Marsh  18:34 
All right. And then uh finally, let's discuss your intention to modify your LinkedIn 
profiles visibility. 
 
11223476508  18:41 
•[BEHV11]Uh, I do not intend to change anything. I update my resume periodically. I don't 
intend to change any settings. •[BNFT05]I accept nearly all requests to uh know whenever 
it's not a friend request that leaked at LinkedIn but but I I think there's value in 
networking. •[USGE06]And I believe that uh people generally generally are doing the right 
thing and abiding by the terms of service and uh and why they're using the system. But I 
know that that is not always the case. •[BEHV01]But uh I'm not intending to change 
anything. And like I said, I accept almost all requests for access and network. 
 
John Marsh  19:44 
Alright, I'm just taking some notes real quick. 
 
11223476508  19:46 
Certainly. 
 
John Marsh  19:50 
Um, so with that uh, any, any uh additional comments or thoughts based on the topics 
you discussed? 
 
11223476508  20:01 
No I think we've pretty much covered everything. 
 
John Marsh  20:05 







     Thu, 3/12 8:34PM 
SPEAKERS 
John Marsh, 11224014306 
 
11224014306  00:00 
Sure am great. 
 
John Marsh  00:03 
All right, perfect. Well uh, let me start by saying Good evening, and um I'll capture your 
participant ID but I'm assuming since you're in your car, you probably don't have it 
handy. 
 
11224014306  00:14 
Uh no, I don't, well, let me see 
 
John Marsh  00:19 
It's not terribly important. I was just trying not to capture names if I didn't have to, but I 
cannot.  
 
11224014306  00:25 
Okay. It's uh, I have it. It's 11224014306. 
 
John Marsh  00:37 
Perfect. Thank you. And do you consent to be interviewed? 
 
11224014306  00:42 
Yes, and I sent you the forms last night. 
 
John Marsh  00:46 
And I did receive them. And I just wanted to also capture do you consent to this interview 
being recorded? 
 
11224014306  00:53 
Yes, Yes, I do.  
 
John Marsh  00:55 
Alright, perfect. Uh, so just allow me to briefly explain uh this study real quick.  
 
11224014306  01:01 
Okay.  
 




So its purpose is to investigate linkages between privacy and behavior in an actual 
privacy specific scenario. If you will recall, you took a survey regarding your LinkedIn 
profile data being scraped and posted to a third-party website called ICWATCH.  
 
11224014306  01:19 
Yes 
 
John Marsh  01:20 
Per, per their website ICWATCH is a project to collect and analyze resumes of people 
working in the intelligence community. People working for intelligence contractors and 
military and  
 
11224014306  01:35 
Okay,  
 
John Marsh  01:35 
These resumes, these resumes, go ahead 
 
11224014306  01:40 
I used to, I don't work for the IC anymore. Is that okay? 
 
John Marsh  01:44 
Oh, oh, absolutely. That's fine um these resumes, per ICWATCH the resumes are useful 
for identifying people in the intelligence community. 
 
11224014306  01:57 
Okay, 
 
John Marsh  01:58 
So, specifically, my study is designed to examine the level of an individual's disposition 
to value privacy.  
 
11224014306  02:06 
Okay 
 
John Marsh  02:07 
How this influences their situational privacy concerns related to having their information 
scraped and posted by ICWATCH, and ultimately, its influence on the user's behavioral 
intention to modify their LinkedIn account settings.  
 
11224014306  02:22 
Okay. 
 




All right. Um so um I will capture your feedback on the following topics for a few 
minutes each. And you're welcome to ask me to rephrase or explain anything. Are you 
ready to go? 
 
11224014306  02:37 
Uh ready to go. 
 
John Marsh  02:40 
Perfect. Um so for the next few minutes, uh let's discuss if you, if this situation is a 
breach of privacy,  
 
11224014306  02:49 
Okay 
 
John Marsh  02:51 
What do you think? Did you believe this is a breach of your privacy? 
 
11224014306  02:55 
What the scraping of the uh, of my site, of LinkedIn? 
 
John Marsh  03:02 
Correct the scraping of your site and then having that information posted to ICWATCH. 
 
11224014306  03:09 
•[INVN01]Yes um yes and no, I'm sorry, I've have to answer it that way. •[BNFT06]I, I am on 
LinkedIn, which is an open site and I people use that to find resumes and things like that. 
Um, so in that respect, I'm fine uh, because I'm looking for something that's advantageous 
to me. •[USGE13]But I don't know what's going on on this site where my information is 
going. •[SPCN07]So I do feel that uh, a little concerned about that based on what I know 
about Intel communities and sharing of information. 
 
John Marsh  03:47 
Okay, great. Uh, so for the next few minutes uh let's discuss your disposition to value 
privacy. 
 
11224014306  03:57 
Okay, um I value my privacy, uh especially in this day and age. Um, let me just go back a 
few years after 911 when I was a younger guy, and even before that, I really didn't have a 
lot of concerns about privacy necessarily. Ah because things weren't in place, uh I what's 
the word I'm looking for intelligence, ability to grab information, uh the the social 
networks and all those sorts of things were not in place. So I really felt very comfortable 
uh in in giving information out in presenting it. Ah, those were the days when you could 
actually keep your social security number on ah on your check and pass it around freely. 
Ah, then 911 hit and ah I was ah I was in agreement that we should have much more of a 
robust intelligence ability to go after terrorists and those people who are ah possibly 




and much more sophistication, on the ability to grab data from us all kinds of 
information, and •[INVN06]I've been hacked and lost a lot of money about five or six years 
ago, and I thought I think it was from the Chinese, ah based on some, some uh research I 
did, •[SPCN08]I become quite concerned, also concerned with little funny things that happen 
when ah I'm standing around talking about a subject and it shows up on my ah Amazon 
feed or something of that nature. •[USGE12]So ah somebody's grabbing my information, ah 
somebody's using it for whether it's sales, or whether to rob me or use my uh uh social 
security number. •[INVN07]I was ah hacked through the OPM hack a couple of years ago, 
and God knows who has my Social Security numbers and things like that. •[GPCN02]So, ah 
right now, at this point, I'm very concerned about my privacy and •[REGL05]actually was a 
little disappointed when the Patriot Act was ah, I think if I'm not mistaken, I know it's 
being re-looked, I think it may have been approved, but I'm not sure we've made any 
adjustments on that. For our, our, our new um for this period, any updates, if you will, 
excuse me. Um, •[SPCN09]so yes, I'm concerned, did that make any sense?  
 
John Marsh  06:34 
It made perfect sense. 
 
11224014306  06:36 
Okay. 
 
John Marsh  06:39 
Alright. So moving on to the next topic. Let's discuss your level of concern regarding 
ICWATCH, scraping and posting your data. 
 
11224014306  06:50 
•[USGE05]Well uh, what are they doing with it? •[SPCN03]Uh, it does bother me. Um, when I 
first saw it, I was concerned. •[COLL11]Uh, it does bother me because I don't know what 
they're doing with I know what the NSA programs are with phones and things like that of 
gathering data uh and and uh holding on to it, but only looking specifically when they 
need something. Um, I don't feel comfortable with somebody holding on uh to critical 
information about me, what are they using it for? What are they scraping it for? And what 
are they doing with it? •[COLL05]So uh I think I need some questions answered, um before I 
can move forward in having worked in the IC community for a short period of time, just a 
couple years, I know the capabilities of what they can do and and uh things they can look 
at. •[SPCN06]And it makes me concerned. I just don't, uh I just don't have enough 
information about it. •[USGE08]So I guess my question, you know, if I'd summed up in one 
statement, what are you doing with it? 
 
John Marsh  08:00 
Sure, Okay, then moving on to the final topic, uh let's discuss your intention to modify, 
your LinkedIn profile's visibility. 
 
11224014306  08:11 
•[BEHV05]Yeah, that's funny you bring that up. Uh, aside from this, I was, someone had 




thought I was in a private mode, I'm going to have to take another look, not just with my 
LinkedIn, but also with Facebook and a few other things. •[INVN05]I've actually as an aside, 
I've had my identity stolen on Facebook, in one of these romance scam things and I had 
four to 500 uh fake profiles out there and people contacting me etc, which gave me great 
stress. •[BEHV03]So I i toned that thing down. And I uh think I uh may be doing the same 
with uh LinkedIn. •[BNFT11]I don't have a lot of information on there except of who I am, 
uh jobs i've held, which is advantageous to me. Uh, well was previously I'm 61 years old. 
•[BEHV10]I'm not going to be job hunting a lot more late in the next few years, but I, I think 
I'm going to take another look at it and see what is accessible. •[COLL08]Um again, I don't 
know, they're we're looking at if they've taken everything, um IP addresses, any phone 
numbers that may or may not be in there. Anything, anything I may have said. Uh, gives 
me pause. Okay. 
 
John Marsh  09:34 
Sure, give me one second.  
 
11224014306  09:42 
All right. 
 
John Marsh  09:46 
All right um. So is there any other additional thoughts or comments you might have? 
 
11224014306  09:54 
•[COLL06]I think as we're moving forward and gaining more capabilities in our and and the 
ways that we're able to collect and store data. •[REGL09]Uh, American and American 
lawmakers need to take a look at uh what we're allowing companies to do and selling 
data. •[USGE17]Uh, and I know they do that at Facebook for promotional concerns and stuff 
like that. •[USGE04]I do think there needs to be a very hard look at what they can do with 
our stuff without permission. •[REGL06]I know we sign an I agree thing, but nobody reads 
any of that stuff. Uh, I think that is uh that's very concerning to me. •[USGE15]Uh, you 
know, we just another point, I have friends who do this DNA testing, which I will never 
do because I don't know who's going to get ahold or protect my DNA somewhere. Might 
be some guy in China walking around with my DNA, so I don't do that. •[INVN04]And I 
want to cut back on some of this other stuff. Uh, especially as I get older, I don't want to 
be losing a nickel to anybody who uh may steal my stuff. I lost 25 thousand dollars a few 
years ago, though, was FDIC a little bit of a ramble there. •[REGL04]But, um, I think we 
need to relook things and starting with many of the laws that are in place and the ability 
to collect on on Americans, and then also the ability for private companies to collect on 
us also. 
 
John Marsh  11:21 
All right, uh perfect. Um, so, I'd like to say thank you again for your participation. This 
concludes my data collection. 
 
11224014306  11:32 





     Sun, 4/5 8:04AM 
SPEAKERS 
John Marsh, 11251351842 
 
John Marsh  06:47 
Hello 
 
11251351842  06:50 
Hey how are you? 
 
John Marsh  06:52 
Very well thank you. Are you participant? Oh, okay [participant enables video], I 
suppose we could do that. That's, actually I don't have a camera on this computer. 
 
11251351842  07:04 
[Lauging] All right. 
 
John Marsh  07:07 
But uh, are you uh participant 11251351842? 
 
11251351842  07:16 
I am. 
 
John Marsh  07:18 
Perfect. And do you consent to be interviewed? 
 
11251351842  07:18 
I do. I do. 
 
John Marsh  07:22 
And do you consent to this interview being recorded? Perfect. Uh so please allow me to 
explain the study for a few brief minutes. Its purpose is to investigate the linkages 
between privacy and behavior in an actual privacy specific scenario. If you will recall, 
you previously took a survey regarding your LinkedIn profile data being scraped and 
posted to a third party website called ICWATCH. Per their website, ICWATCH is a 
project to collect and analyze resumes of people working in the intelligence community, 
people working for the intelligence contractors, the military, and intelligence agencies 
frequently mentioned secret code words and surveillance programs in public resumes. 
These resumes are useful for uncovering new surveillance programs learning more about 
known code words, identifying which companies help with which surveillance programs, 
examining trends in the intelligence community and more. This study is designed to 
examine the level of an individual's disposition to value privacy, how this influences their 




ICWATCH, and ultimately, its influence on the user's intention to modify their LinkedIn 
account settings. Now, I will capture your feedback on several topics for a few minutes 
each. You're welcome to ask me to rephrase or explain anything. Are you ready to 
proceed?  
 
11251351842  08:42 
I'm ready to go.  
 
John Marsh  08:50 
Perfect. So topic one., for the next few minutes let's discuss if this situation is a breach, 
breach of privacy.  What are your thoughts? 
 
11251351842  08:59 
•[INVN02]So, the um the breaches the breach of privacy is actually an intrusion into the 
personal life of another specifically without just cause. •[REGL03]So I've submitted this 
particular instance, they do not have have just cause and and rather um the privacy that's 
being invaded, I would have, if you will, the essence uh or legal liability or legal uh 
ability to bring a lawsuit if damages or for damages that were incurred. •[GPCN08]Um, 
obviously, I'm not any celebrity or public figure who could reasonably assume to be 
recognized in the public and not be protected. But I would go on to say um that As a 
nonpublic individual, I uh certainly have the right to be protected from any intrusion on 
my solitude and my private affairs. •[USGE07]Uh, and then anybody that takes those, that 
data and disclose them in it with the intent to embarrass me or somehow discredit me 
with that private information causes us concern. •[USGE02]Um, so, the uh uh or uh in 
addition, takes that information and uh puts it in in the public under a false light. Uh, and 
then lastly, uh uses my name and or uh my personal information for some sort of uh uh 
commercial advantage. •[INVN03]So, so the breach of privacy is not fully satisfied, if you 
will, under under this particular uh situation. Under this particular topic, ie a breach of 
privacy, that they scraped my personally available information um that anybody with a 
reasonable uh basis could do you know, from uh Facebook, um and that is made to the 
general public, certainly. Uh, but does that necessarily constitute a breach of my privacy? 
Uh, no, not at this point. 
 
John Marsh  09:50 
Okay. Uh, take some notes for a minute.  
 
11251351842  11:32 
Okay.  
 
John Marsh  11:34 
Okay. All right. So moving on to topic two, for the next few minutes, let's discuss your 
disposition to value privacy. 
 
11251351842  11:44 
Okay. •[GPCN09]Uh, at the end of the day, I certainly value the right to be left alone. 




protected from public scrutiny, especially as a employee of the government, uh but I 
think uh recent breaches with, especially with the Office of Personnel Management has 
almost made that null and void. •[REGL08]Um and certainly looking through the uh 
amendments, probably the closest one that covers any sort uh of privacy information uh 
is both the 14th amendment uh or more importantly the Privacy Act of 1974 uh which in 
theory should prevent the unauthorized disclosure uh held by the government. Um, so, so, 
uh so in some value it protections are in place. Uh, are they being followed is the spillage 
occurred? Certainly. Uh does that uh help or hurt uh ICWATCH. Um, you know, 
•[COLL09]I, I suspect the bigger the bigger issue and bigger concern um would be to take uh 
the information from the OPM or some of the other databases that have been breached 
and and kind of uh meld them together if you will. 
 
John Marsh  13:21 
Okay. I'm sorry. So moving on to topic three for the next few minutes, let's discuss your 
level of concern regarding ICWATCH scraping and posting your data.  
 
11251351842  13:38 
Okay. •[SPCN10]Um, surely, uh ICWATCH um their behavior certainly raises red flags. 
•[USGE16]Um and at the end of the day, the question comes into uh what the intent is, um 
you know, is the intent malicious Um, that's questionable. Uh is I would say that posts in 
any of my information is less than desire desirable, certainly. Um, to be sure, I know the 
information I had on my profile is sanitized to the fullest extent possible. •[USGE11]Um, 
using the WikiLeaks model as a conduit to the general public, um um it was in my mind 
anyways that that uh that breach that scraping of information that technique that model is 
uh designed more clear or clearly more designed, if you will, to harm the IC community 
and and writ large the US government. •[REGL07]Um, so um you know, the the fact that 
ICWATCH has violated personal privacy in the past it has and and and, more 
importantly, the US government's resolve to do anything about it. Um um you know, has 
has me equally concerned and I say that because uh uh Julian Assange uh has been uh 
under um has not been brought to trial in 10 years despite being uh currently at trial as we 
speak. •[USGE01]Um but uh you know, his his model of behavior, not only with 
ICWATCH, but similar programs were designed to do that bring discredit on um the 
folks in that community. So it does raise a red flag. They could certainly be used um with 
a nefarious attack. •[REGL01]Um um but but looking at the some of the previous models, 
um especially with uh Chelsea Manning, and and uh and others. Um it it certainly did 
harmful and uh severe damage to the US government writ large. Uh, but at the end of the 
day, uh I think uh the uh WikiLeaks enterprise and especially Julian Assange, have 
perhaps a more personal uh price to pay. 
 
John Marsh  16:33 
All right. Uh then finally, let's discuss your intention to modify your LinkedIn profiles 
visibility. 
 
11251351842  16:42 
•[BEHV07]Um, so quite honestly, I like it the way it is, •[BNFT02]I scrubbed it uh even before 




network of IC and uh intel professionals recognize um the new duties and positions that I 
was that I'm currently in. And then more importantly, uh should I opt to uh leverage those 
that skill set into other arenas other commands? Um I had the requisite background that 
was uh verifiable um for potential recruiters and what. 
 
John Marsh  17:36 
All right. Um, so any uh additional thoughts or comments you might have based on the 
topics that we discussed? 
 
11251351842  17:51 
•[USGE14]The probably in in in stepping back it uh this is not the first time that uh an entity 
agency has looked to scrape and or um use this information for, you know, malicious 
type attacks. •[REGL02]And and um I guess it's frustrating from a jurisprudence perspective 
on the exactly what mechanisms are in place to um prosecute, uh certainly into the, you 
know, the digital cyber realm, um which, which is tough to, and then the content could 
potentially be classified, which adds another uh layer to another dimension to 
prosecution. Uh and again, I think uh, using Julian Assange um and the Wikileaks 
program as as a whole, using that model, uh and then seeing that uh its taken 10 years to 
to bring him to trial, uh I think speaks poorly of, of our um our government's ability to uh 
provide ramifications for such activities. 
 
John Marsh  19:21 
All right. So um thank you again for your participation in the interview. This concludes 





     Sat, 3/28 2:54PM 
SPEAKERS 
John Marsh, 11269613365 
 
John Marsh  07:23 
Hello 
 
11269613365  07:24 
Hey John, [participant name removed]. 
 
John Marsh  07:27 
Oh, hey, how you doing?  
 
11269613365  07:28 
Good. 
 
John Marsh  07:30 
All right. Let me start this out by saying good evening. Are you participant 
11269613365?  
 
11269613365  07:41 
I am.  
 
John Marsh  07:43 
And do you consent to being interviewed? 
 
11269613365  07:46 
I do. 
 
John Marsh  07:47 
And do you consent to this interview being recorded?  
 
11269613365  07:50 
I do.  
 
John Marsh  07:52 
Perfect. So please allow me to explain the study for a few minutes briefly. Its purpose is 
to investigate  
 
11269613365  08:00 
Okay 
 




Its purpose is to investigate the linkages between privacy and behavior in an actual 
privacy specific scenario. If you will recall, you previously took a survey regarding your 
LinkedIn profile data being scraped and posted to a third party website called 
ICWATCH. Per their website, ICWATCH is a project to collect and analyze resumes of 
people working in the intelligence community. People working for the intelligence 
contractors, the military and intelligence agencies frequently mention secret code words 
and surveillance programs in public resumes. These resumes are useful for uncovering 
new surveillance programs, learning more about known code words, identifying which 
companies help with which surveillance programs, examining trends in the intelligence 
community and more. This study is designed to examine the level of an individual's 
disposition to value privacy, how this influences their situational privacy. privacy 
concerns regarding their information being scraped and posted by ICWATCH, and 
ultimately, its influence on the user's intention to modify their LinkedIn account settings. 
So now, I will capture your feedback on several topics for a few minutes each, and you 
are welcome to ask me to rephrase or explain anything that isn't clear. Are you ready to 
proceed?  
 
11269613365  09:24 
I am.  
 
John Marsh  09:26 
Perfect. So the first topic for the next few minutes, let's discuss if this situation is a breach 
of privacy. 
 
11269613365  09:36 
Okay  
 
John Marsh  09:37 
What are your thoughts on that? 
 
11269613365  09:39 
I really don't think it is. So.  
 
John Marsh  09:41 
Okay.  
 
11269613365  09:42 
•[CNTL13]I think I told you that my questionnaire I think that, you know, you could have as 
much as an individual, I could have as much privacy as I want. •[PRBF03]But I think if you 
go out to social media sites, you gotta it's my position that you don't have any uh any 
expectation of privacy at that point. •[PRBF18]So, I mean, that's why they're called social 
media, right? So uh I guess that pretty much answers my the question. Yeah. Do you 
want me to elaborate any further on that? 
 




Um, oh, no. If you have something you'd like to add, that's great. If not, uh however, you 
answer is perfectly fine. 
 
11269613365  10:26 
•[PRBF10]I just want to let you know, I can elaborate if you want more, but I just know that 
that's how I feel it just uh. You know, just by the term social media. So LinkedIn, 
Facebook, Twitter, all those are uh social media sites, and I have no expectation of 
privacy on any of those sites. •[PRBF02]Although they try to do it. I mean, it's just, I mean, I 
don't know how hard it would be to for their platform to work with uh personalized 
privacy settings. So I really don't expect, I have no expectation of privacy on that stuff. 
 
John Marsh  11:08 
Okay, um so moving on to the next topic then for the next few minutes, let's discuss your 
disposition to value privacy. How do you personally feel about privacy or your privacy? 
 
11269613365  11:23 
•[CNTL10]So I feel I'm in control that. So uh if I want something to be private, then I won't 
put it on a social media site. So I mean, there's things that you look at my social media 
sites, I probably, I'm guessing you probably have. There's not much out there. So it's, uh, 
it's pretty vanilla. And like, I try to stay away from politics or a lot of personal opinions. 
Most of it has to do with pictures of the family and stuff like that. •[BNFT09]So it's, it's stuff 
that I wouldn't mind put it on there because I want a large number of people to be able to 
see it, i.e., my friends, so I'm not looking for any real privacy in those settings. •[CNTL22]If 
I'm looking for privacy, then I'll send you know, a personal email or a letter, write 
someone a letter and send it. 
 
John Marsh  12:17 
All right. Just taking some notes here. Um, all right, so the next topic, for the next few 
minutes, let's discuss your level of concern regarding ICWATCH scraping and posting 
your data. 
 
11269613365  12:32 
So I saw that I'm not real sure if ICWATCH is a government thing or a commercial thing. 
 
John Marsh  12:39 
I can answer that, that they are a private entity. And right now they are being hosted by 
WikiLeaks. 
 
11269613365  12:48 
•[CNTL12]Okay. So once again, I mean it's, it's up to me to be careful of what I put out there 
in terms of uh you know what content I make available. •[PRBF15]So maybe you have a 
question about it, you know, we've been instructed to contact the government, if you 
have, if you have any concerns, so uh most of that stuff has been vetted that that I would 
ever talk about, I have very little out there. •[CNTL09]I mean, I have a resume that's been 
there forever, and it's pretty vanilla. And the government's seen it. So it's uh, you know, 




want to talk about additional data that I make sure that we talk in a space somewhere 
where I know that it's, it's uh been SCIF'd for the discussion that we're about to have. 
•[CNTL07]So once again, I thought, you know if your personal responsibility to monitor 
that, so I wouldn't expect uh uh a site, a social media site to be able to uh protect, I 
shouldn't be discussing that. •[COLL13]So I thought, I thought that was it I just wasn't real 
sure ICWATCH almost sounds like a government function so but I'm sure the 
government does the same thing with my with me too also so same thing ICWATCH. I'm 
guessing the government's also doing the same thing. 
 
John Marsh  14:27 
Alright, so topic four last topic. So finally let's discuss your intention to modify your 
LinkedIn profiles visibility. 
 
11269613365  14:38 
Okay, so uh I don't think I have anything was that  
 
John Marsh  14:50 
I was just gonna elaborate has this situation uh influenced your desire to modify the 
visibility of your LinkedIn profile?  
 
11269613365  14:59 
•[PRBF13]No, once again, I just it's my opinion that if I put something on a link on a link 
like LinkedIn so I would say something like clearancejobs.com all of them. Yeah, I mean 
it would I follow the rules the government has given me and that and then I would expect 
it to be open source anybody that looks at those sites that once again, I don't let every I 
don't. •[GPCN03]I don't friend everybody asked to be friended I think you asked and I did 
for you. But uh just because of the topic you were working on, but yeah, I mean, I don't if 
I don't know the person, •[USGE03]I don't know what they're doing with the data, then I'm 
pretty I close it down pretty, pretty uh tightly. •[CNTL21]I know everybody that's on my site. 
•[PRBF11]I also realize that people that know know people that I know can see my some of 
my stuff because they, they share it. So, once again, I uh it's my assumption that anything 
that's on those sites is going to be open source to anybody. •[CNTL06]So I don't I don't 
perceive any, any uh expectation of privacy when dealing with those sites but if I want to 
be private, then I'll write an email, I won't, it won't be on some kind of uh, I guess it's, 
you know, there's a push-pull arrangement, right? It won't be on a site where people can 
pull data. •[CNTL11]If I'm worried about it, it's gonna be a situation where I'll push it to the 
guy. And it won't be through the site, it'll be through an email or something a little bit 
more secure. •[PRBF23]Even when you send an email, you know, to a friend, you're not 
necessarily secure all the time, but that's a whole different problem where people have 
hacked into people's email accounts. •[BNFT08]So that to me is a social media site's all 
about us out there trying to basically generate a network. So that's how I use it. So 
probably not a very fun interview, screw you up? 
 




Oh, no, no, it's perfectly fine. I'm just basically capturing your thoughts on it. So no, that's 
fine. Um, so I'll give you here an opportunity for any uh additional comments based on 
what you've discussed over those topics.  
 
11269613365  17:29 
I'm not, I want to participate because I just, I hear my uh my niece is a big uh software 
person. She worked at gosh can't remember the name of the company. I'm old and I'm 
getting senile, but she worked for [company name removed] now. And uh she gets all 
upset about like, Facebook and all these things. And I'm just like, are you kidding me? 
•[PRBF09]So it's a social media site. So anyway, and I know there's a lot,  a lot of 
millennials, I guess there's an expectation of these things to be more than what they were 
intended to be, I think, so. These expectations evolve. And I don't really know what the 
foundation for it is why they believe that. But uh that's why I wanted to participate with 
this with you just because I wanted to uh. There's some personal [indecipherable word]. 
•[CNTL04]So people have to take a personal uh position on what they're doing, what they're 
posting out there. •[CNTL05]So you gotta, you kind of gotta filter what you're saying and 
doing and uh uh its kinda, I don't think there's any expectation. •[PRBF24]I don't have an 
expectation of privacy on any of those sites. 
 
John Marsh  18:50 
All right. Um, so, thank you again for your participation.  
 
11269613365  18:55 
All right  
 
John Marsh  18:56 
This concludes my data collection.  
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